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1. INTROCUTION 
The decade 2005 to 2015 ushered in a period of great political salience of issues of gender minorities, 
LGBTI communities and the legislation of sexuality. Voices demanding equal rights and recognition for 
LGBTI communities were steadily becoming louder but at the same time as voices calling for the further 
curtailing of homosexuality were also getting much louder many countries have moved towards rights 
incremental approaches to marginalised groups of people. Moreover, many countries have moved away 
from legal discriminatory policies that restrict and supress the rights to privacy and dignity and 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.   
In the first two months of 2014, LGBTI rights were dealt heavy blows in two African countries. On 7 
January, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law a bill that criminalises same-sex unions, 
with prison sentences of up to fourteen years. This same law sentences any person or organisation that 
funds in any way the registration and operation of gay organisations, clubs, or societies to a prison 
sentence of ten years. A month later, the president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, officially assented to a 
more draconian bill which imposes penalties as high as life imprisonment for people engaging in 
consensual same-sex sexual activity.  
Nigeria and Uganda are arguably part of a greater trend in Sub-Saharan Africa of states to exercise 
control and rights extractions with regards to LGBTI communities with the apparent aim of maintaining 
African culture, traditions and family life. Ironically, these anti-homosexuality laws or 'anti-sodomy 
laws'- that date back to the colonial era penal codes, have long been abandoned by those countries that 
created them.  
I argue that political saliency is intrinsically linked to national political interest and this is possibly the 
most central element of the question; what are the factors leading to the recent increase in repressive 
policy making for gender minorities in Africa? 
There exists a gender hierarchy in social structure. This hierarchy reflects the ascriptions and roles that 
come with different prescribed gender identities. It is essential within feminist scholarship and policy 
making in general that the designated group ‘gender’ is not taken to be the exclusive referent for women. 
The work of African feminist theory in international relations and policy dissemination needs to move 
beyond juxtaposing the two; here gender is understood as an all-encompassing term for all gendered 
identities including non-conforming gender groups or what has been called disparate gender identities 
which include the LGBTI community.  
Therefore the study has an inevitable rhetorical aim of secularising gender minority rights under the 
larger banner of gender emancipation as a contribution to African feminist literature. The thinking 
informing this argument is that the project of gender emancipation should not be disintegrated phase by 
phase because the sources of the constructions of repression and rights repossessions are the same. In 
other words, the systematisation that confiscates the rights of women is the same that results in the 
passing of laws that confiscate the rights of gender minorities.   
It is vital to disclaim that legislation is only one step towards the emancipation of repressed gender 
groups and social justice in any society. All the same, however sectional the rule of law is as a tool for 
social justice, it is a necessary- and some would argue a foundational condition towards change. 
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The following paper will analyse the factors leading to an increase in the repressive forms of legislature 
for gender minorities in African nations with the case studies of Nigeria’s 2014 Same-Sex Marriage 
Prohibition Act and Uganda’s 2014 Anti-Homosexuality Act.   
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2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
2.1 Research Question  
What are the factors leading to the recent increase in repressive policy making for gender minorities in 
Africa? The case studies to be used are the 2014 anti-homosexuality laws in Uganda and Nigeria. The 
research project aims to address the question of how these laws came about and what influences were 
involved in their emergence.  
The starting point of the enquiry is that there has been an increase in the passing of repressive gender 
laws on the continent in recent years. The study looks at the two Anti-homosexuality laws of 2014
1
 that 
have been passed in Uganda and Nigeria. The aim of the research is to identify and critically analyse the 
factors leading to this increase dating back particularly to the past nine years, 2006 to 2014 which have 
piloted an overabundance of similarly repressive laws in other parts of the continent and in other realms 
of gender politics. These bills, with varying profiles, occur in diverse contexts but both have similar 
consequences in each instance; the gender hierarchy is further reified and freedoms extracted by those at 
the top of the hierarchy from those at the bottom.  
There has been a plethora of research explaining the factors leading to homophobic legislature in African 
countries as well as other places in the world like Russia, India, the Arab world, and specific American 
states. There is also a significant body of research dedicated to scholarship on Uganda and Nigeria the 
perverse nature of what has come to be known as the “Anti-gays” law. In a move to avoid the dangers 
associated with ideological debates that shade African politics as primitive, backward and morally inept, 
the less confronted question of how the recent legal crackdown on homosexuality is unfolding at a 
particular period is what the research is concerned with. In other words, the project intends to identify the 
issues impacting the level of salience that anti homosexuality bills have increasingly been receiving in 
African states.   
The variables for the purpose of analysis that have been selected from a preliminary scoping of current 
literature on the increase if homophobic legislature in African countries, are political transitions in 
leadership and government system; the regional cascading of anti-gay legislature geo-politically as well 
as the conflation of gender conservative laws in general as well; and the influence of religious diplomacy 
and growth in visibility of the LGBTI
2
 rights movement in Africa. 
Contemporary scholarship on Africa often falls into the trap of particularising Africa and African 
“pathology”; Africa does not have a monopoly over institutionalised and socialized homophobia. 
However, the Nigerian and Ugandan laws of 2014 have depicted a break from the secularization of 
statecraft in the two countries furthermore the heavy sentences on the crimes regarding homosexuality 
have been recently implemented into legislature, worsening the existing colonial laws on homosexual 
conduct. These bills provide one depiction of the larger trend in regression of gender legislature on the 
African continent. It is thus the aim of the study to understand the factors leading to the increase on the 
                                                          
1 At the time of the undertaking of the research, only Uganda and Nigeria had implemented harsher laws on 
homosexuality by 2014.  
2
 A recognisable acronym to collectively refer to a group of identities that includes lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex persons  
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African continent of gender repressive law making in the recent years, this is what makes the cases 
interesting and temporally relevant.   
 
2.2 Claims and Hypothesis  
The main claim the study wishes to put forward as a hypothesis is that regressive laws are often 
defensive and reactive. They are one mechanism that is used by governments to “restore” the authenticity 
in African socio-political ideology and are a rejection of further “Westernization”.  
The claims being made by this dissertation are the following:  
Firstly the study stems from the logic that the rule of law is one necessary condition for driving change. 
This is in fact the first step that needs to lead to social justice because without this foundation providing 
de jure backdrop for social justice the chances of achieving the desired outcome, which in this case is 
gender equality, are slim if not completely unattainable.  
The second claim is that African countries have gone through so much forced modification and 
assimilation in the past-much of which did not originate in Africa-that there is a dire need to retain 
elements believed to be of African origin where possible. The continent has seen a host of ideological 
sacrifices that were made in the name of development. As such, the preferencing of nation-building 
projects has run parallel with development projects and has come to be an important factor in policy 
creation.  
Thirdly, the result of this is a retreat to the status-quo and balanced equilibrium in social relations. 
Inevitably institutions of socialisation that are under threat of being eroded by external forceful 
influences are rebuilt under the nation-building project. Typically, these institutions comprise of the 
family, the church, schools and the media. Gender roles within these institutions are inflexible and 
clearly defined. Those at the bottom of the gender hierarchy are made even more powerless and this 
powerlessness is ratified through the rule of law. 
Lastly, the nexus of political strategic interests and political subject salience is unavoidable for analysis 
in the deconstruction of legislative decisions. The issue of homosexuality began increasing in legal and 
social rhetoric only recently and 2014 was the year that (so far) has witnessed the most legal reversion 
and attention of the issue in Africa. The fact that both the laws received immense domestic public 
support certainly has an effect on the current administration and are thus in the political interests of very 
specific stakeholders; the government and it’s official supporters.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Feminism is one of the avant-gardes of IR, a bold chaser after innovative vision in a field that has little taste for 
visions avant-garde. It stands in many locations, draws many connections, looks for neglected spaces of the 
international and the many relations that have been overlooked in this core area of men's studies, this area devoted 
to great states, military strategies and hardware, statesmen, presidents, tyrants, soldiers, interstate diplomacy-war, 
war, and a little peace. (Christine Sylvester, 1997) 
 
3.1Feminism in International Relations  
Gender in the study of International relations (IR) emerged largely in the eighties and began gaining 
momentum with the end of the Cold War as part of the critical project (Tickner, 2001: 36). This ushered 
in the possibility of a deconstructivist perspective aiming to debunk and re-evaluate existing traditions in 
International Relations and other schools of thought. Currently the study of gender in International 
relations remains a peripheral niche project.  
It is the aim of feminist theory in IR to analyse and depict how conventional understandings of IR are 
gendered and how this affects both men and women. Also to try to put forward different ways of looking 
at how to deal with the current issues in international affairs that are preventing development and social 
justice. In this sense the works of IR feminist theorists such as Anne Tickner (2001); Cynthia Enloe 
(1990); Judith Butler (1999) played a large role in establishing the field of study building on the existing 
traditional rudiments that make up IR and interpreting or re-ordering them through a feminist lens. One 
of the most influential text in  was Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases (1990) wherein she 
explains the unofficial spaces filled by women in international economic trade, diplomatic affairs and 
conflict.  
Broadly feminism in IR has expanded on the work of feminist political and economic theory with view to 
scrutinize the gendered and patriarchal approach towards social and political institutions; most 
specifically the state and its key military and governmental apparatuses. Furthermore feminism in IR 
examined the discursive production and reproduction through time and space of state institutions.  
Based on this broad description Youngs (2004: 76) states three major categories of analysis explored 
by feminism in IR:  (a) the state and markets which are theoretically and practically gendered by 
male-centric structures and assumptions. (b) The normative conceptualizations of political and 
economic life are also male-dominated and defined, ignoring the many strands of women’s 
contributions and realities. (c) The lack of critical analysis and deconstruction of the term ‘gender’ 
which obscures interrelated social constructions of male and female identities and roles.  
 
Christine Sylvester (1989) offers more meticulous categories of the differences within feminist 
thought in IR. The first is feminist empiricism which contends that states and the interstate system 
have been fundamentally gendered structures of domination and interaction. This strand challenges 
the tendency towards focusing on states and worldwide capitalist institutions as points of analysis 
and rather choosing to examine the social attitudes and structures which impart the gendered nature 
of IR.  
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The second is the feminist standpoint theories, which argue that there’s a unique and inimitable 
element to women’s experiences of socialisation that provide valid and necessary insights into world 
politics. Through the experience of being systematically excluded from public life, women are able-
because of marginality and their peripheral, second class citizen experience, to offer and contribute 
significantly to the traditional views that already exist. This would be the peaceful co-existence of 
the two sexes through a dialectical, power-sharing process. There is an understandably abundant 
amount of theory as well as widespread support for standpoint feminist theories; even non-feminist 
theorists see the value of standpoint feminism. This approach comes across as a pursuasive appeal to 
the sensibilities of all citizens- mainly those in power ownership; a summons of the memories of 
oppression and morality and a postulated image of all two genders existing in harmony, drawing 
from the  different expertise of each (Keohane 1989: 246) 
 
Third is feminist post-modernism. This viewpoint discards essentialism within feminism; what 
Harding and Sylvester referred to as a “falsely universalising perspective”. This is in contention with 
standpoint positions because of the commitment to collective applications that are often based on 
stereotypes. A contemporary example of the dangers of essentialism is the motivation employed for 
women’s representation in political leadership; that women are inherently peaceful and men 
inherently aggressive, therefore increasing women in political leadership will lead to a more peaceful 
world. Francis Fukuyama (1999) and Ann Tickner (1999) deliver interesting, conflicting points of 
view on the invocation of gender stereotypes to explain the status or ideal of world politics.  
Fukuyama, in his Woman and the Evolution of World Politics gives an essentialist account using 
evolutionary psychology to explain how world politics will always work. Anne Tickner in her  
rebuttal Why Women Can’t Run the World: International Relations According to Francis Fukuyama 
makes a comment on correcting Fukuyama’s definition of the feminist project in International 
Relations then arguing that neither biology nor evolution unaided can explain gender dynamics 
effectively. She also emphasises the need to move beyond stereotypical, one dimensional accounts of 
gender in order to get a more sophisticated and accurate account of gender dynamics. 
 
These delineations are seminal in understanding the different branches of feminist literature that are 
useful for this study. The importance of the choice of these particular strands for the study is that liberal 
feminist thought, activism and development has taken preference over its radical counterpart in state-
building and policy in an international arena that only recently has to grapple with the official inclusion 
of gender perceptive policy creation.  
We present ourselves as earnestly authentic in an insufficiently authentic field, as avant-gardes tend to do. We 
have a love-hate thing with being on the outside—as undiscovered avant-gardes tend to do. We reason, we rail, we 
outline, we inline, we give forty-two and a half good reasons why feminism should be taken into consideration 
when investigating all issues of the international. Meanwhile the tragedy of IR limps on, keeps us trying to please, 
keeps us from irony (Sylvester, 1997). 
 
 
The theoretic foot-work needed to base the study begins from a larger discourse of feminism in IR; 
followed by the post-colonial feminist school of thought; African feminisms in relation to human rights 
then IR theory, human rights and LGBTI literature follow. The theoretic influences of the paper are 
feminist literature through a human rights and gender emancipation lens and as a response to a 
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universalized modernisation and what some have called “westernized” form of theory creation and its 
implications on African state formation and ratification. 
The next section will highlight the epistemological chasm that exists between liberal feminist theory and 
its dominance in the study of IR, and radical feminist thought that exists in the margins of IR-rarely 
engaged with in mainstream scholarship. What is important to ascertain in this section is the 
contributions of both ranges of scholarship within the feminist critical project in IR. It will further 
demonstrate how the use of radical feminist theory in interpretations of world politics and statecraft are 
applicable, useful and I will argue essential in deconstructing an area that is based on uncontested, static 
pillars that are definitive in state building. In the critical, revisionist project therefore, adequate analysis 
cannot happen when the demarcated areas of ‘critique’ are adhered to. In other words, the irony of the 
dominant feminist interpretations of IR is the double edged sword effect that is the effort to critique an 
inert body of knowledge using the same tools that exclude it.  
3.2 Radical Contributions 
 
Although feminist IR theory is largely marginalised, niche and ‘avant-garde’, it still has a home in 
contemporary cooperative global politics. This is the global politics that understands the need to 
address oppressive practices, to ensure that there is no repetitions of mass-scale tyranny, to produce 
development programs, global institutions that seek to empower women through quotas in the public 
and private sector, decrease in the education gender gap between boys and girls, including women in 
the military, peace-building processes, foreign policy and transitional state-building for example. 
Liberal feminists have thus set the wheels of ‘change’ in motion.  
 
What has less of a place in the discipline of IR is a radical form of feminist theory applied to the 
study of IR. Describing this application will require treading slightly backwards on the path that has 
just been taken and considering epistemological definitions, once more. In this, I will discuss gender 
(There are different definitions depending on the strand generally liberal or radical); space (Post-
colonial feminisms, African feminisms, European feminisms); time (Different waves of feminism) 
and the intersectionality that comes with these.  
 
A fundamental difference or break in thought between radical and liberal strands within feminism is 
definitions of gender as a designated category. A limitation that exists within much liberal 
scholarship is the use of binaries as an adhesive agent in theory production. This has the double 
effect of speaking a common language, using the same tools and sticking to the demarcated areas 
designated by the male policy creators. And it also has the effect of creating surface level change 
without addressing underlying ideologies, prejudices and oppressive practices. Lorber (1996:144) 
explains the idea of binaries which function to conventionalise bodies, sexuality and social location 
using the categories – 
 
“sex” polarized as “females” and “males,” “sexuality” polarized as “homosexuals” and “heterosexuals,” 
and “gender” polarized as “women” and “men”. In writing on feminist research methods, she depicts how 
these binaries exclude many groups of people who do not fit into the conventional boxes, for example, 
intersex people, bisexuals and transsexuals.   
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One of feminisms impediments is the widespread inclination to self-define through difference. In 
other words, essentially defining a body of knowledge, a strand of an area of study, through a 
description of how it differs vastly from what already exists. It is equally important to extract 
commonalities, conflations and overlaps in feminist thought, not for the purpose of legitimation but 
for the purpose of understanding the intersectionality in socio-political existence, producing a 
nuanced body of knowledge that reflects its deviation as well as contribution to a continuum of 
existent theory.  
 
Oloka-Onyango and Tamale (1995: 697) highlight this propensity accurately when arguing that there 
are differences in Western experiences of gender oppression and non-Western, post-colonial 
experiences as well as those in a specifically African context, for example that can be explained 
along the lines of race, class, age and sexuality.  
 
It thus makes pragmatic political sense to retain the category of women despite the multiplicities that exist within 
this category. Without losing focus on the differences, we maintain that a united front is essential for any social 
movement. This conviction is based on our belief that universality exists in many women's concerns, regardless of 
physical location. However, these concerns are always determined and tempered by socioeconomic and political 
specificity. For feminism to achieve any meaningful success, a universal basis must be the foundation. The 
question then becomes: what is the scope of that "universality”? (Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 1995: 698).  
 
Post-colonial Feminism and African Feminism(s)  
 
The foundation of post-colonial feminism is based on the movement for self-expression of the ‘Third 
World Woman” as explained by Chandra Talpade Mohanty in her prolific account of non-Western forms 
of feminisms Under Western Eyes (1988).  
And it is in the production of this "Third World Difference" that Western feminisms appropriate and 
"colonize" the fundamental complexities and conflicts which characterize the lives of women of different 
classes, religions, cultures, races and castes in these countries. It is in this process of homogenization and 
systematization of the oppression of women in the third world that power is exercised in much of recent 
Western feminist discourse, and this power needs to be defined and named. (Mohanty, 1988: 335) 
Some literature on post-colonial feminism is for the aim of writing and re-ordering the experiences of 
non-Western feminists by non-Western feminists. This looks at the rejection of Western feminists’ points 
of view and drawing up a set of feminist tenets that are reflective of women’s experiences in the post-
colony. This reflection embodies the cross-cutting identity factors of race, ethnicity, under-development 
and social class that are experienced differently from a European or American woman. The 
universalising of women’s experiences by Western Feminist writers is the main point of critical analysis 
from post-colonial feminists of what was then mainstream feminist literature (see Kumari, 1986; 
Amadiume, 1990; Bulbeck, 1998). This is the discursive break from Western forms of feminisms that are 
interpreted as devoid of agency and self-reflection from women in the post-colonial settings. Some 
writing on post-colonial experiences highlights the parallels between the colonization and evangelism of 
the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century. This strand of writers problematize Western feminism’s efforts to enlighten, 
teach, determine goals and galvanize the direction of struggles for emancipation for these women (see 
Mohanty, 1988; Okome, 1999).    
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There is a logical overlap in the origin of literature between scholars writing on post-colonial feminist 
experiences and those writing on African feminisms. In the seventies and eighties one finds African 
feminist literature embodying very similar principles to post-colonial writings. The intellectual break in 
literature becomes evident with the de-colonization processes and independence, liberation struggles, 
nationalism and conflict and war.   
In theory it is more accurate to speak of African feminisms than of one homogenous feminism that 
encompasses all feminisms that write on the African experience. It is important to recognise the 
differences as it is to find commonality. Literature often juxtaposes African feminisms and Black 
feminisms. (This is especially evident in bibliographies of both African- and Black feminist writing.) 
However, African feminist thought has an added commitment to analyses in African contexts.  
What perhaps counts as a fundamental point of variance for feminists writing in an African context is the 
difference between feminine politics and feminist politics. There is a strand of African feminism that does 
not aim for radical restructuring of the social order and there is another strand that embodies a more 
radical, left type of politics that calls for complete restructuring of the socio-political as well as economic 
framework. Mekgwe (2008:14) explains the difference as follows; African intellectual feminism is 
viewed as being somewhat elitist and pro-Western. African intellectual feminists have been accused of a 
paternalistic attitude towards African women, reminiscent of Western feminism. Popular feminism, on 
the other hand, is rooted in the lived experiences and cultural beliefs of African women; however there 
are instances where it fails to mobilise against cultural practices that can be oppressive.  
Afro-Feminism on Gender Emancipation 
The imperial nature of theory formation must be interrogated to allow for a democratic process that will create 
room for the intervention, legitimation, and validation of theories formulated “elsewhere.” In other words, 
theory making should not permanently be a unidirectional enterprise—always emanating from a specific 
location and applicable to every location—in effect allowing a localized construct to impose a universal 
validity and application. (Nnaemeka, 2004: 362) 
In her account on African feminisms Susan Arndt (2002: 234) establishes and expands on the three 
useful categories of African Feminist literature differentiating between reformist, transformative and 
radical African feminist literatures. Reformist feminist texts criticize individual traditional and 
modern conventions that discriminate against women. They present alternatives that improve 
women's ways of life, maintaining that improvement even within existent structures is possible. An 
example of reformist feminine texts is Ifi Amdiume’s (1990) earlier works explaining the 
exportation of patriarchy into traditional Nigerian society; Olufunke Okome (1999) in her account of 
the evangelical nature of Western feminism when it comes to female genital mutilation.  
Transformative feminist texts offer a fundamental critique of patriarchy. Men's power bearing is 
presented more sharply and as being typical for them as a group. Women's co-option in the 
reproduction of gender discrimination is also scrutinized. Both men's and women's reproduction of 
discriminatory structures is seen as resolvable. These types of texts would include Fatima Mernissi 
(1987) on Islam and the exclusion of women based on interpretations of Q’uranic texts; Oboima 
Nnaemeka (2004) in her account of a theory of “nego-feminism” where she asserts the importance of 
feminist writing in an African context learning to balance between writing in an African context as 
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something essentially different to Western notions of feminism and also the ability to draw out 
factors in Western feminism that can work for African feminist writers.  
Radical texts "argue that men as a social group inevitably and in principle discriminate against, 
oppress and mistreat women. A disturbing lack of alternatives and perspectives distinguishes these 
texts" (2002: 85) from reformist and transformative ones. Patricia McFaden’s (2003) writing on 
Sexual Pleasure as Feminists Choice would fit into this category. The piece got her deported out of 
Zimbabwe for being accused of disseminating lesbian literature. In it she writes about women being 
able to choose their sexual partners and she expands on the policing of sexuality by the state.  
What perhaps stands out about African feminist literature especially in regard of the study is the 
juxtaposing of the term “gender emancipation” with “women’s emancipation”, which is a 
misconception this study aims to avoid. Power relations are imbedded with hierarchical and stratified 
systems; this is true of state-craft globally. Gender is no different, inequality; oppression and 
domination do not exist in a vacuum they exist because of socialised and institutionalised gender 
stratification where the echelons are clearly defined and static. There are men at the top, followed by 
women then non-conforming gender identities at the bottom. To destroy institutional oppression for 
those that are not part of the gender elite or much less part of popular politics; that is to propose a 
step by step emancipation process which is a notion implicitly stitched into Afro-feminist 
scholarship- further prolongs the efforts towards emancipation. It may be saying ‘that is a different 
battle to be fought in a different space at a different time’ but the reality is that oppressive policy by 
a state on its citizens stems from the same logic every time. It is the systematic extraction of 
freedoms by the powerful on the powerless, always.  
On the issues of culture and tradition, these have always been fluid. Culture is a reflection of society; 
society, however, does not remain the same, over time and space culture has been defined and 
enacted in different ways. What need to be scrutinized are the curators and owners of the direction 
that these definitions will go-those that decide what culture is when and how. It is not unfathomable 
to assert that these are the same power bearers at the top of the hierarchy. In the same way that Afro-
feminism(s) have the need to affirm and redraw theory for themselves and break away from what has 
been handed down as an “evangelical” truth coming from the West; theory building, especially 
pertaining to policy creation in African states needs to examine existent prejudices within African 
contexts and expand the meanings and conceptions of gender emancipation.  
All the same, the theoretic aim of the study is not to impose, eliminate or ameliorate the work that 
African feminist literature has done. Rather the aim is to first understand the increase of anti-
homosexual laws in the selected time frame and to add to existing African feminist literature by 
including gender issues that are often left out of mainstream gender discussions and policy like 
LGBTI rights. The radical feminist views do precisely what the liberal views do not-in an African 
context they recognise structural constraints on the freedom of action that comes with ignoring 
oppressive power systems that do not benefit what can be called the gender elite. Perhaps then it is 
more successful in articulating theories that are more cognizant of the realities of women and gender 
minorities’ lives. 
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3.3 Human Rights and Feminist Theory 
Afro-Feminism on Human Rights 
The literature on human rights by African feminist scholars is often divided according to a particular 
human rights issue. For example, one would find literature on issues such as homosexuality (see 
Tamale, 2009; Mutua, 2009; O’Flaherty, & Fisher, 2008); female genital mutilation (see Toubia, 
1995; Ibhawoh, 2000; Okome, 1999) and a large number of accounts of nationalist women’s rights 
movements. For the purposes of the discursive literary foundation of the study an introduction to the 
concept of universality and cultural relativism and discussions of a normative African human rights 
discourse will be presented.  
The rejection of a universal human rights discourse that is applicable globally mainly started gaining 
momentum during the nineties post-dating the Cold War and largely stems from the idea of cultural 
relativism. The debates were reformulating the idea of human rights as applicable to the South and 
Africa in particular with a twist of culture, tradition and at times religion. For international women’s 
human rights this movement had immediate and often insidious implications.  
Kwasi Wiredo in Chukwudi Eze (2005: 195) warns against accounts of cultural relativism that are 
based on a rejection of ‘modernisation’ in Africa. He points out that culture has not remained the 
same in any place in the world; Western folk thought had to progress and so does African folk 
thought. The methods of progress do not have to be uniform, however, progress is necessary.  
 It becomes possible to see the movement towards modernisation in Africa not as essentially a process in 
which Africans are unthinkingly jettisoning their own heritage of thought in the pursuit of Western ways 
of life, but rather as one in which Africans in common with other peoples seek to attain a specifically 
human destiny […] (Tamale and Oloka-Onyango, 1995: 700)  
Sylvia Tamale and J. Oloka-Onyango in their 1995 entry in the Human Rights Quarterly journal 
effectively explain the two pronged effect of initial interpretations of a cultural human rights 
perspective. Firstly there is the assertion that universal human rights norms are unsuited to non-
western societies. This argument rejects a universal human rights discourse on the basis of its 
imperial nature and disregard for traditional-religious practices that are specific to non-Western 
societies. The second effect is one that pre-dates the Cold War period which implicitly claims that 
human’s rights violations are endemic of non-Western societies and that some cultures are innately 
more prone to violations than others (Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 1995: 706). The authors point out 
that relativist thought of this nature is firstly for the purpose of justifying non-confrontation and 
prevention of international intervention on domestic human rights practices. Secondly the authors 
argue that it urges an interventionist attack on non-Western societies, for example the exportation of 
Islam and terrorism as a replacement of Regan’s “Evil Empire”. An interesting parallel for 
illustration is drawn between Newton Leroy Gingrich (Speaker of the US House of Representatives) 
and former British Prime Minister, Lady Margaret Thatcher, in the north; Lee Kuan Yew, doyen of 
Singapore politics, and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Sekou from the south, all of whom are characterised 
according to their relativism when it comes to an international human rights discourse (Oloka-
Onyango and Tamale, 1995: 708) and: 
All pick and choose their arguments from strikingly similar  models of social, economic, and political 
ordering and pursue them from a panoply of rhetorical and essentialist perspectives. Armed in this 
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fashion, they stampede toward a specific brand of exclusionary, sexist, classist and parochial politics-the 
essential point of which is its unilinear, discriminatory, and unaccomodative nature. All have a decidedly 
Westphalian notion of the state and sovereignty, whether it is Gingrich on the United Nations, Thatcher 
on Europe, Kuan Yew on development and democracy, or Mobutu on aid-conditionality.  
 
What become clearer in an analysis of the concepts of universality and relativism is that often 
arguments for a culturally particular human rights discourse either perpetuates or glosses over 
oppressive practices that a human rights discourse definitively aims to eradicate. Furthermore the 
objective is used to systematically maintain systems of power and domination. In social structure this 
hinders the emancipation of those at the bottom of the hierarchy (also see Rao 1995; Nagengast, 
1997). In Nigeria and Uganda, relativist arguments function to depoliticise the debate around 
repressive laws that oppress and endanger marginal groups of people. Relativism would draw upon 
the sovereignty of all states and autonomy to regulate their constituencies in a manner that best suits 
and mirrors their societies. This approach is overly simplistic because it ignores the undermining of 
human rights that should be applicable to all humans and the dangers involved in legally excluding, 
therefore dehumanising a group of people.  
Governmentality, Human Rights and LGBTI Politics 
Queer theorisation
3
 can be traced back to the early 1990s, when sexuality started gaining precedence 
in international human rights discourse. In 1994 following a statute enacted in Tasmania, Australia 
criminalising homosexual acts between two consenting males, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission (UNHRC) made its first decision on sexual orientation stating that Tasmania was in 
violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNHCR: Toonen v. Australia, 
1994). In 1995, two seminal books on sexuality were published; Sexual Orientation: A Human Right 
by Eric Heinze and Sexual Orientation and Human Rights by Robert Wintemute. (Gross, 2013: 99). 
In the same year  Amnesty International became the first major international human rights NGO to 
publish a report on sexual orientation, aptly titled Breaking the Silence: Human Rights Violations 
Based on Sexual Orientation (1994), Amnesty International followed with a campaign in 1998 called 
‘Gay rights are human rights’, echoing the women’s rights movement slogan ‘Women’s rights are 
human rights’. The movement towards the realisation of LGBTI rights thus connects the discourses 
of sexuality and human rights.  
IR theory to date has not seriously considered LGBTI politics and human rights a topic worthy of 
interest or scrutiny: leading theorists that have largely come from the liberal school of thought still 
adhere to gender binaries and sectional gender activism. By sectional gender activism reference is 
being made to the tendency to categorise LGBTI literature and advocacy under either sexuality 
politics, selective human rights politics or as a non-entity. IR feminist theory has therefore either 
normatively or empirically left out LGBTI politics. Hence the question of LGBTI rights under a 
human rights lens in feminist IR simply has not been engaged in any systematic fashion by 
mainstream IR theory. Despite these limitations, IR theory nonetheless can be shown to generate at 
least three points of concern; defining the domain of ‘the political’ in relation to the role that the 
                                                          
3 For an introduction to queer theory, see Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction 
(1996); For an introduction to queer legal theory, see Carl Stychin, Law’s Desire: Sexuality 
and the Limits of Justice 140-56 (1995) 
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invocation of human rights plays in LGBTI politics; secondly looking at who can be a subject of 
such rights; and lastly an analysis of the state-centricity of international human rights discourse.  
The need for theorizing ‘the political’ becomes clear when one attempts to conceptualise LGBTI’s 
interaction and experience of human rights as well as human rights’ experience of the state and state 
power. This requires a slight deviation from traditional IR theories. Foucault’s theorisation of 
‘Governmentality’ offers an excellent tool to begin defining the political in relation to LGBTI rights 
and the relationship between state and non-state actors. Foucault identifies in the rise of a 
centralizing European state, from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, the emergence of a new 
“art of government” which goes beyond the exercise of sovereign authority and power by the prince, 
but the “introduction of economy into political practice”. For Foucault, this account of 
‘governmentality’ is driven by the ensemble that is institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections 
which are also the strategies through which the state is able to exercise a precise form of power 
“which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its 
essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Eenam and Hagland, 1997: 368). Politics 
therefore is not simply government or state apparatus; it is also the interactions and network of 
relationships between state and society which, in modern states as led to the creation of an 
administrative state, which exercises control and power over its population.  
The backdrop against which these networks and interactions are taking place can thus be understood 
as ‘discursive formations’ which structure relationships of dominance and subjection (Eenam and 
Hagland, 1997: 368). Therefore, using the Foucauldian perspective LGBTI politics are characterised 
by the prevailing discourses around the community. Unlike first generation rights that are afforded 
on the basis of being pre-discursive, for example, the right to life, one might use the concept of 
governmentality to chart the construction of socio-political sexuality and gender identity rights, third 
generation rights, which are also collective rights. On the issue of subjects; different factions of the 
LGBTI, i.e. the transgendered man or the lesbian woman do not exist outside of a set of discourses 
and narratives or in an advocacy vacuum, such as that ensured by the anti-homosexuality acts of 
Nigeria and Uganda
4
, but are constructed for a group of people and dubbed on them5. The 
construction of these discourses often involves the pathologising of LGBTI communities. 
Domination and subjection are complimentary and when subjects internalise imposed discourses this 
leads to notions of inferiority.  
Out of this form of subjection and domination within the context of governmentality in which power 
is exercised through the control of sexuality, may emerge a corollary movement for reconstruction 
and re-writing of discourses in a positive light by the subject where the subject attempts to claim 
rights from states and other non-state actors (Eenam and Hagland, 1997: 369). This is where the final 
consideration emerges regarding the state-centric approach of international human rights claims 
through advocacy and literature. What is significant for this analysis is the system of interaction and 
relationship between state and non-state actors. Some theorists would argue that the state dictates 
                                                          
4 This is by virtue of the specific statutes that forbid any form of advocacy or activism specifically in the laws in 
Nigeria and Uganda 
5
 Consider government propagandist strategies that Uganda undertook to educate people about the dangers of 
homosexuality and recruitment of children into the practice. Also refer to section 6.2 
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and has final control over the nature of human rights discourses in a society, while others would 
argue that the human rights discourse in a country is reflective of the society.   
Kollman and Waites (2009: 2) draw attention to the emergence of human rights discourses as a 
central vehicle and framing device for LGBTI political claims, particularly in international contexts. 
LGBTI movements originating in the West have increasingly defined themselves as global, seeking 
to organize across borders and lobby intergovernmental organizations (Adam et al, 1999; Altman 
2001; Binnie 2004). The debate on international human rights groups’ strategic approaches for 
activism is between development work that engages societies directly and legislative advocacy work 
aimed at changing laws. This is interesting for this analysis because one of the claims this paper 
makes is that in the cases of African states that have included a ban on advocacy of LGBTI rights; 
human rights organisations cannot reach the communities. The laws are created so that once the 
practice of homosexuality is forbidden; the statues regulating that may not be challenged without 
committing a criminal offence.  
Literature that contends for the need for community engagement of international human rights 
perspectives argues that human rights-oriented organisations often reflect a profound state-centric 
bias in their thinking and their activities. The proponents of this point of view, such as Eenam and 
Hagland (1997); James Kirchick (2007); , would argue that while the states are often the most 
flagrant violators of human rights; it is ultimately within the societies within which they are based 
that values inimical to human rights arise. Eenam and Hagland (1997: 362) explain in view of this 
standpoint that if:  
“state” and “society” do not exist independently of each other, but are rather […] interactive, then it is not only 
true that social attitudes, such as homophobia, can prompt homophobic state policy, but conversely, that LGBT-
supportive state policy cannot impose rights on a society. In other words, an effective guarantee of human rights 
cannot be made without the broad support of non-state actors (including other citizens) in the society in which 
those rights are to be exercised. 
Black American feminist Audre Lorde famously declared in reference to the US civil rights 
movement that ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’. In the context of 
international law, Marxist China Mieville would agree. He argues that the danger of looking to 
international law for progressive change ‘risks legitimising … the very structure of international law 
that critical theory has so devastatingly undermined’ (Otto, 2010:98).   
 
A necessary distinction to make is that of international human rights efforts towards changing 
international law and towards changing domestic law. The value of the above positions and critiques 
of human rights movements and international NGOs is more compatible with the efforts concerned 
with international law that are aimed at global governance institutions such as the UN and the 
different UN factions that cover human rights practices like UNHCR. The value is that while there 
have been successes in securing the rights of gender minorities through international treaties and 
agreements such as the aforementioned successes of the early 1990s, more recently the 2006 
Yogyakarta Principles6 and even regional treaties like the African Charter on Human and People’s 
                                                          
6 The Yogyakarta Principles were drafted by a group of human rights experts and are intended to specifically 
address the application of international human rights law to sexual orientation and gender identity 
(Mittelstaetd, 2009: 359) 
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Rights, the obvious limitation to this form of advocacy is that even when countries ratify the treaties; 
the global governance institutions concerned lack in the mechanisms for implementation of such 
instruments within the state.  
 
The efforts of international human rights organisations to change domestic law in states that are 
grossly violating people’s human rights inside the country is less compatible with the critiques 
against an advocacy approach aimed at changing states’ legislative measures. In this particular 
project considering Nigeria and Uganda, one of the unique features of the 2014 legislation is the 
obliteration of the potential for any advocacy inside or outside the country where it concerns the laws 
of the country. Therefore, the viewpoints that move for community engagement and grassroots 
activism by international human rights organisations would not apply in such cases at a stage where 
it would be criminal activity for international organisations to engage the community. However, 
there is still value in a method that considers society level values and how to approach changing the 
minds of the communities that the laws will be enacted upon
7
.  
 
Previous sections have covered the issue of universality and cultural relativism. In African states, the 
issue is further complicated particularly by the application of cultural relativism. Looking at who 
may be subject to human rights, not only are LGBTI factions excluded on the basis of deviant 
sexuality the deviance is then defined on the basis of cultural relativism. LGBTI communities fall 
short of falling under the protections of international human rights, through state power enforcement. 
This form of power also supresses the potential for self-reflection and reconstructions of a group’s 
discursive formations. Because of the extensiveness of the legislation in Uganda and Nigeria, the 
work of international human rights movements has to begin with efforts towards decriminalisation.  
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4. LGBTI COMMUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
“By maintaining a tight grip on certain activities, and silencing the voices of those individuals and groups that 
engage in them, the patriarchal state makes it extremely difficult for these individuals to organise and fight for 
their human rights” (Tamale 2007:18) 
Sexuality and sexual activity, regardless of society, are intrinsically linked with the exercise of 
power (Foucault, 1980). For many societies around the world sexuality continues to be highly 
controlled and managed. In African states, this form of exercise of power is growing in strength, 
frequency and intensity and manifesting itself through morality politics. This is evidenced in the way 
same-sex relations continue to be silenced, marginalised and legally forbidden. While many 
countries have begun to address draconian, discriminatory laws against same-sex relations, a large 
concentration of African countries are cracking down on a small group of people based on their 
sexual orientation.  Horn (2006: 8) contends that sexual rights are not “new” sets of rights; they are 
simply an application of existing internationally recognised human rights within the domain of the 
sexual body.  The policing and management of people’s sexual rights in the case of the recent 
increase in state sanctioned homophobia has a direct impact on the lived experiences and citizenship
8
 
of gender minorities in these countries. In order to understand the emergence of the increase in laws 
that are repressive for gender minorities is contextualising the LGBTI community and analysing the 
backdrop against which affected lives are shaped by the rights extractions.  
This section intends to highlight the importance of situated knowledges or locating the emergence of 
specific discourses and representations (including the literature
9
, advocacy programmes and 
legislative trends) within their historical and political contexts of production. This section will 
contextualise the study and give background to LGBTI communities in Sub-Saharan Africa; the 
intersectionality within the community; the different ways in which members of the community 
experience the law and the perverse nature of the marginalisation of LGBTI persons in an African 
context.  
4.1 A Decade of Discrimination  
Homosexual acts are illegal in 36 countries on the continent and in recent years many African 
leaders have been intensifying in anti-gay rhetoric. At the beginning of this study in early 2014 there 
had been two laws passed in Nigeria and Uganda.  By the end of the study one more country 
(Gambia) had enforced stronger criminalisation laws on homosexuality and two more (Chad and 
Tanzania) have bills in the parliamentary processing stage. These developments all occurred in 2014 
(Also see Stoddart, 9 January 2015; Amnesty International, 20 January 2015).  
There is evidence of a trend and serious growth in homophobic laws in African countries in the past 
ten years. There are factors that make the continent unique in comparison to the both developing and 
under-developed states, and homophonic and non-homophobic states. Firstly, the recent laws in Sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in Nigeria and Uganda are the harshest, notwithstanding Islamic states. 
Secondly the growth in using legislature to fortify homophobia became a trend in a short period of 
time; the past decade has ushered in the highest number of revisions for existing laws against same-
                                                          
8 Consider citizenship as more than a normative rights framework, but an application and realisation of rights as 
the outcome of people’s struggles for recognition, respect and the equitable distribution of resources.   
9 Refer to Chapter 4 
21 | P a g e  
 
sex relations and introductions to new sentences.  Lastly, these countries also present the common 
thread of British colonial history and the resultant irony of the narrative sustaining the need for anti-
homosexuality laws-‘African culture’. Worthy to note is that the trend has been of rights extractions; 
however there are some African countries that have moved in the opposite direction to abolish 
discriminatory laws against gender minorities, South Africa and Cape Verde for example. There are 
also countries that have remained consistent in legislature in that homosexuality was not illegal 
during the colonial period and has not been legislatively revised so far such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Mali. Below is a list of developments from 2005 to 2015 of countries that 
have perpetuated the trend and those that have broken the trend.  
South Africa  
South Africa has seen a number of positive legal developments over the past decade, including 
allowing joint adoption by same-sex couples in 2002, introducing a law on legal gender recognition 
in 2004, and equal marriage for same-sex couples in 2006 (Amnesty International, 2009). Section 9 
(3) of the South African Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender 
and sexual orientation. South African case law
10
 further includes the term “sexual orientation” to 
specifically include transgendered persons as well (De Vos, 2010).  
Cape Verde 
Cape Verde decriminalized homosexuality in 2004, and since 2009, Mauritius, Sao Tome and 
Principe, and the Seychelles have also committed to decriminalizing homosexuality (Amnesty 
International, 2009). In 2008 articles 45(2) and 406(3) of the Labour Code prohibited discrimination 
in employment based on sexual orientation (ILGA, 2014:22). Same-sex marriages are however not 
recognised. According to the Cape Verdean Civil Code, marriage is defined as the voluntary union 
between two persons of different sexes that intend to constitute a family by means of a full common 
life (Global Research Directorate, 2014:3).  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo  
In 2005 the Democratic Republic of the Congo constitutionally prohibited same-sex marriage. While 
Homosexual acts are not explicitly illegal, article 172 of the Penal Code, prohibits “violations of 
morality” under penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment, which could be used against LGBTI 
individuals. December 2013 DRC's National Assembly proposed a draft bill criminalising same-sex 
activity in the country (Global Research Directorate, 2014: 4).  
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s criminal law amendments passed in 2006 (Criminal Law [Codification and Reform] 
Act) criminalize any actions perceived as homosexual. Section 73 (1) states that “anal sexual 
intercourse, or any act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be 
regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” commits the crime of sodomy, on conviction, 
                                                          
10 In the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice the Constitutional Court 
stated that the concept of “sexual orientation” as used in section 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution “must be given a 
generous interpretation” and therefore applies equally to the orientation of persons who are “transsexual”.  
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punishable with up to one year of imprisonment and/or a fine. In Zimbabwe only male-male sexual 
relations are prohibited, there is no mention of female same-sex relations (ILGA, 2014: 52). 
Burundi  
A 2009 revision of the Penal Code made homosexual relations punishable by three months to two 
years of imprisonment and/or a fine of BIF50,000–100,000 (about R360–R730) (Global Legal 
Research Directorate, 2014: 3). In 2009, and for the first time in Burundi’s history, same-sex sexual 
activity was criminalised. The lower house of Burundi’s Parliament first passed a law criminalising 
homosexual acts in November 2008, but it was rejected in the Senate. The legislation was then 
passed back to the Assembly, which was able to overrule the Senate and restore the amendment. 
President Pierre Nkurunziza subsequently signed the article into legislation on 22 April 2009.  
Article 567 of the 2009 Burundian Penal Code punishes same-sex relations with 3 months to 2 years 
imprisonment and a fine (Global Research Drectorate, 2014: 3).  
São Tomé and Príncipe 
The new Penal Code enacted in 2012 does not criminalize homosexuality. During the 2011 
Universal Periodic Review
11
, representatives of São Tomé and Principe vowed that the government 
planned to decriminalize homosexuality by the summer of 2011 (Wockner, 2011). 76 Crimes reports 
that homosexuality was decriminalised on the small island in 2012 although it was not widely 
reported on (Stewart, 2014). However Refugee Legal Aid (2013) reports that as of May 2012, no 
evidence can be found to suggest any amendments have been implemented that do, in fact, 
decriminalise homosexuality.  
Mozambique 
According to the Mozambican government, on December 18, 2013, the Parliament approved by 
consensus, a general draft revision of the Penal Code. It was not possible to determine, however, 
whether the mentioned provisions were altered. Same-sex marriage is not recognized in 
Mozambique. Pursuant to the Mozambican Family Law, “marriage” is defined as the voluntary and 
singular union between a man and a woman (Global Research Directorate, 2014: 10) 
At Mozambique’s UPR hearing at the UN Human Rights Council in March 2011, Justice Minister 
Maria Benvinda Levi, clarified the meaning of certain provisions in the Penal Code. Article 71 of the 
2006 Penal Code contains security measures that can be applied to “those who surrender to the usual 
practice of unnatural vices” but the Minister was clear that this provision did not mean that 
homosexuality was criminal. She went on to state that that homosexuality is not illegal in 
Mozambique (Cowell, 2013). 
Ethiopia 
Homosexuality is illegal. The country’s law states that “whoever performs with another person of the 
same sex a homosexual act, or any other indecent act, is punishable with simple imprisonment” -up to 
fifteen years’ imprisonment (Global Research Directorate, 2014:5). In February 2014 a bill was 
                                                          
11
 UPR is a United Nations (UN) process that occurs every four years that involves a periodic review of the human 
rights records of all 193 UN Member States. 
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endorsed by Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers making homosexual acts “unpardonable”. A 
presidential pardon is granted to thousands of prisoners every year on the Ethiopian New Year. 
However, if the new law is approved, the president will no longer have the power to carry out these 
pardons for those convicted for homosexuality (ILGA Report, 2014: 79). 
Nigeria 
The Nigerian revision of existing Penal Codes through the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 
2014 prohibits same-sex marriage and civil unions alike. The violation of this ban is punishable on 
conviction by a fourteen years’ imprisonment. Additionally anyone who “administers, witnesses, 
abets or aides the solemnization of same sex marriage or civil union” commits a crime punishable on 
conviction by a ten-year prison term.  In some northern Nigerian states, same-sex conduct if 
convicted is punishable by death. (ILGA, 2014: 18). The country also prohibits any form of gay 
rights advocacy. The Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act states that the “registration of gay clubs, 
societies and organizations, their sustenance, processions and meetings is prohibited.” and is 
punishable by a ten-year prison term. Furthermore, Nigeria prohibits a “public show of same sex 
amorous relationship directly or indirectly,” the violation of which, on conviction, is punishable by 
ten years of imprisonment (Global Research Directorate, 2014: 12). 
Uganda  
A law adopted by the country’s Parliament on December 20, 2013, and signed by President Yoweri 
Museveni on February 24, 2014, criminalizes homosexuality and imposes harsh penalties for 
violations of its provisions. Included in the prohibitions are the offence of homosexuality (punishable 
by fourteen years to life imprisonment); aggravated homosexuality (liable, on conviction, to life 
imprisonment); same sex marriage between a couple as well as all witnesses present or in full 
knowledge of the attempted union (punishable by seven years to life imprisonment); promotion of 
homosexuality (a fine or imprisonment of a minimum of five years and a maximum of seven years). 
The law also provides penalties for anyone who attempts to commit the offence of homosexuality, 
who “aids, abets, counsels, conspires, procures or detent another to engage in acts of 
homosexuality”. Moreover, it provides measures of protection, rehabilitation and payment of 
compensation to and confidentially of ‘victims’ of homosexuality (ILGA, 2014: 18).  
Gambia 
Gambia also passed a similar law in October 2014. The Gambian Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 
2014 introduced the new crime of ‘aggravated homosexuality’ for ‘serial offenders’ and gay or 
lesbian people who live with HIV – which comes with the punishment of a lifetime in prison. 
Homosexuality was already illegal in Gambia and punishable for up to fourteen years’ 
imprisonment. The Bill was passed by Gambia’s parliament, the National Assembly, on 25 August. 
Gambia's president, Yahya Jammeh, made the Bill law on 9 October (The Guardian, 21 November 
2014). 
Chad 
Amnesty International (23 September 2014) reported in a press release, that Chad has introduced an 
anti-homosexuality draft bill. The amendments to the penal code proposed by the government would 
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criminalize same-sex conduct in Chad, threatening jail sentences of between 15 and 20 years, and a 
fine ranging from amounts of approximately R1000 to R10 000. If the proposed legislation is 
enacted, Chadian people "who are perceived to be gay or don't conform to traditional gender 
stereotypes will not be able to live their lives with equality and dignity," according to Amnesty, 
ministers were also quoted saying the law would protect Chadian’s family values and society.  
4.2 “Homo(sex)uality is un-African” 
The abhorrence against homosexuality is fuelled and motivated primarily through the reproduced 
discourses of religion and culture. Political leaders have also stimulated the hatred and 
misinformation by using these narratives to single out ways in which homosexuality is an 
abominable anti-tradition, anti-Africa, anti-family threat that should be rejected. For example, Jjuuko 
(2009) carried out a study at Makerere University where it was found that most of those supporting 
criminalisation could not correctly define homosexuality, and that the reasons given for opposition to 
it were based on religion and culture.  
A common modern argument against same-sex relationships and in support of criminalising the 
practice has been that homosexuality is un-African and is a foreign concept imported into Africa by 
the west. However historical and anthropological accounts have shown that a number of variations of 
same sex relationships have existed in African society that predate colonialism.  
Studies based on anecdotal accounts of African societies suggest that traditional community groups 
were largely patriarchal and based on gerontocracy, organized on principles of seniority that existed 
before colonialism (Msibi, 2011: 64). This is not to say that same-sex desire and practice did not 
exist in African societies. The accounts provide evidence of existing same-sex relationships, 
accommodation of alternative sexualities in pre-colonial Africa and diverse definitions and 
understanding of gender in traditional societies. 
One example that is often cited is the Bugandan king, Kabaka Mwanga II whose homosexual 
activities were an “open secret”. Ugandan King Mwanga was widely reported to have engaged in 
sexual relations with his male subjects who once introduced to Christianity stopped consenting to the 
practice. The ‘Ugandan Martyrs’ were then killed by Kabaka Mwanga primarily because, having 
been converted to Christianity, they found the king’s homosexual tendencies towards them to be 
suddenly unacceptable under the new religion (see Faupel, 1962; Southwold, 1983; Tamale, 2003). 
Today Ugandans celebrate Ugandan Martyrs Day annually on June 3
rd
 in remembrance of the men 
that chose death over denouncing their faith.  
Murray and Roscoe (1998: 45) document the experiences of a Dutch military envoy in the late 
1640s, of a warrior woman, Nzinga in the Ndongo kingdom of the Mbundu in present day Angola 
ruled as ‘king’ rather than ‘queen’ and dressed as a man. She was reported to always travel with an 
assembly of young men who dressed as women and who were her ‘wives’.  In the same piece 
Murray and Roscoe (1998: 50) explain that amongst Bantu speaking Pouhain farmers in present day 
Cameroon and Gabon, homosexual intercourse had a traditional name and was considered a 
medicine for wealth which was transmittable through male-male sexual intercourse.  
Driberg’s (1923) findings on the Langi of northern Uganda, state that the Mudoko Dako "males" 
were treated as women and could marry men. Mushanga (1973) offers an account on the Ugandan 
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Nilotico Lango, men who assumed “alternative gender status” were known as mukodo dako. They 
were treated as women and were allowed to marry other men, similarly in Uganda, same-sex 
relations were reported amongst other Ugandan groups including the Bahima, the Banyoro and the 
aforementioned Baganda.  
Tamale (2009: 3) adds that apart from erotic same-sex activities, in pre-colonial Africa, several other 
activities involved in same-sex (or what the colonial powers branded “unnatural”) sexuality. For 
example, the Ndebele and Shona in Zimbabwe, the Azande in Sudan and Congo, the Nupe in Nigeria 
and the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi all engaged in same-sex acts for spiritual rearmament. 
Christian anthropologists later gave accounts of spirit possessions of male spirits over female bodies 
in reformist writings (also see Murray and Roscoe, 1998: 87).  
In Nigeria, the women from Igbo and Yorùbá land lived without the prescriptions of western gender 
norms. Women were said to be highly organized, autonomous, and very powerful in these societies: 
the degree of autonomy and power that women enjoyed is evident in “goddess worship, 
matrilineality, dual sex systems, gender flexibility in social roles and neuter linguistic elements or 
systems” (Rubenstein 2004: 351). There are also reported accounts of same-sex female marriages, 
although it is debatable whether these included sexual activity or not (also see Amadiume, 1990)   
However within accounts of pre-colonial homosexual activity in African countries the context and 
experiences of such relationships did not necessarily mirror homosexual relations as understood in 
the west or in current definitions of same-sex relationships, identity or desire. The contribution that 
accounts of the pre-colonial existence of such relations offer is a dispelling of the overused myth that 
homosexuality was brought to Africa by colonial powers. If anything the evidence proves that 
colonial powers imported a measure of strict control of ‘deviant’ sexuality (among other tools of 
power and regulation) that was also informed by the movement for Christianisation of native 
peoples. This is intrinsically linked with the emergence of morality politics, state control and power 
imposition.  
4.3 Discursive Formations on LGBTI in Africa 
Many African heads of state have discriminated and directly targeted LGBTI communities in Africa; 
publicly castigating LGBTI people and the west for promoting homosexuality on the continent. 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe once described gays and lesbians to be “worse than pigs and dogs” 
he also threatened to behead them. Specifically he said; 
If you take men and lock them in a house for five years and tell them to come up with two children and they fail to 
do that, then we will chop off their heads. This thing [homosexuality] seeks to destroy our lineage by saying John 
and John should wed, Maria and Maria should wed... Obama says if you want aid, you should accept the 
homosexuality practice... We will never do that (Nositter, 2013). 
Gambia’s President Yahya Jammeh was also quoted to have asked gay people to leave his country 
before he cuts off their heads because he believed they were a threat to human existence. He 
described gay people as vermin and threatened that they will be tackled in the same way the 
mosquitoes causing malaria were tackled. According to him LGBT stands for Leprosy, Gonorrhoea, 
Bacteria and Tuberculosis, all of which he said are detrimental to human existence (Scheinert, 2014). 
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The public opinion of citizens in both Nigeria and Uganda is just as hostile towards LGBTI people. 
A Pew (2013) research report on The Global Divide on Homosexuality report that 98 per cent of 
Nigerians do not believe homosexuality should be accepted in society and in Uganda the figure stood 
at 96 per cent.  
LGBTI people have faced a notable increase in arbitrary arrests, police abuse and extortion, loss of 
employment, evictions and homelessness, and scores have fled their countries; hate crimes have been 
legitimated with the passing of these laws. Health providers have cut back on essential services for 
LGBTI people, who also fear harassment or arrest if they seek health care. 
ILGA
12
 (2014, 80) reports that the effects of these laws include but are not limited to an increase in:  
 Instances of human rights abuses for gay and lesbian people; 
 Access to health becomes incredibly difficult as a result of these laws because 
individuals are not able to openly speak about their sexual partners; 
 People get evicted from their dwelling places due to the fact that they are gay or 
lesbian; 
 Gay and lesbian individuals become targets of attacks in the streets and in social spaces; 
 The society effectively considers the individuals criminal due to their sexual orientation 
or gender identity. 
 
In Nigeria and Uganda, homosexual people are being beaten by mobs and abused. ILGA (2014: 65) 
reports that In February 2014 in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, a mob attacked and brutally beat and 
kicked a dozen gay men, nearly killing one man. They dragged four of the injured victims to the 
police station to be arrested for homosexuality where they experienced secondary violence. Activists 
in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2014) say Nigerian police have arrested gay men and 
tortured them into revealing the names of others.  
In Uganda, as soon as the law was passed, one tabloid ran the cover story "Exposed! Uganda's 200 
Top Homos Named," including photos; among those named were a hip-hop star and a Catholic 
priest. Many gay Nigerians and Ugandans are now trying to find asylum abroad.  
Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), a Kampala-based organization, stated March 2014 report, state 
that “the full force of the State, particularly the legislative and executive branches of government, is 
being used to hunt down, expose, demean and suppress Uganda’s LGBTI people.” (SMUG, 2014) 
There is much diversity in the types of laws, the accessibility and interpretation of certain laws in 
some countries, there is even greater disparity when looking at the colonial histories of the countries. 
For instance, four out of eight countries that are moving for further criminalisation of homosexuality 
were under British colonial rule, two Belgian and one French (Ethiopia was never colonised). Of the 
four countries that have moved towards rights incremental legislation for gender minorities, one was 
under British colonial rule, and the remaining three were under Portuguese colonial rule. The danger 
of using colonial rule status of countries for analysis is that it extracts the agency from current 
political leadership. The value that can possibly be derived from looking at the trend is the element 
of timing. 2014 saw three laws passed and two more officially introduced in Chad and Ethiopia. 
There is a clear trend and element of mimesis in the actions of African state leaders. 
                                                          
12 International lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex association 
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Another common feature is he lines of motivation that are offered for the discriminatory laws by 
government officials. Using culture and tradition politicians support he need for anti-homosexuality 
laws. The 'homosexuality is un-African' myth is an unchanging old practice of selectively invoking African 
culture by those in power.  
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
13
 
5.1 Research Design 
As aforementioned the study is qualitative and inductive. Van Evera (1997: 21-22) defines inductive 
research as theory creation that looks at the interaction between phenomena; this is followed by enquiring 
on the possible causality in the interactions or relationships. This is followed by the action to locate the 
findings in a larger theoretic perspective. Inductive research design is also referred to as “backward-
looking” or the “bottom-up” approach. This means that the study begins enquiry from the outcome.  
In the research design the variables can be defined as concepts or aspects of a theory that can possess a 
number of different values. The independent variable in this sense is the unchangeable variable “framing 
the causal mechanism” (van Evera, 1997: 10); A variable that is used to determine whether it has causal 
relations with the dependent variable. The dependent variable can be defined as the variable that is 
“framing the caused phenomenon” (van Evera, 1997: 11). In other words, this is the changeable variable 
and the consequent result being measured.  
The independent variable in this study acts as the “cause” which possibly precedes, influences and 
predicts movement or variation in the dependent variable. In this study the independent variables are the 
factors possibly impacting the increase of repressive law making targeted at gender minorities. Our aim 
is to determine the existence of correlation as well as the level of impact if correlation is determined 
between the independent variables; which were selected through a screening of the existent literature on 
anti-homosexuality laws in Africa, and the passing of the bills. Below the independent variables are 
listed: 
a) The national impacts- political transitions in leadership and/or system. This section will try to identify 
whether there was a change in political leadership or system from the introduction of the bills to their 
eventual passing in 2014.   
b) The regional impacts- a rise in gender conservative laws and anti-gay sentiment on the continent. This 
section will determine the effects of the rhetoric surrounding gender minorities on the continent and 
establish whether there is a noticeable change in the general direction of gender rights extracting laws 
regionally.  
c) The international impacts-religious and civil society influences. This section will seek to study the 
possible correlation between the rise of LGBTI rights advocacy visibility outside the continent, on the 
one hand and conservative religious diplomacy on the other hand; and the passing of the laws.  
Dependent variables act as the effect in that they change as a result of being influenced by an 
independent variable. In this study the dependent variable would then be the outcome, which is the 
passing of the Anti-Homosexuality laws in Uganda and Nigeria.   
 
 
                                                          
13 Please refer to Addendum 1 for a Methods Map  
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5.2 Operationalization and Definitions 
The LGBTI Community is made up of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex persons. The 
group is in no way socially homogenous. Different members of the LGBTI community often have 
different concerns, ways of life, and self-identities. There are also many categories of difference 
within the groupings (Alexander and Wallace, 2009).  However, in the case of the laws against 
homosexuality, the group is for all intents and purposes, treated as legally homogenous and thus in 
many ways would suffer similar discrimination. What this means is that both Nigerian and Ugandan 
laws treat alternative sexualities the same. For example, under conditions where anything other than 
the heterosexual relationship (male and female) is prohibited; an effeminate homosexual man (who 
identifies as a man but is attracted to the same sex) who may display characteristics or mannerisms 
that are traditionally associated with women would be discriminated against to the extent that his 
characteristics or mannerisms deviate from the heterosexual norm and gender roles. Similarly despite 
a completely different lived experience, a transgendered person (born male, who identifies as female 
and is sexually attracted to men, or women) would be discriminated against for again deviating from 
the heterosexual norm. Despite there arguably being disparate lived experiences of the two 
individuals, the absolute approach of discrimination on the grounds of gender norms and roles 
deviation will affect them –neither of them will escape the blanket anti-homosexuality laws.   
The term ‘Lesbian’ refers to women who are primarily attracted to other women. ‘Gay’ is used to 
refer to a person who is attracted primarily to members of the same sex, within the acronym, refers to 
men (although it can be used for any sex, e.g. gay man, gay woman, gay person). ‘Bisexual’ is a term 
for persons who are attracted to both people of their own gender and another gender. The term 
‘Transgender’ has more definitions; it is frequently used as an umbrella term to refer to all people 
who do not identify with their assigned gender at birth or the binary gender system. This includes 
transsexuals, cross-dressers, gender-queer, drag kings, drag queens, two-spirit people, and others. 
Some transgender people feel they exist not within one of the two standard gender categories, but 
rather somewhere between, beyond, or outside of those two genders. ‘Intersex’ people’s bioloical 
sexual anatomy or chromosomes do not fit with the traditional markers of "female" and "male." For 
example: people born with ambiguous or ‘in-between’ genitalia XXY (International Spectrum, n.d). 
The lived experiences of the LGBTI group is incredibly diverse and in terms of the anti-
homosexuality laws anyone who actively steps outside of the gender binary that is heterosexual man 
and woman, in any capacity is vulnerable as an offender.    
The phrase “growth of gender repressive laws” throughout the study explains a growing trend in African 
countries to go in a regressive direction with regards to gender law making. The study aims to avoid an 
essentialist view of African governance, however, it cannot go unscrutinised that there is something 
particularly different about the institutionalisation of the repossession of freedoms for women and gender 
minorities; in other words, the use of the rule of law to institutionalise gender stratification. Furthermore 
an understanding of how this mechanism is reactive to pressures that are deemed external makes an 
interesting case for analysis. 
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Although most African countries have achieved “first” generation political and civil rights for women 
there is largely a human rights vacuum where second and third generations
14
 of rights are concerned for 
all gender groups. This includes the rights of gender minorities in the LGBTI community as well. For 
example, parliament quota systems have been implemented in many African countries; the UNDP 
Millennium Goals that promote gender equity in education and the economy has been endorsed and 
practiced by a number of African countries, this does not translate to inclusion, social justice and gender 
equality within these countries.   
Therefore; the phrases “increase” and “growth” imply a temporal quality and refers to the increase in the 
use of the rule of law to repress women and gender minorities. In 2014 alone for example, five countries 
out of the eight that have had developments in the last decade, had passed or planned drafted plans to 
further criminalise homosexuality. Nigeria, Uganda and Gambia passed anti-homosexuality laws and 
Chad and Ethiopia introduced draft bills that further discriminate against gender minorities in their 
respective manners. 
The factors identified above, which are also the independent variables served as parts of hypotheses that 
are tested. In addition to these, the method of process tracing (explained further in proving causality) was 
used with regards to the laws themselves and the process they underwent from proposal in 2006 (Nigeria) 
and 2009 (Uganda) to passing in 2014. This latter method is in order to get a nuanced understanding in 
testing the selected variables regarding the legislation of homosexuality in these countries.   
It is essential within feminist scholarship and policy making in general that the designated group ‘gender’ 
is not taken to be the exclusive referent for women. The work of feminist theory in IR as well as in other 
fields needs to move beyond juxtaposing the two; here gender is understood as an all-encompassing term 
for all gendered identities including non-conforming gender groups or what has been called gender 
minorities which include the LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender; and Intersexed) community. 
Throughout the paper, the term ‘gender minorities’ will be used interchangeably with all groups within 
the LGBTI community.  
5.3 Proving Causality 
George and Bennett (2005: 73)  explain that confirmation of a causal theory occurs when the predicted 
pattern of co-variation between the independent and dependent variables is present in the case and 
evidence within the case confirms that the causal links, paths or mechanisms specified or implied by the 
theory are present as well.  An independent variable is causally relevant when it causes a positive 
outcome.  
To depict causal links between the variables the study mainly makes use of the co-variance approach. In 
the study the causal variables are the independent variables. Brockington (2006) explains co-variance as 
a condition where two processes vary together which can also be understood as an association or 
correlation between the two variables. The way that this correlation is determined will depend on the 
measures or indicators specified by the researcher. So for example, in this study where there is  an 
                                                          
14Second generation rights can be understood as "group rights" or "collective rights"; for example the rights to 
education, to health and social security. 
Third generation rights may be invoked of the state and demanded of it; for example self-determination, as well 
as a host of normative expressions whose status as human rights is controversial at present.; for example the 
right to development, the right to peace, and a right to a healthy environment. 
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objective to determine co-variance between the two factors; political transitions and the passing of an 
anti-homosexuality act the indicators for the independent variables would be a test of post-conflict 
reconstruction and/or a change in political systems in the particular site. As such, indicators have been 
defined for each of the variables.  
No methods of comparison have directly been applied between the case studies. This is because the 
variables have all been identified from the literature and the claim is that they are all causally relevant. 
However, there could be space in the findings for a ranking of intensity of influence. Additionally 
process tracing of the bills was used to determine causality where co-variance is unable to.  
Process tracing is a method of case study research design that can identify different causal paths to an 
outcome, point out variables that otherwise might be left out, check for falsity, and allow causal 
inferences on the basis of a few cases (George and Bennett; 1997). This method will be used in looking 
at the process of the laws from introduction to passing. Descriptions of the different key actors at 
different stages and the different stages that the bills went through will be determined through process 
tracing. The usage of process tracing particularly in application to the course of the laws is that it informs 
the findings on the temporal element of the research question-the why now element? 
The study will also make use of congruence
15
 to rank the causal applicability of each independent 
variable. In other words, although comparison will not be used for the case studies there is space in the 
methods to measure the causal intensity of each independent variable. For example looking at the 
international impacts and their indicators (growth of Christian Right Wing evangelism in Africa and 
international human rights advocacy) set against the national impacts and their indicators (change in 
political systems in Uganda and Nigeria); the method of congruence allows for a comparative measure of 
causal intensity between the two variables. In this case for example, the methods allow for there to be 
determinacy in which variable is more impactful and had a more significant influence on the passing of 
the laws in each respective case.   
5.4 Case Study Selection 
Inductive research is by definition case orientated. According to Fox (2008: 429) case studies are used to 
stimulate case building and to assess the plausibility of the theories developed. The cases should be 
picked in such a way that falsifiability is possible. This means that the theory should be applicable to 
more cases than those picked. In other words, a study is stronger if the researcher can show that where 
the outcome is negative, there is a missing independent variable (also see George and Bennett, 2005). 
The case studies for research also serve as the unit of analysis.  
In this study the case selection was framed by the outcome which is also the dependent variable, then 
variance on the independent variables was used to achieve falsifiability. In this case selection the cases 
have different profiles in that they are different where the independent variables are concerned. For 
example the national, regional and international impacts regarding the laws are dissimilar in each 
                                                          
15 George and Bennett (2005: 235) define congruence as a way to deal with the possibility of an over-estimated 
causal link between the independent variable and the outcome. In this study for example, if a case occurs in a 
country where there was no political transition between the years 2006 and2014 congruence allows for an 
explanation through consistence between the variables through explaining the speed, depth, or temporal state 
of causality. 
32 | P a g e  
 
country. As a result the impact that the political transitions in Nigeria had on the law will not be the same 
as the transitions in Uganda.  
The selected time frame of the study was informed by a review of i) other laws that have been passed in 
other parts of the continent that are regressive for gender emancipation. For example; the 2014 Kenyan 
Polygamy Bill (which allows men to take on a limitless number of wives without signatory participation 
from the first wife), the 2014 Ugandan Anti-Pornography bill (which limits women’s dress code and 
behaviour in public spheres-also known as the anti-mini skirt law) a similar bill was passed in Swaziland 
in 2009, and the 2009 South African Traditional Courts Bill (which indirectly makes women and children 
second-class justice citizens through reviving the tribal courts system in chiefdoms). The implication of 
the escalation of what can be described as gender repressive laws around the continent is that there seems 
to a process of reinforcement of the gender hierarchy; a redrawing of an equilibrium  that disadvantages- 
in different degrees, those at the bottom of the hierarchy.  
The two cases in Nigeria and Uganda were chosen because the Acts were signed weeks between one 
another, they both occurred in 2014 and both provide Subsaharn Africa with some of the most severe 
offences and penalties. At the time of beginning the study only the two laws in Uganda and Nigeria had 
been implemented, Gambia also passed a similar law in October 2014. 2014 thus has been the peak of 
anti-homosexuality laws severity in Africa with the most renewed laws in Africa since the debate began. 
Another factor that made Uganda and Nigeria interesting is that both countries are former British 
colonies that have in fact inherited these laws through colonial Penal Codes and have decided to rewrite 
them and strengthen sentences and enforcement of the laws. The difference between the two sets of laws; 
Penal Codes and current laws is that in the Penal Codes the sexual act was always criminalised, while the 
Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda and the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act in Nigeria go further 
and criminalise the individual, the knowledge of possible offenders, advocacy for LGBTI communities. 
Uganda goes as far as to criminalise anyone who “aids and abets” offenders.  
Nigeria 
Nigeria has criminalised homosexuality since it was under British colonial rule. Criminal Code Act, 
Chapter 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 sections 214, 215, 217 make it a felony punishable 
by fourteen years’ imprisonment for any person who has “carnal knowledge of any person against the 
order of nature” or any animal, or allows another person to have carnal knowledge of him or her.” 217 
specifically states, “any male person who, whether in public or private, commits any act of gross 
indecency with another male person, or procures another male person to commit any act by any male 
person with himself or with another male person, whether in public or private, is guilty of a felony, and is 
liable to imprisonment for three years.” (White, 2012:7).  
In November 2011, the Senate of Nigeria passed the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill. The House of 
Representatives of Nigeria, in May 2013, also passed the Bill which was sent to the president for his 
assent. President Goodluck Jonathan signed the bill into law in January 2014. Which states that “Couples 
who marry could face up to 14 years each in prison; witnesses or anyone who helps couples marry could 
be sentenced to 10 years behind bars”. Twelve states in North Nigeria adopted the Islamic Shari’ah laws 
criminalizing same-sex activities with the maximum penalty between men being the death penalty and for 
women: whipping and/or imprisonment (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2013: 45).  
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Uganda 
Like Nigeria, Uganda’s Penal Code Act of 1950 (Chapter 120)145, 146, and 148 which dates back to 
British colonial era is similar to Nigeria’s laws criminalizing homosexual acts. Sections 145-146 makes it 
a felony punishable by seven years to anyone who “has carnal knowledge of any person against the order 
of nature, has carnal knowledge of any animal, or if a person allows a male to have carnal knowledge of 
him or her against the order of nature, commits an offence and is liable for imprisonment for life.” 
(White, 2012: 7). 
In 2009, the Ugandan Senate introduced the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which would have the effect of 
intensifying the laws against homosexuals in the country. When it was introduced the law was initially 
called the “Kill the Gays bill” in media because of the original death penalty clauses that it carried. In 
2013 parliament dropped the death penalty clauses for life imprisonment instead. In February 2014 the 
bill was passed into law.  This bill criminalizes homosexual conduct in Uganda and for Ugandans outside 
of Uganda as well. The bill also includes penalties for individuals, companies, media organizations and 
NGO’s that support, promote, excuse or don’t report acts of homosexuality (Karimi and Thompson, 
2014). 
In both Nigeria and Uganda homosexual conduct and same –sex marriage are seemingly linked. 
Homosexual conduct is illegal, therefore homosexuals cannot get married, in other words legally, they are 
treated the same. Only Nigeria’s legislation has explicitly mentioned the prohibition of same-sex 
marriage, however this was an addition to the existing laws prohibiting the conduct.   
5.5 Sources for Research 
The data used in the study was retrieved from Hansard Parliamentary Records, press statements, 
speeches, petitions, letter between different actors, the actual bills and acts on text that were passed as 
well as the steps taken at each state level to pass the bill through media reports, articles, blogs, 
government social media pages. 
Secondly a vast amount of literature on all the selected indicators was used for the study. This requires a 
country-by-country profile of the legislative procedures undertaken for the bills. The different 
government websites are also essential to get policy discourse on the selected issues. Speeches and media 
portals of the countries concerned during the processing of the bill will also be studied.   
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6. CASE STUDY PRESENTATION:  
TRACING THE PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION ON HOMOSEXUALITY IN NIGERIA AND 
UGANDA 2006- 2014 
6.1 Nigeria 
The Nigerian Same-Sex Prohibition Act 
Although the prohibition of homosexuality in Nigeria also dates back to British colonial rule, in 1990 
amendments were made to Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77 in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 
sections 214, 215 and 217. These amendments made it a felony punishable by fourteen years’ 
imprisonment for any person who has “carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature or any 
animal, or allows another person to have carnal knowledge of him or her.” Section 217 specifically states 
that, “any male person who, whether in public or private, commits any act of gross indecency with 
another male person, or procures another male person to commit any act by any male person with himself 
or with another male person, whether in public or private, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to 
imprisonment for three years.” (White, 2012:7) 
In November 2011, the Senate of Nigeria passed the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill. The House of 
Representatives of Nigeria, in May 2013, also passed the bill which was sent to the president for his 
approbation. President Goodluck Jonathan signed the bill into law in January 2014, which states that 
“same sex couples who marry could face up to fourteen years each in prison. Witnesses or anyone who 
help couples marry could be sentenced to ten years behind bars.” In 1999 when Shari’ah Law was 
adopted by twelve Northern states. Shari’ah Law applies to all Muslims and those who voluntarily 
consent to the jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts.  Chapter 3, Part 3, Sections 128-129 of the Kano State 
Shari’ah Penal Code Law of 2000 the offence of ‘sodomy” is punishable “with caning of one hundred 
lashes if unmarried” and one year imprisonment and “if married or has been previously married, with 
stoning to death” (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2013: 44). 
Colonial Laws on Homosexuality 
The legal intolerance of LGBTI persons in Nigeria has existed long before independence in October 
1960. As a legacy of the colonial period there were two Penal provisions that covered homosexual 
conduct; the Penal Code which was applicable in northern Nigeria and the Criminal Code, applicable 
southern Nigeria (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2013: 43). The Criminal Code’s provisions define 
homosexual conduct as “unnatural offences” and prescribe fourteen years’ imprisonment for any person 
who “has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature, or […] permits a male person to 
have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature” (Section 214 (a), (c).  
The 2006 Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill  
On 18 January 2006 the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill was proposed by Justice Minister Bayo 
Ojo and read to the National Assembly. This first reading of the Bill was unsuccessful.  It received much 
opposition from civil society organisations and was subsequently stalled in the legislature because of the 
upcoming April 2007 elections (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Under the leadership of former President 
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Olesegun Obasanjo in January 2007, the Bill was approved by the Federal Executive Council and the bill 
was reintroduced to the National Assembly for a second reading (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2013: 42). 
The bill was originally presented as "A Bill for an Act to Make Provisions for the Prohibition of Sexual 
Relationships Between Persons of the Same Sex, Celebration of Marriage by Them, and for Other 
Matters Connected Therewith,". The bill would impose a five- year prison sentence on people who “[go] 
through the ceremony of marriage with a person of the same sex”, those conducting same sex marriage 
ceremonies as well as those advocating for LGBTI rights or lifestyles (Mittlestaedt, 2009: 371).  
The proposed bill was met with opposition from civil rights organisations due to its violation of 
fundamental liberties enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999, as 
amended). For example section 39(1) states that “Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, 
including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without 
interference.” Additionally, sections 38(1), 37, 40 and 42(1) provide all persons with the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion as well as the right to decide freely on his/her private life. The Bill 
also violated international agreements that Nigeria had ratified, for example the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights which Nigeria ratified in 1983 and the UN Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders (Mittlestaedt, 2009: 373). The Bill can also be seen as a last-resort effort for Obasanjo to 
retain his Presidency after failing to pass the Bill to amend the Constitution’s limit on the number of 
presidential terms. The 2006 Same-Sex (Prohibition) Bill thus failed to be passed before the general 
elections of 2007.  
The Same Gender (Prohibition) Bill 2008 
In January 2009 the “Same Gender Marriage (Prohibition) Bill 2008” was presented to the National 
Assembly by the Senate as a sequel to the 2006 draft bill. Amnesty International (2009) provides the 
following information on the contents of the 2008 bill: 
The bill defines “Same Gender Marriage” as “the coming together of persons of the same sex with the 
purpose of living [sic] together as husband and wife or for other purposes of same sexual relationship.” 
Under the bill, any person who “entered into a same gender marriage contract” would be subject to up to 
three years’ imprisonment. The clause extends the definition of “Same Gender Marriage” to “other 
purposes of same sexual relationships” and could lead to arbitrary arrests on the basis of allegations 
about sexual orientation, rumours of sexual behaviour or objection to gender presentation.  
Article 4 (2) (a) of the draft bill provides for the sentencing of any person who “witnesses, abets [sic] and 
aids the solemnization of a same gender marriage” with five years’ imprisonment and/or a possible fine 
of N2000. Any priest, cleric or other religious actor found to have aided or abetted such a union would be 
subject under this new law to a prison term. 
Article 4(2) of the draft bill states that “Any persons or group of persons who witness such a marriage 
could be sentenced to a fine of N50000”.  
In early March the bill was referred to the Nigerian Joint Committee on Human Rights, Justice and 
Women’s Affairs, awaiting a public hearing to be held on 11 March 2009. However, no progress was 
made toward enacting the Bill prior to the then current administration’s end in May 2011 (Kaleidoscope 
Trust Briefing, 2014).  
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Reactions 
On 11 March 2009 a public hearing on the bill was held in Abuja on the Same Gender Marriage 
(Prohibition) Bill 2008. In reaction to the bill, the International Centre for Reproductive Health and 
Sexual Rights formed a consortium of human rights organisations. The consortium responded and 
attended the public hearings, which were held at the National Assembly on February 14, 2007 and 
March 11, 2009. During the hearings the consortium expressed the various human rights implications 
of the bill and its threat to the socio-economic development of Nigeria as well as the severing of 
international ties that the country has (Changing Attitudes Nigeria, 2011).  
Global Rights and Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2009) released statements after the 
March 11 public hearing that highlighted the redundancy of the bill; stating that same-sex relations 
were illegal through Nigerian Penal Codes to begin with, thus legally prohibiting marriage between 
persons of the same sex is a effort to increase stigmatization of homosexuality and provide official 
grounds for exclusion, harassment, arrests and prosecutions of those suspected to be homosexual.   
A March 2009 article in Leadership (Esebonu, 2009) reports that the Human Rights Writers 
Association (HURIWA) of Nigeria made a “passionate appeal to members of the Federal House of 
Representatives to quickly pass the bill that will spell out punitive measures against same sex 
marriage.” Emmanuel Onwubiko of HURIWA was quoted saying: 
These are un-African deviant practices and ought to be criminalised; as people who represent the interest of our 
African people, we are urging that whatever legislative measures that is considered necessary against this fight 
should be enacted to prohibit these atrocious practices of same sex 
An article dated 15 March 2009 in Daily Trust reports that Ustaz Hudu Muhammad, chief Iman of 
Damaturu Central Mosque “called on Muslim and Christian clerics, as well as “people of goodwill,” 
to speak against homosexuality. He further called on the National Assembly to enact punitive laws 
against such acts. In a 25 March 2009 editorial, the Abuja-based Daily Trust gave strong support to 
the bill and denounced the gay rights activists, calling on elected officials to ban “all forms of gay 
activism” as well and stating: “let [sic] their march on the National Assembly be the last gay 
assembly to be witnessed in Nigeria.” (Idris, 2009). 
In November 2011, sixteen international human rights groups including Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) 
signed a letter to the Nigerian government condemning the bill, calling it a violation of the freedoms of 
expression, association and assembly guaranteed by international law as well as by the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and a barrier to the struggle against the spread of HIV/AIDS 
(Human Rights Watch, 2011). The groups also included in the same statement the serious 
implications the bill would have public health and specifically HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.  
In attempt to discourage the Nigerian government from passing the bill US President Barack Obama 
issued a statement in September 2011 threatening to cut off aid to Nigeria should the bill pass 
through the House of Representatives and be signed by the President. Addressing Nigerian media 
regarding Obama’s statement Member of Parliament Zakari Mohammed said   
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We have a culture, we have religious beliefs and we have a tradition. We are black people. We are not white, and 
so the U.S cannot impose its culture on us. Same sex marriage is alien to our culture and we can never give it a 
chance. So if [Western nations] withhold their aid to us, to hell with them. (Nsehe, 2011) 
The 2013 Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill 
Changing Attitudes Nigeria (2011) explained in an article dated 28 September 2011, the steps the bill had 
taken by then: 
The Nigerian [sic] government has been seeking to further criminalise same-sex relations in Nigeria through the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage since 2006 when the first bill was sent to the parliament by the presidency 
during the regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. This bill died a natural death in April 2007, when a new 
administration was elected into power; with the now since deceased Umar Yar’dua as President. 
Later in 2007 Nigeria’s lower chamber, the House of Representatives, received a similar bill, which had been re-
titled: “A bill for an act to prohibit marriage between persons of same gender, solemnisation of same and for other 
matters related therewith”. The difference here was that the term sex in the initial bill had been replaced with the 
word gender. 
For the second time, the bill died a natural death in April, 2011, when the Goodluck Jonathan administration was 
elected to power. This same bill has now surfaced again and it is now being titled: “A bill for an act for the [sic] 
prohibition of [sic] marriage between persons of same sex, solemnisation of same and for other matters related 
therewith.” The term gender in the previous bill has been replaced with the word sex. 
On 29 November 2011, the Senate of Nigeria passed the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill. The bill 
was then passed on 2 July 2013 by the House of Representatives of Nigeria. In the second half of 2013 
the bill was referred to a Conference Committee in the Senate to synchronize minor differences in 
language between the Senate bill and the House of Representatives bill. The Committee returned with the 
consolidated bill in December 2013. The Bill was subsequently signed by President Goodluck Jonathan 
on 7 January 2014 (Kaleidoscope Trust Briefing, 2014). 
The current legislation contains all the restrictions outlined in the earlier bill; the only difference is in the 
severity of punishments for offenders. Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Act largely restate the extant legal 
position in Nigeria, reiterating that same-sex marriage is not legal. However, section 5 of the Act 
establishes new criminal sanctions of up to fourteen years’ imprisonment for those who seek to enter into 
a same-sex marriage or civil union. The section also imposes criminal penalties of up to ten years’ 
imprisonment on those who witness a same-sex marriage or civil union. The broad definition of “civil 
union” means that any arrangement by which same-sex couples live together is prohibited (Obidimma 
and Obidimma, 2013: 45) 
Section 4(1) of the Act prohibits the registration of “gay clubs, societies and organisations, their 
sustenance, processions and meetings” with similar punishments of imprisonment for any individual 
who tries to register or participate in such a club, society or organisation. Section 4(2) of the Act 
criminalises “public shows of amorous same-sex relationships directly or indirectly” with up to ten 
years’ imprisonment. The Act also makes a person or group of persons that “witness, abet and aids 
the solemnization of a same sex marriage or civil union, or supports the registrations, operation and 
sustenance of gay clubs, societies, organizations, processions or meetings in Nigeria” liable for ten 
years’ imprisonment (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2013: 45).  
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6.2 Uganda 
Uganda’s Penal Code Act of 1950 (Chapter 120)145, 146, and 148 which dates back to British 
colonial era is similar to Nigeria’s laws criminalizing homosexual acts. Sections 145-146 makes it a 
felony punishable by seven years to anyone who “has carnal knowledge of any person against the 
order of nature, has carnal knowledge of any animal, or if a person allows a male to have carnal 
knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, commits an offence and is liable for 
imprisonment for life.” (White, 2012: 7). 
In 2009, the Ugandan Senate introduced the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which would have the effect 
of intensifying the laws against homosexuals in the country. When it was introduced the law was 
initially called the “Kill the Gays bill” in media because of the original death penalty clauses that it 
carried for being a "homosexual". In 2013 parliament dropped the death penalty clauses for life 
imprisonment instead. In February 2014 the bill was passed into law.  This Act criminalizes 
homosexual conduct in Uganda and for Ugandans outside of Uganda as well. The Act also includes 
penalties for individuals, companies, media organizations and NGO’s that support, promote, excuse 
or don’t report acts of homosexuality (Karimi and Thompson, 2014). 
In August 2014, the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 was annulled by the Ugandan Constitutional 
Court on a procedural ground-the law was passed unconstitutionally and is deemed "null and void," 
on grounds that the process had contravened the constitution, as it has been passed in parliament in 
December without the necessary quorum of lawmakers. 
Anti-Homosexuality Laws Revisited 
Uganda’s re-criminalization of homosexuality stems legislatively as a legacy from the British 
colonial Penal Codes that criminalize ‘sex against the order of nature’ (Nyanzi, 2014: 14). From the 
year 2000 Ugandan LGBTI persons started experiencing increasing pressure on their legal 
protection. Before 2000 male homosexual behaviour was illegal but would result, at most, in a short 
jail sentence or fines; female homosexual activity on the other hand was not legally prohibited 
although it was met with serious social discrimination. Revisions were implemented in 2000 that 
made all homosexual activity illegal and punishable by life imprisonment, making Uganda one of the 
most hostile places in the world to live as an LGBTI person (Kretz, 2013: 219). 
Before the 2009 bill was introduced it was preceded by an increased interest among MPs in a wide 
range of issues relating to homosexuality. Evangelical pastors led by Martin Ssempa of Makerere 
Community Church, Stephen Langa of Family Life Network and supported by American evangelical 
groups led by Scott Lively who is the President of Abiding Truth Ministries launched a campaign to 
fight what they described as the Western and un-African intrusion of homosexuality  (Jjuuko and 
Tumwesige, 2013: 7). These actors justified their actions as being in the interest of the protection of 
children and the African family unit. In 2005 an amendment was included in the Constitution of 
Uganda 1995 which prohibited same sex marriages (Sadgrove et al. 2012). Various anti-gay marches 
were organised in Kampala drawing crowds onto the streets to denounce homosexuals as perverted 
individuals who were paid by Americans and Europeans to recruit school children into the practice 
of homosexuality. After an anti-gay conference which was facilitated by Scott Lively and two other 
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Americans, the then Minister of Ethics and Integrity, Hon. Nsaba Buturo announced that a new 
‘tough law on gays’ was to be looked at (Jjuuko and Tumwesige, 2013:8) 
 
In March 2009, all MPs were invited to attend a seminar called ‘Exposing the truth about 
homosexuality and the homosexual agenda’ in the Parliament Conference Hall, which was 
advertised as addressing the ‘dangers of homosexuality’. Hosting and speaking at this seminar was 
Scott Lively, International Healing Foundation’s Caleb Brundidge, Stephen Langa of Uganda’s 
Family Life Network and Exodus International’s board member Don Schmierer (Burroway, 2009). 
At this seminar MPs also debated diverse issues such as “gay activists addressing a press 
conference” and the inadequate law enforcement response to this (Hansard, Hon. Sebaggala MP)16; 
marriage between persons of the same sex as a ‘threat to human civilisation’ (Hansard, Dr Buturo 
MP); the external funding of political parties by ‘undesirable forces’ such as ‘perversion groups’ like 
‘the scourge of homosexuals’ (Hansard, Mr Katende MP); and same-sex sexual harassment in 
policing (Hansard, Mr Kasaija MP).   
In September 2009 Hon. David Bahati, Member of Parliament for Ndorwa East Constituency, 
Kabale District, introduced a private member bill that would intensify the repression of LGBTI 
people and those in support of LGBTI rights (Kretz, 2013: 219) which was presented to the 
Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (CLPA).  Bahati at the time was a backbencher, first 
term Member of Parliament who had deep ties to American religious conservatives. There were 
several new provisions made by the 2009 draft bill; first it strengthened the criminalisation of 
homosexual activity directly; second, the law implemented a death penalty for “aggravated 
homosexuality”, acts falling into this category included a second violation of the prohibition on 
same-sex activity and any sexual activity with a minor, disabled person or a person who was HIV 
positive; third, the Bill proposed criminalising the actions of anyone who “aids, abets, counsels, or 
procures another to engage of acts of homosexuality”, the latter is punishable by up to seven years in 
prison (Anti-Homosexuality Bill, Part II(3)(1) (a)—(g), supra note 1, 2009). This in essence includes 
any heterosexual person who engages in the “promotion of homosexuality”, “fund[ing] or 
sponsor[ing] homosexuality or other related activity” or “us[ing] electronic devices….for the 
purposes of homosexuality or promoting homosexuality” (Anti-Homosexuality Bill, supra note 1, 
2009). The Preamble of the bill reads:  
The object of this Bill is to establish comprehensive consolidated legislation to protect the traditional 
family by prohibiting (i) any form of sexual relations between persons of the same sex; and (ii) the 
promotion or recognition of such sexual relations in public institutions and other places through or with 
the support of any Government entity in Uganda or any non-governmental organization inside or outside 
the country. This Bill aims at strengthening the nation’s capacity to deal with emerging internal and 
external threats to the traditional heterosexual family. This legislation further recognizes the fact that 
same sex attraction is not an innate and immutable characteristic. The Bill further aims at providing a 
comprehensive and enhanced legislation to protect the cherished culture of the people of Uganda. Legal, 
religious, and traditional family values of the people of Uganda against the attempts of sexual rights 
activists seeking to impose their values of sexual promiscuity on the people of Uganda. There is also need 
to protect the children and youths of Uganda who are made vulnerable to sexual abuse and deviation as 
a result of cultural changes, uncensored information technologies, parentless child developmental 
                                                          
16 Uganda Hansard parliamentary records found in (Johnson, 2014) 
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settings and increasing attempts by homosexuals to raise children in homosexual relationships through 
adoption, foster care, or otherwise (Anti-Homosexuality Bill, supra note 1.1, 2009) 
Reactions 
The bill received immense support within Uganda and in Parliament, although external observers 
showed contempt. With the bill indefinitely put on pause, global icons and leaders such as the Arch 
Bishop Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela, Ban Ki-Moon, David Cameron and Barak Obama publicly 
condemned the bill on the grounds of human rights concerns and its direct prejudicial and oppressive 
nature (Rice, 2009). The publicity and media reactions the bill incited, led to public outcry, leading to 
large community campaigns against LGBTI people in Uganda. In October 2010, the Ugandan 
weekly tabloid newspaper Rolling Stone ran a front page story publishing pictures and names of 
Uganda’s “100 known homosexuals” (Kretz, 2013: 220).  Large scale violence and threats followed. 
One of Uganda’s most outspoken LGBTI activists, David Kato was found hacked to death in his 
home just months after the paper was published. This resulted in some LGBTI fleeing the country for 
asylum purposes (Levantis, 2012; Day, 2011). The bill, mainly due to the death penalty clause-did 
not pass.  
Parts of Ugandan civil society reacted to the bill by forming a coalition of civil society organisations 
to oppose the bill. This was the Civil Society Coalition on Human Rights and Constitutional Law 
(CSCHRCL), an umbrella of over 45 sexual minority and mainstream human rights organisations 
coming together to oppose the affront to human rights and criminal justice posed by the bill (Jjuuko 
and Tumwesige, 2013: 4). The opposition the bill faced, forced President Yoweri Museveni to appeal 
to members of Parliament to put the bill on hold as it was a foreign policy issue (Olupot and Musoke, 
2010). There were statements by the Minister of Investment stating that the bill would be harmful for 
investment and a Cabinet Sub-Committee submitting a paper stating that the bill was not necessary 
as it simply replicated existing laws (BBC, 2010; The Daily Monitor, 2010). 
In October 2009 Sylvia Tamale, Professor of Law and Trustee of the Equal Rights Trust at Makerere 
University in Uganda delivered a speech at Makerere University, Kampala that highlighted the 
human rights implications of passing the 2009 bill in a manner that would appeal to rational 
objectivity. She pointed out that the Anti-Homosexuality bill contained a total of eighteen clauses 
that were duplicated from the pre-colonial Penal Codes; that means 67 per cent of the clauses were 
not new at all (Tamale, 2009). 
The first serious implication is emphasised in clause 13 which attempts to outlaw the ‘Promotion of 
Homosexuality’. This clause introduces extensive censorship and subverts fundamental freedoms 
such as the rights to free speech, expression, association and assembly. Secondly, the criminalization 
of ‘funding and sponsoring of homosexuality and related activities’ jettisons Uganda’s public health 
policies and efforts. An example is used of the work Uganda has been doing on the Most At Risk 
Populations’ Initiative (MARPI) introduced by the Ministry of Health in 2008, which targets specific 
populations in a comprehensive manner to curb the HIV/AIDS scourge. If this bill becomes law, 
health practitioners as well as those that have put money into this exemplary initiative will 
automatically be liable to imprisonment for seven years. Finally Tamale looks at clause 18 which 
would require Uganda to extract itself out of any international treaty that the country has previously 
ratified that goes against the values entrenched in the bill (Tamale, 2009: 50-51; also see Kretz, 2012: 
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2011-215). Some of these agreements include following international human rights treaties: 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and protocols; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW); African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC); and, Maputo Protocol (Kaleidoscope Trust Briefing, 2014).  
Revised Bill and Parliamentary Processes 
In late 2011, the bill re-emerged, this time under the leadership of speaker Rebecca Kadaga, it 
remained similar to the 2009 bill, with the exception of the then removed death penalty as a possible 
sentence for those convicted of aggravated homosexuality, which was replaced with life 
imprisonment instead (BBC, 2012; All Africa, 2012). The revised bill contained the exact same 
provisions as the 2009 bill.  
Kadaga made reference to public outcry from failure to pass the 2009 bill as motivation to hasten the 
parliamentary process for the bill. She was quoted promising the Anti-Homosexuality bill as a 
“Christmas gift” to Ugandans (Biryabarema, 2012). There was indeed pressure from Ugandan anti-
gay activists, who took to the streets in thousands to pressurise the government to pass the bill. Many 
Ugandan citizens were in support of the bill citing the widespread belief that homosexuality was 
being imported into Uganda and young children were being recruited into the practice. For example, 
the Pew Research Centre’s 2013 Global Attitudes Project found that 96% of the surveyed Ugandans 
agree with the statement ‘Homosexuality should be rejected’. Moreover, parts of the Ugandan media 
actively participate in campaigns against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered people (Human 
Rights Watch 2006, 2009). 
In August 2011, the cabinet discussed the bill, deciding unanimously that current laws making 
homosexuality illegal were sufficient. The bill thus failed to be passed by Christmas, it was however 
“fast tracked” for the parliamentary sessions in the following year.  
In February 2012 the bill received a First Reading and was resubmitted for consideration in the 
CLPA.  A final report was produced by the CLPA in November 2012. This majority report was 
accompanied by a separate minority report (Johnson, 2014: 9). The majority report moved for the bill 
to be passed. There were amendments recommended by the report that would have to be considered 
for application. First was the removal of the death penalty for ‘aggravated homosexuality’; the 
elimination of the ‘attempts to commit homosexuality’ offence clause; the ‘failure to disclose the 
offence’ clause; the removal of the clause providing extra territorial jurisdiction for the legislation to 
cover Ugandans globally, even those with permanent residence in different countries and the deletion 
of  the clause that invalidated inconsistent international treaties, protocols, declarations and 
conventions, which also contained a sub-clause stating that certain definitions (such as ‘sexual 
orientation’) ‘shall not be used in any way to legitimize homosexuality, gender identity disorders and 
related practices in Uganda’. All the proposed amendments were accepted by MP’s with the 
exception of the proposal on the ‘attempt to commit homosexuality’ when the bill of 2009 was 
considered at Committee stage (Johnson, 2014: 10). 
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The minority report that was also submitted moved that the 2009 Anti-Homosexuality Bill to ‘be 
rejected by this House and no further consideration of the same be done’ (Johnson, 2014:10). The 
minority report had six recommendations. The first was an appeal to Article 27 of the Ugandan 
Constitution which protects the right to privacy of person, home and other property to motivate an 
appeal for privacy of individuals. The second was the indication that the state should not involve 
itself in the sexual affairs of two consenting adults, in the same manner that the sexual affairs of a 
heterosexual married couple are not legally monitored. The third was the affirmation that children do 
need to be protected from homosexual recruitment, however there were no specific provisions for 
this in the 2009 bill. Fourth was that the legislation would breach international agreements and 
treaties that Uganda has ratified. Fifth was that the legislation was ‘discriminatory’ and that ‘rather 
than persecute the homosexuals in our society, the State should be trying to find ways to help them 
reform’. The last recommendation was that the new 2009 bill did ‘not add any significant value’ to 
the requirements stated in the Penal Codes (Johnson, 2014:11).  
The minority report was subsequently speedily discarded. The signatories of the minority report were 
absent during the Second Reading of the CPLA reports and were thus excluded from the process and 
any potential for debate obliterated. This potentially contravened the Ugandan Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure (Johnson, 2014: 11). The signatories of the minority report were left out of Parliament 
proceedings on that particular day because the bill was left out of the Order Paper for debate. David 
Bahati admitted to purposely leaving the dissenters out of the proceedings, he was quoted stating:  
We knew that if it were to be included on the order paper, they [the dissenters] would scheme against it, 
it was in our plan that members request for it and the speaker uses her prerogative to have it included on 
the order paper (Kaaya and Kakaire, 2013) 
 
On 1 May 2014 a leading anti-gay campaign coalition group called Coalition for Advancement of 
Moral Values (CAMOVA) delivered to parliament a letter appealing for passing of the Anti 
Homosexuality bill. The letter referred to ‘The Horrors of homosexuality’ and gave a ‘detailed’ 
explanation of what, according to CAMOVA, were the real dangers concerned with homosexuality 
that Parliament needed to be aware of in debating this bill. The details offered in this letter included 
anal sex and the dangers involved in that and other ‘deviant’ sexual practices that homosexuals part 
take in. Graphic images
17
 of the said physical and medical dangers surrounding homosexual sexual 
practices were presented (CSCHRCL, 2014). The letter closed in saying: 
 
Our leaders have a clear choice. It is choosing [sic] between defending and promoting Uganda’s interests 
and those of promoters of a practice whose dangers to nations are well known. It is also to choose 
between God and man. Should promises of money cause us to offend God and sell the future of Uganda? 
GOD BLESS YOU, GOD BLESS UGANDA! 
   
                                                          
17 Images were included of a young man suffering from serious rectal injuries and another whose genitals were 
deformed through surgery.  
The letter also highlights what CAMOVA considers homosexual sex practices, these include “fisting”, ”golden 
showers”, “orgies”, “rimming”, “sexualisation of human excreta” please download letter on:  
http://www.ugandans4rights.org/attachments/article/416/CAMOVA_protect_the_children.pdf 
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There were discussions and debates that took place in Parliament regarding whether Parliament had 
reached quorum or not concerning the bill with a significant group of the Committee absent. During 
the Committee stage, the Prime Minister stated twice that the House did not reach quorum as the 
Rules of Procedure required (Johnson, 2014:13). According to the Ugandan Constitution (Article 
88(1) The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995), a quorum is reached when one third of 
Parliament is entitled to vote. The Chairperson and Speaker Kadaga, failed on both occasions to 
recognise the absence of quorum as pointed out by the Prime Minister (Johnson, 2014:15).  The 2009 
Anti-Homosexuality Bill was thus passed by the Ugandan Parliament on 20 December 2013, 
although it still needed the signatory power of the President of Uganda before the bill became law.  
 
The 2014 Anti-Homosexuality Act 
President Museveni, after weeks of deliberation signed the bill into law on 24 February 2014. 
According to government spokesperson Ofwono Opondo, this followed weeks of negotiation and 
consideration. President Museveni’s decision was based on a report by medical experts presented at 
an NRM party retreat in Kyankwazi, saying that "homosexuality is not genetic but a social 
behaviour". Museveni had previously stated that he would only sign the bill into law, if scientists 
could prove that homosexuality was learned and social behaviour, not genetic. According to a press 
release by the Presidential Press Unit (2014), Museveni sought advice from local scientists as well as 
American medical scientists. The following seven findings were presented in the reports by the 
Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health Scientific Statement on Homosexuality, 2014: 8 also see 
NRM Caucus Report): 
a) There is no definitive gene responsible for homosexuality  
b) Homosexuality is not a disease  
c) Homosexuality is not an abnormality 
d) In every society, there are a small number of people with homosexual tendencies 
e) Homosexuality can be influenced by environmental factors (e.g. culture, religion, information, peer 
pressure 
f) The practice needs regulation like any other human behaviour, especially to protect the vulnerable 
g) There is need for studies to address sexualities in the African context.  
 
Three weeks later on March 11th 2014 a petition against Uganda's Anti Homosexuality Act (2014) 
was filed at Uganda's Constitutional Court under the organisation of the Legal Committee of the 
CSCHRCL. The Petition represented a concerted effort by ten petitioners including civil society, 
parliamentarians and academics: Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango, MP Fox Odoi-Oywelowo, veteran 
journalist Andrew Mwenda, Prof. Morris Ogenga Latigo, Dr. Paul Nsubuga Ssemugooma, 
Jacqueline Kasha Nabagesera, Julian Pepe Onziema, and Frank Mugisha, the indigenous civil 
society organizations; Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF) and the Centre for 
Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD). The aim was to challenge the constitutionality 
of the “Draconian” Anti-Homosexuality Act, which further undermines the already precarious rights 
of sexual and gender minorities, and also jeopardizes the work of all those who believe in human 
rights for all (CSCHRCL, 2014). On 1 August 2014, the Ugandan Constitutional Court announced 
the annulment of the law due to lack of required quorum at the passing of the bill, this was celebrated 
by civil organisation groups as a success of the justice system. MP Bahati has already publicly 
denounced the court ruling saying: 
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The court case ruling is no victory at all, the morals of the people of Uganda will prevail […] The Attorney 
General who is very competent will petition the constitutional court over the constitutional court ruling. Our 
competent legal team will continue to petition the Supreme Court and I believe we will win.” (Bwire, 2014). 
 
Worthy to note, the case of Prof. J Oloka-‐Onyango & 9 Others v. Attorney General (Petition No.8 
of 2014) contained claims of the breach of Parliamentary Rules of Procedure through the absence of 
quorum at the passing of the bill as well as the violations of the bill of the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom from discrimination and from cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, rights to 
privacy among others. At the time this paper was being written, only the ground of quorum was ruled 
on (CSCHRCL Press Statement, 2014).  
 
Uganda presented a wider covered case in media and literature than Nigeria; this can partly be 
attributed to the initial death sentence clause that came with the 2009 draft. Both countries were 
under British colonial rule and have largely kept the structure and language of the Penal Codes. In 
both cases the narratives of African culture, traditions, religion and he importance of family are 
drawn upon by political leaders. The ignorance of the direct contravention between these laws and 
citizens’ constitutional rights is present in both cases. There is also a stark redundancy in the laws in 
that in both countries, homosexuality was illegal prior to introduction of the bills. Essentially the 
introduction of this form of legislation functions to publicly exclude and sanction an already 
marginalised group of people by revising existing oppressive legislature and making it more harsh in 
substance and in form.  
The public element is significant because both societies in Nigeria and Uganda are hostile towards 
LGBTI people. What perhaps stands out about Uganda thus far is the extremity of miseducation and 
propaganda the government is presenting to the people.  
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 7. THE NATIONAL, THE REGIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL: ASSESSING 
THE LEVEL OF CAUSALITY TOWARDS THE PASSING OF RESTRICTIVE LGBTI 
LAWS 
71. National Impacts: Political Transitions and Leadership 
The aim of this section is to identify whether there is a causal link between the anti-homosexuality 
judicial rhetoric in Nigeria and Uganda and political conflict or transition of the political system. 
Analysis can be drawn from examining the prominence an issue receives on the national political 
agenda. Intensifying LGBTI legal discrimination only started becoming prominent in these two 
African states from 2000 onwards. This section outlines the transitional history of leadership and 
political systems since the independence of Nigeria and Uganda.  In doing so, the aim is to assess 
whether there is a correlation between the salience on tightening legislation on homosexuality and 
domestic political transitions.  
Nigeria 
Nigeria was a British colony from 1900 to 1960. A series of constitutions after World War II granted 
Nigeria greater autonomy. Independence came in 1960. Today, Nigeria is officially a Federal 
Republic comprising 36 states and its Federal Capital Territory is Abuja (Mundi Index, 2014).  
Nigeria's government was made up of an alliance between the more conservative parties: the 
Nigerian People's Congress (NPC) which was a party dominated by Northerners and those of the 
Islamic faith and led by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) which was dominated by the Igbo and Christian and led by Nnamdi Azikiwe 
(Mundi Index, 2014). The 1960 Constitution established in Nigeria a parliamentary government with 
a central government and three regional governments. The opposition comprised of the 
comparatively liberal Action Group (AG), which was largely dominated by the Yoruba and led by 
Obafemi Awolowo. The cultural and political differences between Nigeria's dominant ethnic groups 
- the Hausa (Northerners), Igbo (Easterners) and Yoruba (Westerners) - were well pronounced and 
manifested politically through the differences in governance and leadership, religion, economic 
muscle and culture (Nwauche, 2008: 1). 
In1963, Nigeria became a republic. Azikiwe became President of the country although Balewa, as 
Prime Minister was still more powerful. Nigeria’s first military coup took place in 1966. 1967 
marked the beginning of a civil war in Nigeria
18
 and the country was sustained under military rule 
until 1979. Following the first military coup and under threat of the country being broken up, the 
four regions were further broken into a twelve state structure in 1967. Leading up to the coup a 
group of army officers attempted to overthrow the federal government, and Prime Minister Balewa 
and two of the regional premiers were murdered. A military administration was set up under Major 
General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (Nwauche, 2008: 3). In July 1966 northern officers staged a counter-
coup, during which Aguiyi-Ironsi was assassinated, and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu 
Gowon. Gowon was in office at a time when Nigeria was experiencing the oil boom of the 1970s. 
                                                          
18 The Nigerian Civil War is also known as the Biafran War was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural and 
religious tensions that broke out between the different ethnicities: Hauseas in the north and the Igbo of the 
south-east of Nigeria. 
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His administration was riddled with accounts of corruption and mismanagement of the economy 
(Ogbeidi, 2012: 7). 
Gwon was later overthrown in 1975 and fled the country. Brigadier General Murtala Ramat 
Mohammed became the new head of state. He introduced progressive reforms in his brief time in 
office. He began the process of moving the federal capital to Abuja and initiated the process for 
Nigerian return to civilian rule. In 1976 he was assassinated and replaced with his top advisor and 
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo (Paden, 2005: 39). 
In 1979 the Nigerian Second Republic was ushered in. In a bid to ensure popular participation in the 
making of the 1979 Constitution, the military government introduced an elaborate process of 
consultation and representation for its drafting. This was in the form of a Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC) which consisted of stakeholders from each of the states of the federation, a 
number of technocrats recommended by the military government, and representatives of civil society 
(Paden, 2005: 42). Obasanjo ensured a government transfer back to civilian rule in October 1979 and 
the CDC submitted a draft constitution. The 1979 Constitution departed from a parliamentary system 
of government to a presidential system of government. Additionally the constitution also featured a 
bicameral national assembly; a chapter of non-justiciable fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy; a bill of rights; a federal system of government; a local government 
system; and independent national institutions (Faola, 2014).  
The 1979 presidential elections were won by the right-wing National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by 
Shehu Shagari.  Shagari’s term witnessed a resurgence of corruption which sent the Nigerian 
economy plummeting even further with an alleged $16 billion lost to government corruption 
between 1979 and 1983 (Ogbeidi, 2012: 8). All the same, amid allegations of election rigging, 
President Shagari was re-elected in the 1983 elections. He was subsequently unable to manage the 
political crisis or economic decline that followed and the military once again seized the chance to 
launch a coup; which brought Major General Muhammad Buhari into power (Falola, 2014). 
The regime declared a “War against Indiscipline”, which saw a number of politicians imprisoned, 
Buhari’s term was characterised by a human rights vacuum with the aim of eliminating public 
dissidence and chaos through coups and public protests that were aimed at overthrowing the 
government. The government’s popularity soon began to diminish. General Ibrahim Babangida 
assumed power following a bloodless coup in 1985 (Falola, 2014). Babangida’s regime returned to 
gross corruption with detained ministers and politicians arrested under the Buhari regime making it 
back into office. After losing much popularity, he was replaced in the 1993 general elections by 
Chief Abiola. These elections were annulled and a civilian-military interim government 
implemented. This was toppled by General Sani Abacha who served as the defence minister under 
Babangida (Falola, 2014).  
Abacha’s seizure of power reversed the economic and political gains made by Nigeria from the mid-
1960s. The regime ignored due process of law, accountability, press freedom, human rights, 
individual liberty, and social justice and used violence to suppress opposition and critics. Nigeria’s 
international image was tarnished further as it suffered isolation and condemnation. In 1994 Abiola 
declared himself president, was arrested and died of a heart attack in 1998 (Ogbeidi, 2012: 9). His 
replacement was General Abdulsalami Abubakar who handed the government over to a 
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democratically elected civilian government in 1999. He freed political prisoners, ended violence and 
the harassment of political oppositions, new parties were registered-Nigeria was on a slow 
improvement trajectory (Falola, 2014). One of the new parties to emerge was the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), led by Obasanjo who eventually won the 1999 elections.  
The Fourth Republic commenced with the election of General Olusegun Obasanjo as the 
President of Nigeria in 1999. Indeed, the sixteen unbroken years of the military era from the fall of the Second 
Republic in 1983 and the restoration of democracy in 1999 represents an era in the history of the country when 
corruption was practically institutionalized as the foundation and essence of governance. (Ogbeidi, 2012: 10).  
 
Conditions in Nigeria were significantly improved during Obasanjo’s term and he was re-elected in 
2003. These improvements were however short lived; there was brewing ethnic and religious conflict 
in parts of the country. Hostility between Christians and Muslims grew when some northern and 
central states decided to adopt Islamic Sharīʿah law19; protests were held against the government’s oil 
policies and high fuel prices; residents of Niger delta also protested against the operations of 
petroleum companies in their area and there was an ongoing border dispute with Cameroon regarding 
an oil-rich area-Bakassi Peninsula, to which both countries have strong cultural ties (Paden, 2005: 
23). After Obasanjo failed to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, Umaru 
Yar’Adua was selected to stand as the PDP’s candidate and became president in 2007. After years of 
battling with his health, Yar’Adua died and was succeeded by his Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan 
in 2010. Jonathan’s immediate concerns included curbing corruption, dealing with the country’s 
energy problems, continuing with ongoing peace negotiations regarding the Niger delta and building 
on national unity between religious factions. Nigeria held general elections in 2011, which Jonathan 
won, resuming his administration on 18 April 2011. He persists as the current president of Nigeria 
(Falola, 2014).  
 
See the below timeline
20
 of the beginnings of the Fourth Republic of Nigeria. The timeline includes 
important dates drawn from the previous chapter on ‘Tracing the Passage of Legislation on 
Homosexuality.  
 
DATE NATIONAL EVENTS 
5 May 1999 Fourth Republic Constitution disseminated  
29 May 1999 Obasanjo sworn in as President 
2000 Shari’ah Law introduced in Zamfara State and eleven other northern states 
February and May 
2000 
Kaduna riots break out between Muslims and Christians over Shari’ah concerns 
October 2001 U.S attacks on Taliban in Afghanistan cause riots and demonstrations in Kano state 
(north of Nigeria)  
2002 “Miss World” riots between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna state break out.  
April 2003 Third democratic elections in Nigerian history for president and governors 
29 May 2003 Obasanjo sworn in as President for second term 
                                                          
19 To view an image depicting the north/south religious divide, please refer to Addendum 2. Retrieved from 
http://socialandpolitical2016.blogspot.com/  
20 Dates and events were retrieved from Falola, T., & Genova, A. (2009). Historical dictionary of Nigeria (Vol. 
111). Scarecrow Press. AND Paden, J. N. (2006). Muslim civic cultures and conflict resolution: the challenge of 
democratic federalism in Nigeria. Brookings Institution Press. 
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2003 Election tribunals hear petitions 
2004 Intensified ethno-religious violence breaks out in Plateau State which spilled over to 
Kano state. Obasanjo declares a federal state of emergency in Plateau 
2004 Petitions opposing presidential elections go through final hearings in Abuja State 
appeals court 
2005 Preparations for 2007 presidential and state elections take place 
16 May 2006 National Assembly of Nigeria votes against Obasanjo’s proposal to amend 
presidential term limits in the constitution.  
June-August 2006 Obasanjo meets with Cameroonian President for peace negotiations over Bakassi 
peninsula. Nigerian troops begin to pull out of Bakassi.  
21 April 2006 Yar’Adua is elected President of Nigeria  
August 2008 Bakassi peninsula finally handed over to Cameroon 
July 2009 Boko Haram a radical Islamist organisation, launches a campaign of terror in north-
eastern Nigeria. They demand Shari'ah Law imposed on the entire country. Nigerian 
security forces attack the Boko Harum HQ and kill its leader 
5 May 2010 Yar’Adua dies and succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan 
October – December 
2010 
Boko Haram bomb attacks increase, so does civil ethno-religious violence in 
Plateau State, Kano and Abuja.  
March 2011  Jonathan wins his first Presidential elections 
December 2011 Jonathan declares a state of emergency following Boko Haram Christmas day 
attacks 
 
 
An analysis of the Nigerian political transitions and leadership provides political context to the 
country. The end of military rule and re-emergence of democratic rule led by of PDP in 1999 under 
leadership of Obasanjo introduced a new era in Nigerian politics. Most significantly there was an 
executive split in government between Islamic and Christian-northern and southern states. 1999-2000 
saw the official adoption of Shari’ah Laws in Muslim states Nigeria also departed from military rule 
to a federal democratic system. Looking at the transitions one factor that seems to characterize both 
Obasanjo and Jonathan’s terms is the lack of socio-political cohesion in Nigeria brought about by 
newly implemented statutes that further solidified the ethno-religious divisions. Obasanjo’s 
administration faced serious difficulties with civil conflict along religious lines as well as the Bakassi 
region conflict over oil reserves. Jonathan’s term continues to experience serious challenges with 
radical Islamist group killings and reprisal civil conflict.   
 
What is significant to extract is the challenge Obasanjo was facing in finding a unifying agent to 
build a nation-state. Jonathan prematurely came into power with the death of his predecessor. His 
administration largely carried the burdens of the previous ones and was met with escalating internal 
conflict. At the time of the introduction of the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Draft Bill in 2006 
the country was faced with internal as well as border conflict. There was also Presidential and state 
elections in 2007. A number of observations can be drawn from these terms. Firstly the years that the 
Same-Sex (Prohibition) Draft Bill (2007, 2011) was being re-introduced for discussions in 
parliament, coincide with the presidential election dates in Nigeria. Secondly, Nigeria is increasing in 
social disintegration due to the ethno-religious conflict coupled with the constant occurrence of terror 
attacks. There is a clear need in Nigeria, at the time of the introduction of the bill as well as during its 
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passing in 2014, for distraction from numerous crises faced by the state firstly, and secondly for 
something that both Muslim and Christian factions of the National Assembly and the general public 
can rally around.   
 
Uganda 
 
Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962 under Prime Minister Milton Obote. The first 
post-independence elections were held in 1962 and won by an alliance between the Uganda People's 
Congress (UPC) under Obote who became Prime Minister and Kabaka Yekka (KY) under the King 
Buganda Kabaka, Edward Muteesa II who became the President. William Wilberforce Nadiope, the 
Kyabazinga (paramount chief) of Busoga, was appointed Vice-President. The latter two positions 
were more ceremonial, which was represented by parliament seat distribution (2010, Website of the 
Parliament of Uganda).  
By 1966, relations had broken down between the Obote-led government and King Muteesa. The 
Constitution was then redrawn through the efforts of the UPC dominated Parliament; both the 
President and Vice-President positions were removed and by 1967, Uganda was declared a republic 
and all traditional kingdoms abolished. Without elections, Obote was declared the executive 
President of the Republic of Uganda (Mutibwa, 1992: 25).    
The Obote government was toppled in 1971 through a coup led by Major-General Idi Amin. Uganda 
subsequently experienced atrocious conditions of state-sponsored human rights abuses and a 
demolishment of the economy. Amin ruled Uganda, through military dictatorship where an estimated 
300 000 Ugandan lives were lost. He was overthrown in 1979 during the Uganda-Tanzania war. 
Guerrilla leader Yoweri Museveni with the National Resistance Movement (NRM) then took power 
in 1986 and was credited with substantially improving the country’s human rights record. He also 
achieved some stability and a fragile unity. Museveni's first decade in power was a period of 
regeneration for Uganda's economy, which had been shattered by years of political upheaval. At its 
height, the country achieved economic growth rates of close to 10 percent per year. Museveni 
adopted a policy of liberalisation, privatising government parastatals and embracing the International 
Monetary Fund's structural adjustment programmes. Politically, Museveni introduced a system of 
elected de-centralised government known as resistance councils, later changed to local councils; to 
manage affairs from villages to districts. This introduced the concept of democracy to Ugandans at 
the grassroots level (2010, World Vision Australia). 
He maintained, however, the so-called "Movement" system which was essentially a one-party state. 
Political parties were not expressly forbidden, but they were not permitted to field candidates 
officially for elections. Museveni blamed political parties for dividing Uganda along religious and 
ethnic lines, leading to the civil strife the country suffered following independence (2010, World 
Vision Australia).  
From the mid-1980s, the rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) began an armed struggle 
against Museveni. Using the abduction of children as a weapon of war, the LRA conducted a terror 
campaign across northern Uganda until 2006. This conflict claimed thousands of lives and displaced 
approximately 1.6 million people over two decades. Attempts to secure a permanent peace 
agreement between Ugandan forces and the LRA failed in 2008. Since then the LRA focus has 
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shifted outside of Uganda to neighbouring countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Sudan (2010, World Vision Australia). 
 
Political party activity was largely banned under Museveni for the twenty years that the LRA forces 
were in Uganda. A new Constitution was however adopted in 1995 and there was a vast 
improvement in the creation of an environment conducive to public dialogue. Museveni won 
contentious elections in 1996 and 2001. Despite allegations of voting malpractices in 2001; this 
would have been Museveni’s final term in office according to the Constitution.  Instead of preparing 
for retirement, however, Museveni allowed Parliament, dominated by his NRM, to change the 
Constitution to remove the two-term limit on the presidency and is now in his fourth term in office 
(BBC Media Action, 2012:4). I explaining NRM values, Museveni (9 October 2012, Jubilee 
Speech), in a speech at the Golden Jubilee Celebration of Uganda’s independence said:  
 
On the issue of ideological disorientation, the NRM, our Liberation Movement, holds in contempt and 
denounces sectarianism of religion or tribe and fights gender chauvinism. We believe firmly in the four 
principles: nationalism and anti-sectarianism; pan-Africanism; socio-economic transformation; and 
democracy. It is this posture that has enabled Uganda to move forward. 
 
In 1998 Museveni in collaboration with Rwandan President Paul Kegame invaded the Congo on the 
side of the rebels to overthrow President Kabila. In making this decision, the Ugandan Parliament 
and civilian advisers were not consulted by Museveni, which was in direct contravention of the 1995 
Constitution (Clark, 2001:45).  From 1998 to 2003, Uganda was involved in a number of activities in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that ranged from border protection to mineral plundering 
and militia led attempts at other throwing Kabila. In 2005 an International Criminal Court ruling 
declared that Uganda must compensate the DRC for rights abuses and the looting of resources in the 
five years leading to 2003 (The ICC, 19 December 2005).  
Below is a timeline
21
 detailing key events from 2006 after the multi-party elections took place that 
secured another term for Museveni.   
 
 
DATE NATIONAL EVENT 
February 2006 Museveni wins multi-party elections in Uganda, beginning his third term in 
office. 
August 2007 Uganda and DRC attempt to diffuse border disputes. 
September 2007 Severe floods cause widespread displacement, poverty levels increase and 
major devastation of Ugandan public. Museveni declares a state of 
emergency. 
January –March 
2009 
LRA appeals for ceasefire as attacks from regional countries continue. 
Ugandan army withdraws from DRC. 
April 2009 Strong ties are established between Museveni and American fundamentalist 
Christian group “The Family”.  
                                                          
21 Dates and events were retrieved from Human Rights Watch (2013) World Report, Uganda retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/uganda AND BBC News: Africa (2015) Uganda Profile, 
retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446 
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July 2010 Two bomb attacks are set off in Kampala by Al-Shabab, a Somali Islamist 
organisation. This was in retaliation of civilian killings that occurred during 
peacekeeping missions that Ugandan troops were involved in in Somalia.   
August 2010 General elections are suspended due to voting irregularities and violence. 
February 2011 Museveni win’s his fourth presidential election. 
April 2011 Opposition leader Kizza Besigye stages a “Walk to Work” protest against the 
high cost of living due to increased inflation rates caused by food and fuel 
prices. Museveni had Besigye arrested, more riots followed in Kampala and 
the government crackdown on riots and protests continued. 
July-November 
2012 
UN accuses Uganda of collaborating with M23 rebel group in the DRC. 
Uganda denies and announces intention to withdraw from UN backed 
international peacekeeping missions as a result of the accusations.  
February 2013 Eleven countries including Uganda sign a UN-mediated agreement not to 
interfere in the DRC. 
May 2013 Government suspends and seizes two local newspapers: The Daily Monitor 
and Red Pepper for publishing government’s alleged plans to assassinate two 
government and military officials who were in opposition to Museveni’s 
apparent plans to groom his son for Presidency.  
 
 
Uganda has been under the unrelenting leadership of President Museveni since1986. A number of 
actions call Museveni’s administration call into question the government’s regard for human rights, 
international law and the Ugandan Constitution. Considering Museveni’s illegal involvement in the 
DRC, his rearrangement of Constitutional limits on Presidential terms, the recent crackdown on the 
freedoms of expression, assembly and association, questions can be asked about the substance of the 
rule of law in Uganda.  
 
The Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014 was passed in a similar manner in Uganda, without undergoing 
the correct procedures as stipulated in the Ugandan Constitution. There is a general pattern therefore 
in this particular administration of serious disregard for official legislative boundaries. In similarity 
to Nigeria; the country was facing conflict, violence and an unstable political climate which peaked 
particularly around election periods. Ugandan has experienced rising inflation rates coupled with an 
increase in poverty. It needed to provide relief and reconstruction for many communities devastated 
by widespread flooding . Islamist attacks have threatened internal security. International disputes 
regarding the DRC together with peaking demonstrations, riots and protests in Kampala province, 
have compounded the burdens of Museveni’s government.  
 
An important observation to make is the fact that in 2000 when the Ugandan Parliament began to 
review laws on homosexuality making all homosexual activity illegal and punishable by life 
imprisonment coincided with Museveni’s preparations to contest the 2001 elections. He further 
needed to garner support to change the constitutional limits prohibiting a President from serving 
more than two terms which he was successful in achieving. It can be argued that initial revision of 
the laws on homosexuality occurred at this critical juncture, when Museveni needed to substantially 
increase his support base, in Parliament as well as from the general public in order to realise his 
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objectives. In light of this agenda, a mass populist crackdown on homosexuality was an extremely 
useful tool through which to rally for a larger political agenda.   
 
Analysis can be drawn from examining the prominence an issue receives on the national political 
agenda. Therefore the explanatory ability of this variable in answering the question of political 
salience of an issue in the national agenda can begin from a statement on power retention and 
enforcement. Political pressure in Uganda came in the form of the need for Museveni to firstly 
retain power through extending the constitutional limit on the presidential terms in office and 
secondly to win the 2010/2011 elections at a moment when opposition parties were gaining 
momentum. Similarly in Nigeria, political pressure came in the form of upcoming elections in 2007 
and then in 2011. However, unlike Museveni, Jonathan was also faced with an incredibly 
threatening and increasing issue of ethno-religious violence in parts of the country. There is also a 
great deal of socio-cultural diversity between the two parts of the country in the north and the south 
of Nigeria.  
There is also some explanatory value, less in comparison to electoral period pressure and 
nationalism, in the fact that in both cases, during the respective introductory months of the bills in 
2006 (Nigeria) and 2009 (Uganda), there was violence stirring up or calming down. The dates of 
the introductions correlate with conflict within the countries; Nigeria was in the process of 
negotiations over the Bakassi region, there was also the ubiquitous ethno-religious conflict. In 
Uganda, the LRA armed struggle against Museveni was subsiding with the rebel group appealing 
for a ceasefire.    
Overall, the factors that can be drawn from this variable to answer the research question in order of 
weight of applicability are electoral period pressure, conflicting internal national identities and 
transitions from or into violent periods.  
7.2 Regional Impacts: Anti-Homosexuality and Gender Conservative Legislature in Africa 
The past ten years have seen an increase in the prominence of the issue of homosexuality and rights 
for persons in the LGBTI community in Africa and internationally. This attention has led to the 
reactive suppression of sexual minority groups’ basic human rights and freedoms. The prominence 
that the issue has received is often laced with mass hysteria appealing theories, methods of 
‘othering’, misinformed media sanctioned information and religious villainisation.  
The existent literature on this matter deals with gender repressive laws in Africa sectionally and 
individually. Furthermore the definition ‘gender’ as the exclusive referent to women is limiting and 
has a direct impact on legislature and its application, development projects and advocacy programs. 
One might ask whether there is a necessary link between patriarchal societies and institutionalized 
homophobia. Patriarchy stipulates very rigid sexual and gender roles in society; it thrives on the 
sustenance and reiteration of these roles through social institutions. As such, deviant sexual and 
gender identities that do not conform to the ascribed roles are a direct resistant force to the 
equilibrium, which is the norm. There is therefore a clear link between societies that oppress 
women and societies that are institutionally homophobic. 
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The following section will map out the current legal status of LGBTI persons on the African 
continent. The objective is to identify the effects of a regional positioning and condition of LGBTI 
rights using a contextual, geo-political approach. The first part of the regional analysis will look at 
the status of LGBTI rights in Africa; the second part will answer the question of whether there is a 
wave and mimetic element in the direction that LGBTI rights repossessions are happening 
geographically/regionally and whether the same can be said for gender hierarchy enforcing rights 
repossessions in general as well. 
LGBTI Rights in Africa
22
 
The status of the rights of LGBTI persons in Africa is extremely diverse. If African countries had to 
fall on a spectrum with regards to ensuring the human rights of LGBTI individuals; South Africa 
would fall at the end with not only the decriminalisation of homosexuality in the post-Apartheid 
constitution but the 2006 legalisation of same-sex marriages. On the opposite end would be Sudan, 
Mauritania and parts of Northern Nigeria where the offence of homosexuality is punishable by 
death. The penalties are as vast ranging from fines to the death sentence; some countries ban 
homosexual activity among men and not women (Kretz, 2013: 209, also see ILGA Report, 2014). 
All in all, homosexuality is illegal in thirty-six African countries
23
; sixteen African countries do not 
explicitly prohibit homosexuality 
24
(Paoli Itaborhay and Zhu, 2013: 22).  
The legislation on LGBTI rights can be categorised according to the different stages that the laws 
embody. Kretz (2013: 211-216) presents seven useful, encompassing stages of the legislation and 
rights of LGBTI persons. The struggle for recognition of LGBTI rights however is never linear but 
rather appears in ebbs and flows of rights endowments (mostly indirectly), repossessions and legal 
neutrality. Nevertheless Kretz’ stages offer a functional overview of the different spaces LGBTI 
rights can occupy in a country.   
Stage 1-Total Marginalisation: This is the earliest stage or lowest level of integration and goes 
beyond criminalisation and includes the ban on the advocacy of LGBTI rights. At this stage, there 
is criminalisation as well as repression of civil organisation forcing the movement completely 
underground and stifling the potential for dialogue. Until the passing of the Ugandan Anti 
Homosexuality Act, no African state contained de jure criminalisation on the advocacy on LGBTI 
rights.  
Stage 2- Criminalisation of Status and Behaviour: This is the second most restrictive stage of 
LGBTI rights’ status in a country. This is where the act of homosexuality or identification as a 
homosexual is illegalised. The majority of African countries fall under this category. This stage 
offers de facto criminalisation because there are codified laws against homosexuality, this also 
stifles the efforts of LGBTI rights activism. For example, the marginalisation is solidified through 
                                                          
22
 Please refer to Addendum 3 which is a map depicting the diversity of laws on LGBTI communities  
23
 The 36 African states where homosexuality is illegal: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi(enforcement of law 
suspended indefinitely), Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
24
 The 16 countries that do not explicitly prohibit homosexuality; Burkina Faso, Benin (as of May 2014) Cape 
Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mozambique, and South Africa. 
54 | P a g e  
 
national leader’s speeches and press releases. An outspoken anti-gay rights proponent, President 
Robert Mugabe has denounced the humanity of LGBTI persons entirely being quoted saying “[gay 
people are] worse than dogs and pigs [and] worse than organized drug addicts, or even those given 
to bestiality” (Skoch, 2012). Another example is Gambian President Yaya Jammeh who told the 
2013 United Nations General Assembly “Homosexuals are not welcome in the Gambia […] if we 
catch you, you will regret why you were born [sic] […] Allowing homosexuality means allowing 
satanic rights. We will not allow gays here” Nichols, 2013). 
Stage 3-Decriminialisation: For many civil rights groups and LGBTI activists in Africa 
decriminalisation is the main objective of current campaigns for LGBTI rights. International 
organisations through mainstreaming and human rights campaigns are working together with 
domestic and regional rights groups to attempt to influence policy makers. The United Nations 
(UN) as well as the International Lesbian, Gay, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) describe 
this stage as the first step to legitimating the social and legal inclusion of LGBTI persons. Ban Ki-
Moon, the UN Secretary General launched worldwide appeals for the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality, focusing in particular on encouraging African states to revise the legislative 
prohibitions on homosexuality that exist on the Penal Codes (BBC News, Jan. 29, 2012). Since 
2012, the Seychelles and Benin have agreed to take up legislation that would decriminalise 
homosexuality. Other forms of international pressure have come from individual political leaders, 
religious leaders as well as individual countries. The latter often comes in threats to cut aid. Days 
after the 2014 Ugandan Anti Homosexuality Act was passed at least three European governments 
and the World Bank withdrew aid and aid plans from Uganda. Uganda depends on donor aid for 
about 20 per cent of its budget. The Dutch government announced that it would suspend aid to the 
Ugandan government but will continue supporting nongovernmental groups, joining the 
governments of Norway and Denmark in taking such action (Al Jazeera, America, February 27, 
2014). LGBTI activists in the affected countries have conversely warned against cutting aid to their 
governments. Kenyan gay rights activist David Kuria (2014) succinctly explains this fear, and as 
yet another point for popular galvanization against LGBT persons: “Can you imagine the glee in a 
corrupt regime having to scapegoat their misappropriation of resources on aid cuts because they 
have not accepted ‘men-to-marry-other-men?’”.  
 
Stage 4- Codification of Anti-Discrimination Laws: This takes the form of protective rights for 
LGBTI persons encompassed in the term ‘sexual orientation’. For most of the globe, the first step 
towards human rights realisations, after decriminalisation was the protection of citizens and non-
discrimination rights to protect the sexual orientation of citizens. Only six African countries 
currently guarantee the protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
expression of citizens; South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, Mozambique (Paoli 
Itaborahay, May 2012) and Benin. Some countries, like Botswana have rights that protect against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in the Employment Acts but still have not legally 
decriminalised homosexuality.  
Stage 5-Establishment of Positive Rights: This is the move from exclusively preventative rights 
against discrimination to positive rights endowments. These rights include mostly the equality 
between same sex persons and couples and heterosexual persons and couples some examples are 
inheritance rights, power-of-attorney and tax benefits. The only country on the continent to confer 
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positive rights upon LGBTI citizens is South Africa. The importance of the granting of positive 
rights is that it is the first step towards socio-cultural integration of LGBTI persons.   
Stage 6-Full Legal Equality: At this stage, legal distinctions between LGBTI and non-LGBTI 
citizens are eliminated. The South African Constitution is closest to this stage, although it is not 
fully there. Some examples towards reaching this stage are adoption rights, full marriage rights and 
some rights for transgender persons. Section 9(3) of the constitution does not fully protect gender 
identity as sexual orientation (South African Constitution, 1996)  
Stage 7-Cultural Integration: No African state has reached this stage and it can be argued that even 
the most LGBTI-friendly countries globally, struggle to reach this stage. This is where any kind of 
discrimination against LGBTI persons is both illegal and socially unacceptable.  
Most African countries fall within the first two stages where LGBTI persons risk fines, jail time, 
and violence and in some cases death because of their identity. African nations furthermore, until 
recently, remained static in the stages listed above. 2012 to 2014 has seen a significant move 
towards moving between stages with countries like Uganda, Nigeria and Gambia moving upwards 
and countries like Seychelles and Benin attempting to move downwards. Some African Countries 
did not carry Penal Codes prohibiting homosexuality to begin with, for example the Madagascar, 
Mali, Cape Verde. 
25
 
Gender Conservative Legislature in Africa 
One of the most efficient ways that patriarchy uses sexuality as a tool to create and sustain gender hierarchy in 
African societies, is by enshrouding it in secrecy and taboos. 
Another option is to use the law to prohibit all "sex outlaws" in the social ghettoes of society. Prominent among 
the sex outlaws that have historically resisted and subverted dominant cultures are homosexuals, bisexuals and 
transgendered individuals. Punitive laws against prostitution, abortion, adultery, erotica and prostitutes serve a 
similar purpose (Tamale, 2003) 
 
Revision of Colonial Penal Codes on Homosexuality  
Four African states have revised and intensified existing laws on homosexuality; Nigeria, Uganda, 
Burundi and most recently Gambia. Also necessary to note is that Uganda’s legislation came six 
weeks after Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law a ban on homosexuality 
In April 2009, Burundi's lower house of government passed a law outlawing homosexual activity, 
with prison sentences for the convicted ranging from two months to three years. President Pierre 
Nkurunziza led the criminalization effort and worked with the country's National Assembly to sign 
the act into law, even after its senate overwhelmingly rejected the proposal (Guardian, 2014) 
Gambian President Yahya Jammeh has signed into law a bill which mandates life sentences for 
“aggravated homosexuality” and targets “serial offenders” and people with HIV or AIDS, 
the Associated Press reports. The law was apparently signed October 9, but “no government 
officials have yet publicly notified the country of the new law.” The Gambian law seeks to punish 
those who engage in consensual relationships with a person of the same sex, putting sex acts on a 
                                                          
25 Please refer to Addendum 3 
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par with paedophilia, incestuous sexual abuse, and the deliberate passing of HIV to an unknowing 
partner (Human Rights First, 2014) 
 
In Tanzania, a Member of Parliament from the main opposition party has submitted a proposal for 
enactment of a law called The Bill to Prohibit and Control any Form of Sexual Relations between 
Persons of the Same Sex, 2014. He claims that the existing laws are not strong enough and wants 
the country to mirror Uganda’s Anti-homosexuality Law (ILGA Report, 2014: 79). 
 
In Ethiopia, same sex conduct is illegal and punishable with up to 15 years’ imprisonment; a Bill 
was endorsed by Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers making homosexual acts “unpardonable”. A 
presidential pardon is granted to thousands of prisoners every year on the Ethiopian New Year. 
However, if the new law is approved, the president will no longer have the power to carry out these 
pardons for those convicted for homosexuality (ILGA Report, 2014: 79). 
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s legislation does not prohibit homosexuality although LGBTI 
people still face social discrimination. A Member of Parliament introduced a draft Bill to National 
Assembly that would explicitly criminalise homosexuality. The proposed penalty for engaging in 
homosexual acts is three to five years in prison and a fine of 1 million Congolese francs (about R10 
000), while a transgender person would face the same fine and a jail sentence of three to twelve 
years (ILGA Report, 2014: 79). 
The Marriage Act 2014 
In March 2014, Kenya's Parliament passed a bill allowing men to marry multiple wives. Polygamy 
is common among traditional communities in Kenya, as well as among the country’s Muslim 
community. In Parliament, the proposed 2014 polygamy bill had initially given a wife the right to 
veto the husband's choice, but male members of parliament overcame party divisions to push 
through a text that dropped this clause. The passing of the bill caused angry female members of 
parliament to storm out of the late night vote on the polygamy legislation in protest. 
 
The Bill was made legislation on the 1st May 2014. The Kenyan President described the act as one 
which “consolidates various laws relating to marriage – provides procedures for separation and 
divorce. It also regulates the custody and maintenance of children in the event of separation and 
divorce". The act also defines marriage as "the voluntary union of a man and a woman whether in a 
monogamous or polygamous union registered under the Act" (Jurist, 2014). 
 
The Anti-Pornography Act 2014 
The 2014 Ugandan Anti-Pornography Act; which limits women’s dress code and behaviour in public 
spheres-also known as the anti-mini skirt law. The Anti-Pornography Act, seeks to create the offence of 
pornography which is blamed for sexual crimes against women and children including rape, child 
molestation and incest (The Anti-Pornography Act, 2014) 
In the Act, pornography has been defined as any representation, through publication, exhibition, 
cinematography, indecent show, information technology or by whatever means, of a person engaged in 
57 | P a g e  
 
real or stimulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for 
primarily sexual excitement (The Anti-Pornography Act, 2014). 
Anti-Rape Law in Swaziland, 2012 
In 2012 Swaziland resurrected an archaic colonial criminal act from 1889 to stop women from wearing 
clothes that expose their bodies. Miniskirts, low-rise jeans, and midriff-baring tops have been banned 
because these revealing clothing items allegedly promote rape. Swazi police were responding to a 
march in the second city of Manzini by young women, some wearing miniskirts, who were seeking 
equal rights and safety. In Swaziland women are legal minors. Offenders could face up to six months in 
prison (Webb, 24 December 2012) 
Traditional Courts Bill 2012 
Six years ago, the South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development introduced 
a new bill to Parliament. Called the Traditional Courts Bill, it was intended to replace sections 12 
and 20 of the Black Administration Act of 1927, which gave traditional leaders such as chiefs and 
headmen the power to exercise certain judicial duties within the administrative regions they 
governed. Its provisions still give that power in the new democratic dispensation. 
However, the bill was met with opposition at every turn from critics and community members. It 
was described by critics as creating a different set of legal rules for people living on traditional 
lands, separate to people living in urban areas. It envisaged a fairly broad set of powers for 
traditional leaders. It sought to centralise judicial power to an extent not envisaged by customary 
law. It effectively turned those living under traditional authority into serfs, at the mercy of the 
leader. 
The bill failed to protect women by guaranteeing them participation. It did not provide for legal 
representation for people appearing before the traditional court. By not giving people the right to 
opt out of the traditional court system, it curtailed their freedom of cultural expression and freedom 
of association. 
These bills, all have very different profiles and occur in varied contexts, however the consequence 
is the same in each instance; the gender hierarchy is further reified and freedoms extracted by those 
at the top of the hierarchy from those at the bottom. The disentangling of gender issues and as 
aforementioned,d the definition of gender as referring exclusively women has an effect on 
legislative processes, development projects and advocacy. There is a necessary link between 
patriarchal societies and institutionalized homophobia. Patriarchy stipulates very rigid sexual and 
gender roles in society; it thrives on the sustenance and reiteration of these roles through social 
institutions. As such, deviant sexual and gender identities that do not conform to the ascribed roles 
are a direct resistant force to the equilibrium, which is the norm. 
The spill-over effect of negative rhetoric around LGBTI issues and repressive laws being passed 
around the continent, has an effect on similar laws coming up in different countries in the same 
category of rights for LGBTI persons or in different categories of gender rights but with similar 
effects which are rights extractive practices by governments. Therefore the explanatory power of 
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this variable in analysing the increase of legislature that is repressing gender minorities, lies in the 
spill over effect that can be noticed by looking at the peak in introductions to revisit existing penal 
codes, bills that are introduced in parliaments and actual bills that get passed into law in the recent 
years. In 2014, three pieces of legislation were passed (Nigeria, Uganda, and Gambia) and two 
more were introduced as drafts (Chad and Ethiopia). The introductions also followed one another 
quite closely and overlapped in terms of the announcements for the need for stricter laws and 
implementation in that Gambia’s bill for example, was announced in commentary of the Ugandan 
bill. Many leaders that are aiming to go in a similar direction with their laws herald and cite both 
Nigeria and Uganda for taking a firm stand on the issue.  
The explanatory ability of the second indicator in this variable; the gender conservative nature of 
many African states is seminal in explaining how homosexuality in particular, became the witch 
hunt of the decade. There are many morality politics issues to tackle that would flex the patriarchal 
state’s muscle satisfactorily, none as unifying however, as the criminalisation of homosexuality. 
The second indicator thus offers an analysis of how, out of all the issues that could have been 
picked, homosexuality became the issue of choice. The reality is that there are other oppressive 
legislations being added to countries’ laws that are inimical to gender emancipation and equality, 
however none had the immense support of the voting public and government as homosexuality, the 
marginalisation and prevailing discursive formations of the LGBTI community only added its 
advantages as a choice.   
 
7.3 International Impacts: International Religious Activism and International Human Rights 
Activism 
 
The third aspect of enquiry is examining the international level influences on the 2014 laws. The 
increase in visibility of LGBTI activism on the global map; widely reported on by the media; 
through protests; broadcast on television shows and the news, discussed at international human 
rights conferences -has triggered a reactive counter-movement in the form of legislature and most 
notably U.S Christian right wing evangelical churches and networks. This international level clash 
has an inevitable influence on the amplified attention that homosexuality and the legislation thereof 
has been receiving recently.  
A closer look at international activism’s role in the rise of such legislation depicts a multifaceted 
blend of factors that are at play. The most influential elements of power however emanate from 
international human rights and LGBTI activism on the one hand and international religious activism 
on the other hand. The two are arguably mutually inclusive. In the case of Uganda and Nigeria, 
these almost always exist concurrently.  
 
In asking questions about the peculiarity of the growth of anti-gay laws in Africa, it is easy to fall 
into precarious ideological paths that replicate colonial discourses on African moral ‘ineptitude’ 
and ‘primitiveness’. The corollary of this approach is an attempt to depoliticise the debate by 
drawing on the sovereignty of all states and the autonomy of all states to govern themselves as they 
see fit. This section will detail the background influence from an international level from both sides 
of the debate; those advocating for decriminalisation of laws on homosexuality and those 
advocating for further stringency in laws on homosexuality in African states, particularly 
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conservative Christian religious factions, in Uganda and Nigeria. In this section the intention is to 
answer how these laws have come into practice and what deeper power interests are at stake; to 
look at each factor identified as having in some way influenced  the passing of the laws with the 
aim of determining the weight of the influence from an international level.  
 
Religious Activism  
 
On a continent where sexual rights are largely deemed or located in the personal domain and 
traditionally kept out of legislation, Christian right wing organizations are lobbying for anti-
reproduction rights (abortion and contraception) and anti-homosexuality rights. For the purpose of 
this project it is necessary to determine what the effects are, of these lobbies and templates for 
legislation for African countries and to what extent has the U.S Christian international advocacy 
influenced the recent and increase in anti-gay legislation? 
 
The U.S Christian renewal movements can be described as a predominantly white conservative 
movement and network from mainline U.S Protestant churches that promote a Christian worldview 
in politics and believe in the superiority of the nuclear family as the fundamental unit of society. 
For the Christian Right, any sex outside the institution of heterosexual marriage is considered 
dangerous for children, families, economies, and nations (Grossman, 2013: 9). In order to 
understand the anti-gay and anti-feminist legislation that is developing across the continent we must 
understand the ways in which the U.S Christian Right and its conservative supporters are shaping 
and nurturing the anti-gay laws that countries like Uganda and Nigeria have created. Acording to 
Grossman (2013: 10): 
 
Renewalist Christianity and the related Pentecostal, evangelical and `charismatic' movements is one of 
the largest and fastest-growing movements in global Christianity, with its major strands accounting for at 
least a quarter of all Christians worldwide (World Christian Database). In Africa, as recently as 1970, 
Pentecostals and charismatics combined represented less than 5% of the continent's population. 
According to recent figures from the World Christian Database, by 2005 shoe [sic] that Pentecostals 
alone represented 12%, or about 107 million, of Africa's population of nearly 890 million people. 
Charismatic members of non-Pentecostal denominations number an additional 40 million, or 
approximately 5% of the population (Pew, 2006).  
 
Reverend Kapya Kaoma  in his seminal work Globalizing the Culture Wars notes that Pentecostal 
churches and organizations influence every sphere of public life in both countries; from villagers 
and government members being “born again” to asking “international religious organizations to 
carry out development work alongside evangelism”. See the below graph showing the relationship 
between the penetration of Evangelical Christianity and public opinion with respect to whether 
homosexuality is morally wrong.  
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Kaoma argues that, the momentum for the upsurge of homophobia in Africa is produced externally, 
driven by the neoconservative evangelical agenda of the religious movements in Western countries, 
particularly the U.S (Kaoma, 2009: 8). 
The growth of Evangelical Pentecostalism in African countries in the recent past years has been a 
key driver of public anti-gay sentiments in Nigeria
26
 and Uganda
27
.  The focal drivers of the anti-
gay laws have been Church groups that fall under the category of evangelical Pentecostal churches, 
Kaoma (2009) looks at the most active categories of denominations in Uganda and Nigeria: The 
Episcopal Church (TEC), United Methodist Church USA (UMC), and the Presbyterian Church 
USA (PCUSA)—and their Christian conservative branches. These denominations are key in the 
homosexuality debate in Africa because of their long history of evangelism in the United States; 
their deep involvement in African mission work and their tremendous political influence in U.S
28
 
 
In Uganda the introduction of the 2009 Anti-Homosexuality Bill to Parliament, took place against 
the backdrop of a conference to expose the ‘dark and hidden’ agenda of homosexuality organized 
by a fundamentalist religious NGO called the Family Life Network and funded by right-wing 
American evangelicals (Tamale, 2013: 33; Barroway, 2009). The initial legal proposal was 
formulated some months after the conference
29
 aimed at protecting African family values hosted by 
Caleb Brundidge, Don Schmierer and Scott Lively; who were joined by a large number of anti-gay 
                                                          
26
 Christians in Nigeria form a slight majority of the nation, comprising 50.8% of the population, while Muslims 
make up 47.9% (Pew, 2013) 
27 85.4% of Ugandan population is Christian, while 12.1% of the population adheres to Islam (Pew, 2013) 
28 For example in 2003, conservative Christians successfully shifted the foreign aid policy of the United States so 
that it promotes abstinence-only education abroad through HIV/AIDS relief grants channeled to the Christian 
Right base of the George W. Bush Administration. (PRA, n.d) 
29 Refer to section 6.2 
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groups from Uganda and abroad (Anderson, 2011: 1594 and Burroway, 2009). The same group of 
people organised a petition with over fifty thousand signatures from parents calling upon the 
government to “save our children from being recruited into homosexuality.” (Tamale, 2013: 33).   
 
Fellowship Family Foundation (also known as ‘The Family’) is an American Christian community 
that focuses on influencing US political, social and economic elites as well as leading figures in 
other countries in promotion of ‘morality politics’. (Anderson, 2011: 1595). For example American 
congressman, Joe Pitts was instrumental in reversing Uganda’s HIV prevention policy towards an 
abstinence-only dominated approach that excluded the promotion of condom-use or any form of 
family planning (Sharlett, 2008: 328). Openly connected to this group are both David Bahati and 
President Museveni who have attended the group’s events in Uganda and the US (Gettleman, 2010; 
Tamale, 2013: 34; Burroway, 2009, Anderson, 2011: 1595). The organisation also hosts the long-
established National Prayer Breakfasts in Washington (Anderson, 2011:1595).  
 
Another prominent player among the US conservative organizations supporting anti-gay sentiments 
in Nigeria and Uganda is the Institute on Religion and Democracy 
(IRD), a Christian conservative think tank. Ironically, this group was instrumental in opposing the 
twentieth-century African liberation struggles, and these organizations now work hand in glove 
with African religious and political leaders to oppose progress in the rights of LGBTI people 
(Kaoma, 2009: 5). In further defining evangelism in Uganda and Nigeria Kaoma states that 
 
In Africa, however, the Christian Right means something different. It operates under the banner of 
“evangelicalism,” which Africans understand to mean biblical and doctrinal orthodoxy, but without the 
“antiwelfarist” connotations it has in the United States. U.S. Christian conservatives working in Africa 
are generally known as American Evangelicals, and many Africans do not distinguish, for example, 
between the Christian Right, evangelicals, the neoconservative IRD, U.S. mainline renewal movements, 
Holocaust revisionist Scott Lively, and right-wing megachurch leader Rick Warren. All these groups are 
considered representative of U.S. Evangelicals. 
 
Another illuminating example of a U.S Christian Right organisation that is influencing sexual 
politics on the continent is Family Watch International’s involvement in Nigeria.  Founder Sharon 
Slater, delivered a keynote speech at the 2011 Nigerian Bar Association, warning the delegates 
about the dangers of “sexual rights” being promoted by western progressives. Slater told the 
delegates:  
 
It doesn’t matter if they are heterosexual, homosexual, premarital or extramarital—the evidence shows 
that as sexual relations stray from marriage the family unit disintegrates, children are hurt, economies 
decline, and nations are weakened. (Throckmorton, 17 April 2012) 
 
The international Christian community was at odds with each other regarding the Ugandan Bill. 
U.S President Barak Obama addressing a National Prayer Breakfast stated that while there may be 
disagreement within the US regarding gay-marriage; it was unacceptable and odious to target 
homosexual people for the sake of their sexuality anywhere in the world (BBC News, 4 February 
2010). In the US House of Representatives, 62 Democrats signed a resolution condemning the 
proposed legislation on the grounds of it impeding the HIV/AIDS health battle and being in 
contravention of human rights commitments. However, lobbying groups such as the conservative 
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Family Research Council rebuked the resolution claiming that it was in direct promotion of 
homosexuality.  
 
In 2011, on the heels of the Nigerian Senate passing the 2006 Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) 
Bill, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S would officially promote LGBTI rights 
abroad as part of its development framework. In response, the Catholic Family and Human Rights 
Institute, which is heavily involved in Nigeria, denounced the administration’s directive for putting 
“U.S. foreign policy on a collision course with religious freedom.” (Throckmorton, 17 April 2012). 
In a letter to the Primates of the Anglican Communion and the Presidents of Nigeria and Uganda, 
the Anglican Archbishops of Canterbury and York urged leaders to adopt policies of acceptance 
and care for all people. 
 
We wish to make it quite clear that in our discussion and assessment of moral appropriateness of specific 
human behaviours, we continue unreservedly to be committed to the pastoral support and care of 
homosexual people. The victimization or diminishment of human beings whose affections happen to be 
ordered towards people of the same sex is anathema to us. We assure homosexual people that they are 
children of God, loved and valued by Him and deserving the best we can give - pastoral care and 
friendship. We hope that the pastoral care and friendship that the Communiqué described is accepted and 
acted upon in the name of the Lord Jesus. We call upon the leaders of churches in such places to 
demonstrate the love of Christ and the affirmation of which the Dromantine communiqué speaks (Welby, 
2014) 
 
Ugandan and other African churches were as divided in their reactions and consequent decisions as 
well, with many supporting the principles of the bill, but rejecting its harshness; in particular the 
death penalty proposal. U.S pastor Rick Warrern for example blatantly described the bill as un-
Christian (Chua-Eoan, 10 December 2009). Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu equated anti-gay laws and 
their application by African leaders to the horrors of Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa 
stating that  
 
We must be entirely clear about this: the history of people is littered with attempts to legislate against 
love or marriage across class, caste, and race. But there is no scientific basis or genetic rationale for love. 
There is only the grace of God. There is no scientific justification for prejudice and discrimination, ever. 
And nor is there any moral justification. Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa, among others, attest 
to these facts. (Kennedy, 23 February 2014). 
 
Much of the debate surrounding the intensity of these laws revolved around the international 
involvement and stakeholder interests in the bills. Those who supported them claimed it was 
necessary because international homosexual advocates were recruiting as well as funding behaviour 
that is un-African, un-Christian and anti-family. Those against the bill drew on arguments 
portraying the issue as a U.S-style culture war where African leaders were being used as well-oiled 
proxies for U.S conservative Christian actors to enact laws in Africa that they were unable to lobby 
for back home.  
 
The neo-colonial extrapolations that characterise both arguments ignore the agency that African 
leaders possess, and too often act upon for a multitude of purposes. There are limitations to 
applying this approach too simplistically to African countries and in particular Uganda and Nigeria. 
Homophobic rhetoric and public opinion, when supported by legislature serves to strengthen the 
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standing of its proponents in mainstream thought and maintains socio-political relevance of an 
administration whether it is in the West or in African states. This also feeds into the political 
interests of the governments, rouses voting publics’ support and contributes to the portrayal of a 
government committed to sovereignty, agency and African values.  
 
International Human Rights Activism 
 
The international human rights community generally sees changing laws as the necessary first step 
toward changing attitudes. Where treatment of, and attitudes toward, sexual minorities violate 
international human rights obligations, international human rights organizations have moved aggressively 
to advocate for change in domestic laws, with an eye to ultimately transforming attitudes and beliefs 
toward the LGBT community (Mittlestaedt, 2008: 355).  
 
It is important to identify the specificity of the model of advocacy that is adopted by international 
human rights organisations working in the field of LGBTI rights. The distinction between 
development/community level work and advocacy directed towards legislative change from the 
government- incremental strategic litigation- will have an impact on the scope for success; 
boundaries of influence and the buy-in from host states. There are strong arguments for the method 
of advocating for change in laws before change in attitudes of society. The public fear and 
misconceptions fuelled by political leaders about homosexuality serve a specific socio-political 
purpose, offering them a tool for achieving short-term goals and preserving political power.  
 
The appeal of incremental strategic legislation advocacy approach follows as a logical congruent on 
the one hand. In other words, these governments are using very specific laws to revoke people’s 
human rights; this functions to silence not only the LGBTI community, but also to repress all 
activism, engagement and opposition therefore closing down political space for discussion and 
debate while violating the fundamental rights of all citizens. There is therefore a need for advocacy 
methods with the same specificity, aimed at reclaiming the rights that are being extracted, through a 
model that is intended for law advocacy. 
 
In the recent years international human rights organizations like Amnesty International, Global 
Rights, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human 
Rights Commission (IGLHRC)
30
 have worked closely with human rights and development 
practitioners and governments to a lesser extent to overturn anti-gay laws not only in Africa and 
promote the perseveration of human rights in societies and legislation. Looking at the role that 
international advocacy played in the wake of the discussions around these laws the first factor to 
highlight is that the general visibility on LGBTI issues and lifestyle increased not only in 
international media but also on the continent. Between 1996
31
 and 2006
32
 for example, South Africa 
was heralded as one of the most progressive constitutions and legislature with regards to LGBTI 
rights and equality globally. During those years African political commentary on the issue grew 
exponentially (See Tamale, 2013; Msibi, 2011).   
                                                          
30 Please refer to part 4 detailing the reactions of human rights organisations abroad.  
31 In 1996 South Africa became the first jurisdiction in the world to provide constitutional protection to LGBTI 
people by disallowing discrimination on race, gender, sexual orientation and other grounds (Stewart, 2015) 
32
 In 2006 South Africa became the fifth country, the first (and only, as of January 2015) in Africa, the first in the 
southern hemisphere, and the second outside Europe to legalise same-sex marriage (Stewart, 2015) 
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In November 2007 the U.S State Department launched the LGBT Foreign Policy Project whose 
objectives were stated as follows: 
 
The premise of this discussion series is that the LGBT community in the United States must do more to 
shape U.S. diplomatic positions on LGBT issues at the international level. And with a push from 
domestic LGBT organizations and activists, U.S. foreign policy leaders themselves can do far more to 
assist LGBT communities in other countries by extending the recognition, respect and resources those 
communities need to defend their basic human rights. (Council for Global Equality, 2007: 2)  
 
There has also been regional civil society and human rights activism in response to these laws. 
Activists are providing direct assistance to LGBTI people, bringing cases of rights violations to 
court, encouraging growing public acceptance within their countries and demanding political 
change. This includes leaders of civil society as well as elected and appointed leaders. For example 
following the creation and strengthening of homophobic laws in several African states, the human 
rights body for the African Union, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, issued a 
bold resolution calling for the protection of the human rights of LGBTI persons. At the 55th session 
of the commission that took place from April May, 2014, members called for an end to acts of 
violence and abuse. The African Union’s Resolution 275: On Protection against Violence and other 
Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or imputed Sexual Orientation 
or Gender Identity, is the important first step towards the realization of continent-wide protection of 
the human rights of LGBT people (AWID, 2014). The resolution: 
 
Strongly urges States to end all acts of violence and abuse, whether committed by 
State or non-state actors, including by enacting and effectively applying appropriate laws prohibiting and 
punishing all forms of violence including those targeting persons on the basis of their imputed or real 
sexual orientation or gender identities, ensuring proper investigation and diligent prosecution of 
perpetrators, and establishing judicial procedures responsive to the needs of victims. (AWID, 2014) 
 
As Mittlestaedt (2008: 357) notes, the international community’s increased focus on LGBTI issues 
in Africa has not been received wholly positively by many governments that are fervently opposed 
to de-criminalisation. The spill over effect that the laws have had on the continent in countries like 
Gambia and Tanzania
33
 indicate the refutation that governments in Africa have against the presence 
and lobbying of international human rights organisations. The heavy involvement, funding and 
branching off of smaller LGBTI groups in Africa from larger international human rights groups is 
being used by governments to comply with the their conspiracies about external funding, 
recruitment into homosexuality and accusations of neo-colonialism.  
 
Additionally the international backlash that both Uganda and Nigeria faced from aid and funding 
countries through threats to cut aid also did not benefit the LGBTI community. In October 2011 for 
example, during the Commonwealth Meeting of Heads of State, David Cameron, the UK Prime 
Minister, threatened to reduce development aid to countries that criminalise homosexuality. Shortly 
after the statement was made, the United States also announced that they would use all available 
mechanisms, including measures related to development cooperation, to promote LGBTI rights. In 
                                                          
33 Please refer to section 8.2 
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February 2014, the World Bank postponed a US$90 million loan due to the signing of the Anti-
Homosexuality Act. Norway said it would be withholding $8m in development aid to Uganda, and 
Denmark will divert $9m away from the Ugandan government (Kaleidoscope Trust, 2014) 
 
Donor sanctions are definitively coercive and reinforce the uneven power dynamics between donor 
countries and recipients. They are often based on assumptions about African sexualities and the 
needs of African LGBTI people. Edwin Sesange, director of the African LGBTI Out and Proud 
Diamond Group, said in a Gay Star News comment piece (Morgan, 26 February 2014)  
 
Aid in various forms helps all ordinary Ugandans, including LGBTI people who we are campaigning for 
[…] Politicians and the anti-gay vigilantes are using this threat from developed countries as a way of 
convincing people the west is using foreign aid and its influence to spread homosexuality to Uganda. 
 
The intention of reviewing the influence from both sides of the international debate informing the 
2014 anti-gay legislature in Nigeria and Uganda is to address questions of how these laws came to 
be and what influences were pivotal in gearing them towards being implemented. What emerges is 
firstly a conflation of interest bearers agendas pulling in multiple directions; secondly there is 
evidence of a polemic but discursive exchange happening at international advocacy level that 
appears to inform regional and national level engagements when it involves a dialectic approach 
between domestic and international advocacy efforts. Most importantly there seems to be a 
pendulum of actions and reactions directed specifically at changing legislation in these countries 
from international Christian Right Wing factions as well as international human rights and LGBTI 
activists.  
 
The effect of this on the passing of these laws is that African state leaders are in a position to assess 
their relative strengths and weaknesses, their positioning internally and externally and choose an 
issue and a side to the debate that is the most expedient and lucrative to their own interests. In this 
case, the issue was homosexuality; the advocacy of which increased exponentially in African states. 
Both proponents and opponents grew in visibility at the time the bills were being introduced and 
grew even more during the discussions of the bills and the eventual passing of the laws. The leaders 
of Uganda and Nigeria in this case opted for narratives that seemed to preference nationalism, 
African traditions and religion which really translate to politically strategic interests.    
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8. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
There is no culture without a tomb and no tomb without a culture; in the end the tomb is the first and only cultural 
symbol. The above-ground tomb does not have to be invented. It is the pile of stones in which the victim of the 
unanimous stoning is buried. It is the first pyramid.-Rene Girard-Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World 
(English Translation, 1987) 
In René Girard’s theory of ‘violence and the sacred’ the political philosopher explains the violence 
involved in the founding of a culture or a community as based on the scapegoating of a sacrificial 
member. This member is arbitrarily
34
 selected by placing the blame for all of the community’s distress on 
one individual or group of individuals, the community’s violence becomes polarized toward the ones 
being blamed. In Girard’s theory, the primitive man stumbled upon the solution to this threat: the 
scapegoat and by expelling or killing the scapegoat, order is restored and the community becomes 
peaceful again. The single act of sanctioned violence becomes curative and order is restored. According 
to Girard, this is the basis of culture; violence and making the scapegoat sacred. Through sacrifice, the 
scapegoat is both villainized and made sacred by virtue of restoring the cultural order after death. Girard 
proposes that world mythologies and religions hide the scapegoat mechanism within the sacred rituals of 
sacrifice; the crucifixion of Christ; the medieval witch hunts; the Jewish Holocaust.  These rituals are a 
re-enactment of the very first killing of the sacrificial victim through which the first community 
established order (Girard, 1987:1-9). 
*** 
The following section will evaluate the research findings and categorise them according to the selected 
variable categories of influences from the national level, regional level and international level. Within 
these categories, specific themes that surfaced will be discussed. A description of their compatibility with 
the arguments will follow as well as a description of how the variables comparatively fared in 
contributing to the 2014 pieces of legislation. Finally brief recommendations will be offered.  
8.1 National Level-Nationalism and Collective Identity 
Not only is there no all-encompassing concept for identity in much of Africa, but there is no substantive 
apparatus for the production of the kind of singularity that the term seemed to require. The petty bureaucratic 
insistence on tribal and racial markers, our new flags and anthems, and even the grand national stadiums and 
ballistics could not and still cannot be compared to the imperial administrative and ideological apparatus that 
lay behind the production of English culture, and its more encompassing political front, British identity 
(Mama, 2001:64). 
The concept of collective identity is one that many African states from independence have clung onto. 
Using Fanon’s perceptions of the colonial subject; of all the secondary entities that colonisation left, the 
worst is the notion of European superiority. That Africans were, prior to European settlement, barbaric, 
primitive and imprudent. For Fanon European civilization which encompasses Western values, social 
systems, political systems and economics all shaped the very identity of the colonial subject. The African 
intellectual-the liberation movement governments and civil activists who came into power after 
independence were faced with the need to break away from colonial rule while being the vanguards of 
African society and nation-state; de-colonising not only politics but education, society and culture as a 
whole (Jinadu, 1986: 155). The irony is that there are in fact many discursive contractions and state 
                                                          
34 Arbitrary with regards to their link to the accusations. 
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structures that African state leaders inherited from colonial powers. One of which is the concept of 
governmentality; driven by the collective of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections which are 
also the strategies through which the state is able to exercise a precise form of targeted power and have 
the population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security through mass support.  
In Nigeria and Uganda, both presidents that were in office during the introduction of the bills; Obasanjo 
(2006) and Museveni (2009); were both active in drafting the post-independence states.  Obasanjo 
ensured a government transfer back to civilian rule twice after military rule in 1979 when he ushered in 
the Nigerian Second Republic and in 1999 when he led the Nigerian Fourth Republic. Obasanjo was not 
only faced with post-military state reconstruction and transition to civilian led government; Nigeria’s 
position is also unique because the North/South divide predates independence and is organised along 
ethnic and religious lines. It is also the derivation of internal conflict in Nigeria which has always been 
the case. On these grounds, there has always been a lack in Nigeria, of common grounds especially 
legislatively. Firstly the homosexuality debate has brought otherwise polarized sides to agreement in 
Nigeria. Secondly, it contributes to social cohesion in a society void of much social cohesion in.  
When Jonathan came into power his administration inherited religious conflict that escalated to terror 
attacks, he needed to continue with peace talks regarding the Bakassi region and there were Presidential 
and state elections coming up. Then he was selected as a southern Christian to balance the ticket for a 
northern Muslim presidential candidate, who died in office. So having never won an election to major 
public office on his own, Jonathan had the challenge of not only continuing his predecessor’s goals; his 
administration also faced massive corruption scandals, the economy continues to suffer from falling oil 
prices and the state faces surging violence from Boko Haram insurgency in the north, which has been on 
the increase since he took office.   
Another factor that makes the Nigerian case unique is the backdrop of military threat that has previously 
led to successful take overs in the recent past. The significance of these events is that for a state facing 
external as well as internal contention, having a tool to reinstate the public’s confidence in the 
administration contributes to its perceived strength and ability to unite and lead the nation. When the 
House of Representatives passed the bill in December 2013, for Jonathan, not signing the bill risked 
alienating his own government and signalling to the general public that he does not support one of the 
few issues that bring the majority of Nigerians together. Alternatively, signing the legislation could have 
cost the country substantial sums of international aid and investment. All the same, with the 2015 
national elections coming up his decision on signing the bill may significantly influence the Nigerian 
political debate in the run up to the elections.  
Uganda presents a slightly different case in terms of the administrations and political transitions. 
President Museveni has been in office since the end of the Idi Amin dictatorship. He came into power as 
a rebel leader influential in the military toppling of the Amin dictatorship and his predecessor Obote’s 
administration. He has since vigorously held on to power and changed the law to allow him to remain in 
power. Museveni has also been deeply involved in the processing of the bill, communicating the need for 
it to be passed, his hesitations and how he arrived at his eventual decision to sign the bill into law. Of his 
list of reasons for the need to have the law, some that stand out are that the issue of homosexuality 
presents a Western attempt at social imperialism, to impose social values that are un-African.  
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Though peace and a new inclusive form of politics were promised when Museveni seized power, his 
terms have been plagued by a series of civil wars. Political, military, and economic power have remained 
ethnically biased in favour of groups from western and central Uganda, and this in turn has been a major 
cause of recurrent civil wars. Increased territorial power sharing since the late 1990s helps explain the 
recent decline in violent conflict. Museveni continues to face growing populist criticism for seeking to 
remain in power for life. In Uganda, the new law will no doubt increase his popularity. The Ugandan 
government has however come into some difficulty with the Act being annulled by the Constitutional 
Court, the effect this has on this administration is that it makes the disregard for the rule of law clearer to 
critics. But the ruling also offers Museveni a political out, serving to diffuse international pressure while 
allowing him to maintain his widely popular anti-gay stance. The President is also considering running 
for re-election in 2016. 
The popular vitriol against perceived (or legitimate) external intrusion that can be summoned by 
governments that have come into power by struggling to overthrow oppressive regimes is an extremely 
powerful tool. The collective memory of the effects of African concessions to western nations in 
exchange for promises of development, aid, artilleries, loans and even democracy; has become many 
African government’s basis for normative projects of nation building and power retention.  The result of 
this is an appeal by the government for a retreat to the status-quo and balanced equilibrium in social 
relations. Inevitably institutions of socialisation that are under threat of being eroded by external forceful 
influences are rebuilt in the name of unity. In the case of Uganda and Nigeria, the ‘sexual deviant’, as an 
unwelcome Western import bears the brunt of uniting otherwise diverse opinions and strengthening 
domestic support for governments, therefore contributing to the revival of discussions on Africana and 
national identity. This presents a form of sacred cultural violence.  
8.2 Regional Level Impacts 
The question on the influence of legal bans on homosexuality on the continent is linked to the discussion 
on the overall growth of negative discourses around LGBTI communities as well as the discussion on 
political saliency. Access to legislation can be a challenge when it comes to LGBTI issues. This can be 
due to rapidly changing legal provisions, contradicting sources, and the inaccessibility of certain legal 
provisions in the public domain. On the regional cascading effect of these laws, two indicators were 
looked at: the growth of anti-homosexual rhetoric expressed by government leaders and the status of 
LGBTI rights on the continent and the increase of repressive gender law making in the broad realm of 
gender policy making.  
Uganda’s legislation came six weeks after Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law a ban 
on homosexuality. The Gambian President, followed suit, passing The Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 
of 2014 eight months later. Most African countries have some legal prohibition against homosexuality; 
where LGBTI communities risk fines, jail time, and violence and in some cases death because of their 
identity. Inference can be drawn from the diversity of countries that are leaning towards (through 
discussions) a rights incremental approach (like Seychelles and Benin); countries that are tightening 
existing laws-rights extractive approach; and countries that have no specific laws against homosexuality. 
There is a definite increase in; firstly the attention the issue is receiving politically; and secondly the 
number of countries tightening existing laws on homosexuality (2014 saw an increase of three). This is 
bound to have a domino effect, especially when leaders recognise the powerful unifying effect of a 
collective adversary on national credence.  
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The second part of the regional discussion looked at whether there were conclusions to be drawn from 
the possible cascading in gender conservative laws on the continent. The examined bills, all have very 
different profiles and occur in varied contexts, however the consequence is the same in each instance; the 
gender hierarchy is further reified and freedoms extracted by those at the top of the hierarchy from those 
at the bottom. Considering the suggestion that there is a common thread within these laws
35
 means 
placing the struggle for LGBTI rights in the mainstream gender category; it means recognising that this 
form of repression affects more than just those in the LGBTI community but it also functions to maintain 
the existent male-centric, chauvinist, gender elitist discourse.  
The explanatory ability of the second indicator in this variable; the gender conservative nature of many 
African states is seminal in explaining how homosexuality in particular, presented a good choice 
considering other types of gender repressive laws that the region is experiencing. There are many 
morality politics issues to tackle that could similarly reify the gender hierarchy; none of them offer the 
widespread public support that comes with homophobic laws. The reality is that there are other 
oppressive legislations being added to countries’ laws that are inimical to gender emancipation and 
equality, however none have received the immense support of the voting public and government as 
homosexuality has. The marginalisation and prevailing discursive formations of the LGBTI community 
only added to its advantages as a choice.  
8.3 International Level Impacts 
The global reaction to the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, for example, demonstrated both a selective amnesia about the 
origins and operation of homophobic legal codes and persecutions on the one hand, and imperialist impositions of 
moral sexual values on the other. Those who commented on Uganda’s homophobic bill from the outside often 
expressed criticism that smacked of arrogance, a stunning lack of historical knowledge about homophobia, and a 
patronizing and domineering agenda that might impress even NATO. And those who supported the bill within 
Uganda and other African states perpetrated a deeply troubling rewriting of African sexual cultures based on 
skewed historical untruths (Tamale, 2013:35) 
 
Homophobic rhetoric and public opinion, when supported by legislature serves to strengthen the standing 
of its proponents in mainstream thought and maintains socio-political relevance of an administration 
whether it is in the West or in African states. Additionally, the invocation of mass hysteria and fear by 
misinformation by the government, summoning of collective identities and commitment to rebuking 
Western imposition puts governments in better stead with the voting public.  
An analysis of the international level influences reflects a myriad of issues, standpoints and actors that 
the governments of Uganda and Nigeria have carefully selected and collaborated with. There is evidence 
of the availability of both sides of the debate for and against LGBTI rights in both countries. These laws 
occur at a time when international movements for and against further bans on homosexuality are active 
and available to the public and to the governments. The clause that forbids advocacy or forms of 
assembly that are in support of homosexuality in Nigeria and Uganda functions especially to silence 
international human rights organisations that could otherwise, in collaboration with local rights groups, 
provide education and information dispelling widely accepted fallacies.  
                                                          
35
 Consider the other gender repressive laws that were passed in the last decade: The Marriage Act 2014 (Kenya); The 
Anti-Pornography Act 2014 (Uganda); Anti-Rape Law 2012 (Swaziland) 2012; Traditional Courts Bill 2012 (South Africa) 
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The evidenced high level involvement of U.S Christian evangelical groups in Africa
36
, whose mandate is 
to promote and spread morality politics through conservative policies that are gender repressive, anti-
reproductive rights and anti-HIV/AIDS health systems-is pervasive in Uganda and Nigeria. However, the 
involvement and lobbying of Christian right wing advocates is no different categorically, than the 
international human rights actors’. The difference in the acceptance by governments of one over the other 
is a matter of political gain. The choice for alliance with religious advocates for morality politics has 
much to do with the quantitative strength of religious constituencies in Uganda and Nigeria. In Nigeria, 
the issue additionally presented a previously non-existent common ground between Muslims and 
Christians.  
The actions that took place at an international level from the time the laws were introduced as bills were 
twofold; firstly the negative reactions from the international community of states through the threats to 
cut aid and appeals from governance institutions had the adverse effect of reaffirming the governments’ 
accusations of social imperialist powers that are importing homosexuality, recruiting young children and 
funding homosexuality in Africa. These reactions strengthened the governments’ decision to resist 
international pressure, therefore providing assurance of their commitment to protecting African cultural 
values. For example, consider statements by Museveni where he exclaimed “We will not shy away from 
this, we want to rid this country of homosexuality and if that means these people  Obama, Hague, you 
name them  want to stop their aid then let them,” (The Telegraph, 27 February 2014). Secondly aid cuts 
also have damaging effects on weak economies that depend on aid for development, this affects the entire 
country, and more significantly aid cuts are a form of social imperialism that is laced with power 
dynamics that recreate and evoke colonial memories and widen the global inequality gap. Not to 
mention, the arrogance in what Tamale called “selective amnesia” regarding the origins of legislative 
homophobia.  
The laws have been created within a unique and tumultuous political and religious context with 
underlying with power struggles and cross-border relations, specifically between Africa and the United 
States. What emerges from an analysis of international influences from both sides of the debate is firstly 
an overlap of actors’ agendas pulling in multiple directions; secondly there is evidence of a polemic but 
discursive exchange happening at international advocacy level that appears to inform regional and 
national level engagements when it involves a dialectic approach between domestic and international 
advocacy efforts. Most importantly there seems to be a pendulum of actions and reactions directed 
specifically at changing legislation in these countries from international Christian Right Wing factions as 
well as international human rights and LGBTI activists. 
Worthy to consider is the question whether these laws would have come about in the absence of external, 
international influences, in the absence of U.S evangelical activism for example. I would argue that they 
would. Cultural conservativeness in these cases, in a great sense is reactive. Even with the removal of 
this variable, the facts remain of political strategic interest, of gender hierarchism and a need to build a 
national identity. Therefore, while the explanatory power of the international level variable is useful in 
understanding an element of the speed, timing and coverage of the criminalisation of homosexuality; it is 
limited in explaining the need for such laws.  
 
                                                          
36 Consider discussion in section 7.3 International Impacts- Religious Activism  
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8.4 Political Salience and Political Strategy 
I argue that the national level influences are the first and foremost basis for these laws. There has been a 
noticeable influence from regional and international influences although to a lesser extent. This can be 
evidenced in revisiting the inevitable link between political saliency and political interest. What 
governments are presented with both at regional level (through a diversity of repressive laws, an 
overabundance of the different measures of tightening already existent bans on homosexuality); and 
international level (through a myriad of actors; allies and opponents) is a vast variety of positions and 
decisions. The choice for a revision of laws further repressing the LGBTI community is strategic and 
largely informed by national level interests of a particular administration.  
There are several reasons why laws against homosexuality have taken up increased importance on the 
political agenda globally, in Africa particularly in Uganda and Nigeria. The first is what Grossman 
(2013:14) calls the “equilibrium pressure to match between demand and supply”. The demand in this case 
would be the need for government to show commit to nationalism and religious beliefs of the public. The 
supply would be the selection of a unifying issue, and in this case-homosexuality. The second component 
that makes homosexuality worthwhile as a legislative issue for governments is that it enjoys broad 
support within Nigeria and Uganda
37
; it is an issue, unlike others that fall under the category morality 
politics that is not polarized. Thirdly, morality politics offer an easy way to build a political reputation or 
stereotype one's opponents because it is communicated in a zero-sum manner.   
There is no doubt that some leaders certainly believe in the propaganda that homosexuality is a threat to 
the family, African traditions, causes paedophilia and endangers children. However, the will for further 
enquiry and education about a marginalised group of people weighs less than the will to remain in power 
through an appeal to the commitment to national identity, rejection of western values and the emergent 
cultural violence against gender minorities.   
Overall, through a textured analysis of the factors influencing the increase of the political salience of 
legislation for gender minorities four factors become prevalent: 
i) Political leaders are under multi-directional pressure from citizens, opposition party leaders and 
other political leaders. Both Uganda and Nigeria from independence until now have experienced 
military take-overs. In Nigeria, the history of the country depicts a high attrition rate of 
administrations. Under Jonathan, ethno-religious violence reached its highest peak. In Uganda, 
Museveni contends to hold on to power having been in office since 1986; his term has been on a 
steady decline.  Both governments, from introduction to confirmation of the anti-gay laws, were 
experiencing (and continue to experience) high levels of political volatility.    
ii) There is also an element of cascading of anti-gay laws and gender conservative law making on the 
continent. Since Uganda and Nigeria announced its process of intensifying the laws criminalising 
homosexuality, other countries (Gambia, Ethiopia and Chad) have started to buckle down on the 
issue and announce plans of modifying existing laws to be stricter on enforcement.  
iii) Religion in these cases provides a socio-political adhesive and effective nationalism tool. Both 
Uganda and Nigeria have deep connections with Christian Evangelical right-wing groups and in the 
                                                          
37 Consider graph on African public forum attitudes on homosexuality in section 7.3 
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case of Nigeria, a large Muslim population- that had a direct impact on the prominence and 
misinformation around the anti-homosexuality laws.   
iv) It becomes progressively more important to appeal to mass nation-building narratives, morality 
politics in this particular period as well as retention of ‘African’ culture and tradition, which have 
been proving effective in congregating around issues of commonality. Leaders that are able to 
effectively retain traditional African values, thus rejecting western values (that are understood to be 
to the peril of African populations); are considered strong, bold, and anti-imperialist. 
8.5 Recommendations 
Power relations are imbedded with hierarchical and stratified systems; this is true of state-craft 
globally. Gender is no different, inequality; oppression and domination do not exist in a vacuum they 
exist because of socialised and institutionalised gender stratification where the echelons are clearly 
defined and static. To propose a step by step emancipation process further prolongs the efforts 
towards emancipation. In other words, when NGOs large and small that deal with gender 
emancipation issues claim ‘we are not a gay rights organisation’ as if oppression against gender 
minorities exists in a vacuum and fall into a different category-it takes the whole gender 
emancipation movement, steps back.  
The need for the realisation of common struggle is necessary in activism as well as development 
work. This is not with the aim of seeking legitimation but with the understanding that these forms of 
repression affect the whole population, but more so those at the bottom of the hierarchy.  This is not 
a ‘gay’ problem; it is a problem that all feminists, human rights activists and gender development 
workers should be concerned with.  
There is also a need for stronger transnational networks of gender activism. In a strictly literal and 
sense, the term transnational feminism points to the multiplicity of the world’s feminisms and to the 
increasing tendency of national feminisms to politicize women’s issues beyond the borders of the 
nation state, for instance The Civil Society Coalition for Human Rights and Constitutional Law in 
Uganda called for a number of responses before and after the law was signed by the president. 
Among the responses they called for was a recall of United States, European and other ambassadors 
from the country. This meant travel bans for politicians, religious leaders and other public figures 
who support the law. They asked the international community to engage the African Union and the 
leadership of other African nations such as Rwanda and South Africa to speak out against the law 
and the discrimination of sexual and gender minorities (Ugandans4Rights, 2014). Additionally, 
activism specifically by the LGBTI groups is very important as without these groups especially in the 
U.S very little progress in rights achievements would have been made.  
Incremental strategic legislative advocacy, has been seen as a way in which oppressive laws have can 
be quelled. The appeal of this approach is that it deals with governments on the same level of the 
law. Supporting a legislative advocacy approach by building the capacity of the activists on the 
ground in African countires on the same and assisting in establishing the grounds in which this can 
be done is one other response to the increased intolerance by the states towards the LGBTI 
community. An example of this is the Ugandan annulment of the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 by 
the Ugandan Constitutional Court. The case of Prof. J Oloka-‐Onyango & 9 Others v. Attorney 
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General (Petition No.8 of 2014) contained claims of the breach of parliamentary Rules of Procedure 
through the absence of quorum at the passing of the bill as well as the violations of the bill of the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom from discrimination and from cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment, rights to privacy among others. At the time the paper was written, only the ground of 
quorum was ruled on (CSCHRCL Press Statement, 2014). 
Lastly, large multinational corporations form a significant part of Africa’s economy and investment 
pool.  These corporations usually have non-discrimination clauses in their policies and in most cases 
these clauses include non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and 
expression. Activists at the domestic level and the international community can push these multi-
national corporations and foreign embassies to speak out publicly about the negative effects of these 
laws.  
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9. CONCLUSION 
The nexus of political strategic interests and political subject salience is unavoidable for analysis in the 
deconstruction of legislative decisions. The issue of homosexuality began increasing in legal and political 
rhetoric from 2000s onwards and 2014 was the year that (so far) has witnessed the most legal reversion 
and attention of the issue in Africa. The fact that both the laws received immense domestic public 
support certainly has an effect on the current administration and are thus in the political interests of very 
specific stakeholders; the government and its official supporters.  
Firstly, looking at the origins of this kind of legislature; British colonial rule-the only explanatory value 
is in the attempt to restructure discursive formations around the narratives and identities of sexual 
minorities and definitions of gender roles that colonialism regulated in Africa. The exercise of strict state 
control on sexuality was introduced by European colonial powers. This is clear when one compares 
sexuality narratives in pre-colonial Africa, colonial Africa and post-colonial Africa. The commonality of 
the tools of governmentality and subjectivity -power and control of sexual politics, is introduced during 
the colonial period and sustained after it. This is the significance that lies in the origins of anti-
homosexuality laws.   
From the issue of Western importation of homosexuality the issue of Western importation of 
homophobia can be extracted. Both cases have been funded and virulently supported by U.S Christian 
Right Wing advocates and in both cases the governments detest external international imposition through 
what has been dubbed a fight against neo-colonialism, claiming that homosexuality is being imported 
into African countries. This latter irony is not to be misjudged and should also not be interpreted as 
African leaders simply being used as pawns in Western culture wars. There is agency, autonomy and 
sovereignty in African states and their leadership. This means that state leaders are strategically selecting 
from a basket of issues, those that will gain prominence from those that will not.  
Secondly the language of nationalism is a common thread in both cases and all homophobic rhetoric 
regionally to explain the need for regulation of homosexual conduct and activism. Markers such as 
traditions, religion, and family and to a large extent national identity have become seminal in motivating 
this form of legislation. Therefore what emerges is a constant ebb and flow of the attempt to retain these 
national identifiers as reactive measures to external imposition, project them onto the general public as 
such and produce widely accepted laws against a small, defenceless minority. This dialectic process 
between these governments and what they consider to be external imposition also functions to buttress an 
administration’s commitment to representing and protecting the national public. The reason the external 
imposition of Western religious factions is more palatable is because morality politics is concomitant 
with the prevailing nation-building rhetoric in these countries and also because of the stronghold of 
Christian evangelism and its rapid growth in Africa. 
The resultant cultural violence that stems from this form of sanctioned exclusion of people relates to 
many historical collective acts of violence. A feminist analysis of policy making around gender 
minorities in states, links the violent and destructive manifestations of modern statecraft with the 
persistence of patriarchy, in all its perversity. It approaches authoritarianism in a manner that draws on 
the insights of gender activists, human rights advocates and LGBTI factions, building on work that 
begins to explore the complex resonances and dissonances that occur between subjectivities and politics, 
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between the individual and the collective. It offers a powerful rethinking of national identity, and opens 
up possibilities for imagining radically different communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 | P a g e  
 
REFERENCE LIST 
Amadiume, I. (1990) Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society, 
St. Martin’s Press. 
Amnesty International (20 January 2015), “Gambia” retrieved from 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/gambia 
Anti-Pornography Act, 2014  
Aolain, F. and Hamilton, M. (2009) “Gender and the Rule of Law in Transitional Societies” for 
University of Ulster: Transitional Justice Institute, Research Paper No. 09-02 
Arndt, S. The Dynamics of African Feminism: Defining and Classifying African Feminist 
Literatures. In Africa World P, 2002. 234 pp 
AWID (Association for Women’s Rights and Development), (2014) “Civil Society 
Organisations Commend the African Commission’s Resolution Condemning Violence Based 
On Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity” 
BBC News, 4 February 2010 ‘Obama condemns anti-gay bill as odious’, retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8498836.stm 
Bevacqua, M. (2000). Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the Politics of Sexual Assault. 
UPNE. 
Brockington, D. (2006). COVARIANCE. In V. Jupp (Ed.), the SAGE Dictionary of Social 
Research Methods. (pp. 47-48). London, England: SAGE Publications, Ltd 
Bulbeck, C. (1998). Re-Orienting Western Feminisms: Women's Diversity in a Postcolonial 
World, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Burroway, J. (2009) Slouching Toward Kampala: Uganda’s Deadly Embrace of Hate in The 
Box Bulletin. http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/slouching-toward-kampala 
Butler, Judith (1999). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and 
London: Routledge 
Charlesworth, H. (1994) “What are ‘Women’s International Human Rights’?” in Cook, R.J. (Ed), 
Human Rights of Women, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 
Chikwudi Eze, E. (2005) African Philosophy: an Anthology, Blackwell Pubkishers 
Chua-Eoan, H. Rick Warren denounces Uganda’s anti-gay law, 10 December 2009, retrieved 
from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1946921,00.html, 
Cornwall, A. (2009) “Sexuality and the Development Industry” in Society for International 
Development 1011-6370/09 
Enloe, C. (1990) Bananas, Beaches and Bases, University of California Press 
Enloe, C. (2004), III "‘Gender’ is not enough: the need for a feminist consciousness". 
International Affairs, 80: 95–97. 
Fox, N. (2008) “INDUCTION” in the SAGE Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research, SAGE 
Publications  
77 | P a g e  
 
Fukuyama, F. “Women and the Evolution of World Politics” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5 
(Sep-Oct., 1999), pp.24-40. Council on Foreign Relations 
George A. L. and Bennett, A. (1997) “Process Tracing in Case Study Research” in MacArthur 
Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods retrieved from 
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm 
George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Gettleman, J. (2010) “Americans’ Role Seen in Uganda Anti-Gay Push”, in New York Times, 
retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/africa/04uganda.html?_r=0 
Girard, R. (1987) Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World,  Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 
Grossman, G. (2013) Renewalist Christianity, Political Competition and the Political Saliency 
of Lgbts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political Competition and the Political Saliency of Lgbts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (April 12, 2013). 
Hendricks, C. (2011) Gender and Security in Africa,  Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Upsala  
Hoffman, J. (2001)  Blind Alley: Defining Feminism, Blackwell Publishers, POLITICS: VOL 
21(3), 193–199 
Human Rights Watch, (20 May 2014) “Anti-Homosexuality Act’s Heavy Toll” retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/uganda-anti-homosexuality-act-s-heavy-toll 
Ibhawoh, B. (2000). Between culture and constitution: Evaluating the cultural legitimacy of 
human rights in the African State. Human Rights Quarterly, 22(3), 838-860. 
International Spectrum, (n.d) “LGBT Terms and Definitions” by University of Michigan, 
retrieved from http://internationalspectrum.umich.edu/life/definitions 
Jones, B. (2005) ‘The Church in the Village, the Village in the Church: Pentecostalism in 
Teso, Uganda’ in Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 45(178):497–517 
Jupille, j., Caporaso, J.A. and Checkel. J.T. (2003). “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, 
Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union.” Comparative Political Studies 36 
Jurist (2014) “Kenya president signs polygamy bill into law” retrieved from 
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/kenya-president-signs-polygamy-bill-into-law.php 
Kaoma, K. (2009). Globalizing the Culture Wars: US Conservatives, African Churches, & 
Homophobia in Political Research Associates. 
Karimi, L.  And Thompson, T. ( 2014) http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/24/world/africa/uganda-
anti-gay-bill/ 
Kennedy, M. ‘Desmond Tutu condemns Uganda's proposed new anti-gay law’, in The 
Guardian (23 February 2014) retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/desmond-tutu-condemns-uganda-proposed-
anti-gay-law 
78 | P a g e  
 
Krolokke, C., & Sorensen, A. S. (2006). Gender communication theories and analyses: From 
silence to performance (No. 50), Sage 
Kumari, J. (1986). Feminism and nationalism in the Third World (Rev. Ed.). New Delhi: Kali for 
Women.   
Lenhert, M. (2007) “Typologies in Social Inquiry” in Gschwend & Schimmelfennig (Eds) 
Research design in political science: how to practice what they preach (Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 62-82 
McFadden, P, “Sexual Pleasure as Feminist Choice”, Feminist Africa Changing Culture Issue 2, 
2003    
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S. (2013) “Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing 
is bad for International Relations” European Journal of International Relations 19(3) 427–457 
Mekgwe, P. (2008). Theorizing African Feminism (s). African feminisms, 11. 
Mgadmi, M. (2009) ‘Black Women’s Identity: Stereotypes, Respectability and Passionlessness 
(1890-1930)’, La Revue LISA/ LISA e-journal, Vol. VII n°1 / 2009 : 
<http://www.unicaen.fr/mrsh/anglais/lisa>. ISSN 1762-6153 
Mohanty, C. T. (1988). Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. 
Feminist review, 61-88. 
Morgan, J. “Gay Uganda’s plea: ‘Don’t cut aid, you’ll make it worse’” in Gay Star News (26 
February 2014) retrieved from http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/gay-ugandas-plea-dont-cut-
aid-youll-make-it-worse260214 
Msibi, T. (2011) “The lies we have been told: On (homo) sexuality in Africa”, in Africa Today, 
58(1), 54-77. 
Museveni, H.E. Jubilee Speech, 09 October 2012, retrieved from 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/mobile/Detail.aspx?NewsID=636251&CatID=4 
Mutua, M. (Ed.). (2009). Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions. 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Nagengast, C. (1997). Women, minorities, and indigenous peoples: Universalism and cultural 
relativity. Journal of Anthropological Research, 53, 349-370. 
Nnaemeka, O. (2004). Nego‐feminism: Theorizing, practicing, and pruning Africa’s way. Signs, 
29(2), 357-385. 
Nossiter, A. (2014). Nigeria Tries to ‘Sanitize’ Itself of Gays. Retrieved on 2014-05-13 from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/world/africa/nigeria-uses-law-and-whipto-sanitize-
gays.html?_r=0 
O’Flaherty, M., & Fisher, J. (2008). Sexual orientation, gender identity and international human 
rights law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles. Human Rights Law Review, 8(2), 207-248. 
Obidimma, A. and Obidimma, E. “The Travails of Same-Sex Marriage Relation under Nigerian 
Law” in Journal of Law, Policy and Globalizatio, Vol.17, 2013   
79 | P a g e  
 
Oloka-Onyango, J., & Tamale, S. (1995). " The Personal is Political," or Why Women's Rights 
are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism. Human Rights 
Quarterly, 17(4), 691-731. 
Tamale, S. (14 October 2009) Speech at Makerere University, A Human Rights Impact 
Assessment of the Ugandan Anti-homosexuality Bill 2009 
Pew Research Center, (2013) The Global Divide on Homosexuality, retrieved from 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/ 
Political Research Associates (PRA) (n.d), A Growing Threat to Basic Human Rights, retrieved 
from http://www.publiceye.org/christian_right/exporting.html 
Rao, A. in  Peters, J. and Wolper, A. (1995) Women's Rights, Human Rights: International 
Feminist Perspectives, New York: Routledge 
Reiley, N. (2007) ‘Cosmopolitan Feminism and Human Rights’ in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy 22 (4): 180–198 
Sadgrove, J., Vanderbeck, R. M., Anderson, J., Valentine, G. and Ward, K. (2012) “Morality 
plays and money matters: towards a situated understanding of the politics of homosexuality in 
Uganda” in The Journal of Modern African Studies / Volume 50 / Issue 01 / pp 103 – 129 
Scheinert, J. (2014). This Is How America Should Respond When the President of Gambia Calls 
Gay People Ungodly Vermin. Retrieved from 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/02/24/gambian_president_calls_gays_ungodly_vermin_
how_america_should_respond.html 
Sharlet, J. (2008). The Family: Power, Politics and Fundamentalism's Shadow Elite. Univ. of 
Queensland Press. 
Stewart, C. (2015) 76 Crimes retrieved from http://76crimes.com/ 
Stoddart, H. (9 January 2015) “Why gay rights is a development issue in Africa, and aid agencies 
should speak up”, Oxfam, retrieved from http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/why-gay-rights-is-a-
development-issue-in-africa-and-aid-agencies-should-speak-up/ 
Sylvester, C. (1989) ‘Looking at the Field through Feminist Lenses' in Sylvester C. and Pirages, 
D. Transformations in the Global Political Economy (London: Macmillan, forthcoming) 
Sylvester, C. (1997) “Feminism and International Relations: or Encounters with Wolves in the 
Woods”, in Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 100(1) 
Tamale, S. (2013). Confronting the Politics of Nonconforming Sexualities in Africa. African 
Studies Review, 56(02), 31-45. 
The Week, (2014) “Everything you need to know about Africa's anti-gay crackdown” 
http://theweek.com/article/index/258826/everything-you-need-to-know-about-africas-anti-gay-
crackdown#axzz34RAY5div 
Throckmorton, W. ‘American Anti-Gay Campaign in Africa Opposes’ Fictitious Sexual 
Rights’ in Religion Dispatches, 17 April 2012 retrieved from 
http://religiondispatches.org/american-anti-gay-campaign-in-africa-opposes-fictitious-sexual-
rights/ 
80 | P a g e  
 
Tickner, J. A. (1999) “Why Women can't Run the World: International Politics According to 
Francis Fukuyama” in International Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers 
Tickner, J. A., (2001) Gendering World Politics, Colombia Press 
Tolley J. H. (1989). Popular sovereignty and international law: ICJ strategies for human rights 
standard setting. Human Rights Quarterly, 11, 561-585 
Tong, R. (1997). Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction. London: Routledge. 
Toubia, N. (1995). Female genital mutilation: a call for global action. 
Van Evera, S. (1997) Guide for Students of Political Science, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Webb, J. (24 December 2012) 
Welby,J. (2014)  Archbishops recall commitment to pastoral care and friendship for all, 
regardless of sexual orientation,  retrieved from 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/5237/archbishops-recall-commitment-to-
pastoral-care-and-friendship-for-all-regardless-of-sexual-orientati 
Willis, E. (1984). Radical feminism and feminist radicalism. Social Text, 91-118. 
Youngs, G. (2004). Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women 
and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’live in*. International Affairs, 80(1), 75-
87. 
Amnesty International (2009) Nigeria: ‘Same Gender Marriage (Prohibition) Bill 2008’ violates 
Constitution- A memorandum to be included in the House of Representatives public 
hearing on 11 March 2009 available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/007/2009/en/1c317e71-56e6-4399-9936-
0f668fa73057/afr440072009en.pdf 
 
Changing Attitudes Nigeria (2011) New Bill prohibiting same-sex marriage placed before 
Nigerian Parliament available at http://changingattitude.org.uk/archives/4443# 
 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999, as amended) available at 
www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/files/download/43 
Esebonu, C. (2009) Nigeria: Huriwa Advocates Speedy Passage of Same-Sex Bill in All 
Africa, retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200903180824.html 
 
Idris, H. (2009) Nigeria: Cleric Chides House Committee for Listening to Homosexuals in All 
Africa, retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200903160271.html 
 
Human Rights Watch (2007) Nigeria: Anti-Gay Bill Threatens Democratic Reforms available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/02/27/nigeria-anti-gay-bill-threatens-democratic-reforms 
81 | P a g e  
 
Human Rights Watch (2009) Global Rights and Human Rights Watch Statement to the 
Nigerian National Assembly on the Same Gender Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/11/human-rights-organizations-respond-nigeria-same-
gender-bill-national-assembly-hearin 
Human Rights Watch (2011) Joint Memorandum to the Government of Nigeria: ‘Same Gender 
Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, 2011’ violates Constitution available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/joint-memorandum-government-nigeria-same-gender-
marriage-prohibition-bill-2011-viola 
Kaleidoscope Trust Briefing (2014) Nigeria: Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill 2013 available 
at http://kaleidoscopetrust.com/usr/library/documents/main/2014-02-nigeria.pdf 
Nsehe, M. (2011) “Obama Fights Nigerian Anti-Gay Bill, Threatens To Cut Off Aid”, Forbes, 
retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2011/12/09/obama-fights-nigerian-
anti-gay-bill-threatens-to-cut-off-aid/ 
 Obidimma, A. and Obidimma, E. “The Travails of Same-Sex Marriage Relation under Nigerian 
Law” in Journal of Law, Policy and Globalizatio, Vol.17, 2013 
White, C. M. (2012) “Human Rights and the Impact of Criminalization: Legalizing Homophobia in 
Jamaica, Nigeria, and Uganda” for the International Criminal Law AWR Paper 
All Africa, Uganda Kill the Gays Bill: Ugandan Activists Confirm Death Penalty Not Removed, 
ALL AFRICA NEWS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201211290868.html 
Atuhaire, (2014) ‘NRM Postpones Annual Retreat to Discuss Anti Gay Bill’, In Uganda Radio 
Network https://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=59811 
Biryabarema, E.  Uganda Says Wants to Pass Anti-Gay Law as “Christmas Gift”, REUTERS 
(Nov. 13,2012, 12:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/13/us-uganda-
homosexualityidUSBRE8AC0V720121113 
Burroway, J. Slouching Toward Kampala: Uganda’s Deadly Embrace of Hate in The Box 
Bulletin. http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/slouching-toward-kampala 
Bwire, J. (1 August 2014) “Government to Petition Court Over Anti-Gay Law Ruling” Sunday 
monitor. Retrieved 30 November 2014. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Government-to-
petition-court-over-anti-gay-law-ruling/-/688334/2405248/-/3linyez/-/index.html 
CSCHRCL Press Statement, (2014) ‘Civil Society Press Stateent on Annulment of Anti 
Homosexuality Act on African Women’s Development Fund: http://www.awdf.org/civil-society-
coalition-statement-on-annulment-of-ugandan-anti-homosexuality-act/ 
CSCHRCL, 2014 onUgandans4Rights http://www.ugandans4rights.org/index.php/press-
releases/429-legality-of-anti-homosexuality-act-challenged-in-constitutional-court-by-an-
unprecedented-coalition-of-petitioners-injunction-against-enforcement-sought.html 
Bwire, J. (1 August 2014). "Government to petition court over anti-gay law ruling". Saturday 
Monitor. Retrieved1 August 2014. 
The Anti-Homosexuality Bill, Bill No. 18 of 2009, Bills Supplement to the Uganda Gazette No. 
47 Volume CII, 25th September 2009. 
82 | P a g e  
 
BBC News (23 November 2009) ‘Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Bill: MPs drop death penalty’, 23 
November 2013,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20463887. 
Day, E. (2011), 'Why was I born gay in Africa?' in The Guardian, retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/27/uganda-gay-lesbian-immigration-asylum 
Hansard, Hon. Buturo MP, 15 April 2009, 3.30 p.m. 
Hansard, Hon. Katende MP, 16 April 2009, 5.58 p.m. 
Hansard, Hon. Kasaija MP, 21 April 2009, 5.50 p.m. 
Hansard, Hon. Kamya MP, 1 April 2009, 3.29 p.m. 
Hansard, Hon. Ssekandi MP (Speaker), 4 March 2009, 5.55 p.m 
Hansard, Hon. Sebaggala MP, 1 April 2009, 3.08 p.m. 
Jjuuko, A., & Tumwesige, F. (2013). The Implications of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2009 on 
Uganda's Legal System. 
Johnson, P. (2014) 
Kaaya, S. K. and Kakaire, S. (2013) ‘Anti-Gay Bill: How MPs Outfoxed NRM, Donors’, The 
Observer, 22 December 2013, http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=29272:anti-gay-bill-how-mps-outfoxed-nrm-donors 
Demetri Levantis, Gay Ugandan Flees to New Zealand Over Death Threats, GAY STAR NEWS 
(July 2, 2012), http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/gay-ugandanflees-new-zealand-over-death-
threats020712 
Ministry of Health Scientific Statement on Homosexuality, 2014 on Ugandans4Rights 
NRM Caucus Report 2014, on Ugandans4Rights retrieved from 
http://www.ugandans4rights.org/index.php/the-news/427-the-president-signs-the-anti-
homosexuality-bill-into-law-after-scientific-reports-apparently-prooved-to-him-that-homosexuals-
are-made-not-born.html 
Nyanzi, S. (2014) “The Paradoxical Geopolitics of Recriminalizing Homosexuality in Presidential 
Press Unit, ‘President to sign anti-gay bill after experts prove there is no connection between 
biology and being gay’ sourced from Ugandans4Rights, 
http://www.ugandans4rights.org/attachments/article/427/Presidential_Press_Unit_Press_Realease.
pdf 
Sadgrove, J, Vanderbeck, R. M, Andersson, J. Valentine, G. and Ward, K. (2012) ‘Morality 
Plays and Money Matters: Towards A Situated Understanding of the Politics of Homosexuality in 
Uganda’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50, 103–129. 
Olupot, M. and Musoke, C. (2010) ‘Museveni Warns NRM on Homo Bill’, The New Vision, 12 
January 2010 
Pew Research Center (2013) “Global Divide on Homosexuality” 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Homosexuality-Report-FINAL-
JUNE-4-2013.pdf 
83 | P a g e  
 
Rice, X. “Uganda Considers Death Sentence for Gay Sex Before Parliament”, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
29, 2009) retrieved formhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/29/uganda-death-sentence-
gay-sex 
Tamale, S. (2009) “A Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Ugandan Anti-homosexuality Bill 
2009”, The Equal Rights Review, Vol. Four (2009) 
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 
UGOM (Uganda Gay on Move), (2014) http://ugandagayonmove.nl/ ; 
https://www.facebook.com/UgandaGayOnMove/posts/694378740606892 
Jjuuko, A. (2008) Aren’t These Emperors Naked? Revealing the Nexus Between Culture, and 
Human Rights over the Issue of Homosexuality in Uganda, LLB dissertation, Makerere University, 
Uganda 
Mundi Index (2011), Uganda Demographics Profile 2014, retrieved from 
http://www.indexmundi.com/uganda/demographics_profile.html 
Faupel, J. (1962) African Holocaust: The Story of the Uganda Martyrs. New York: P.J. 
Kennedy. 
Southwold, M. (1973) "The Baganda of Central Uganda" in Molnos, A. ed. Cultural 
Source Materials for Population Planning in East Africa: Beliefs and Practices. Nairobi: 
East African Publishing House. 
Murray, S. O., & Roscoe, W. (1998). Boy-wives and female-husbands: Studies in African 
homosexualities. 
Driberg, J. 1923. The Lango. London: Thorner Coryndon. 
Mushanga, M. (1973), ‘The Nkole of Southwestern Uganda’ in Molnos, A. (ed.), Cultural 
Sources Materials for Population Planning in East Africa: Briefs and Practices  
Tamale, S. (2003) “Out of the Closet: Unveiling Sexuality Discourses in Uganda” in Feminist 
Africa, Issue 2 (Changing Cultures) Cape Town: African Gender Institute 
Alexander, J., & Wallace, D. (2009). The queer turn in composition studies: Reviewing and 
assessing an emerging scholarship. College Composition and Communication, 61(1), 300-320. 
Rubenstein, M. (2004) An Anglican Crisis of Comparison: Intersections of Race, Gender, and 
Religious Authority, with Particular Reference to the Church of Nigeria. Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 72(2):341–365 
 
Ungar, M. (2000). State violence and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (lgbt) rights. New 
Political Science, 22(1), 61-75. 
Foucault, M. “Governmentality.” in Burchill, et al. 87-104. “Gays Tortured in Albania.” 
Outlines (November 1994): 8 
 
Otto, D. (2010). Power and danger: Feminist engagement with international law through the 
UN Security Council. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 32(1), 97-121. 
 
84 | P a g e  
 
Janet, H. Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism Princeton University 
Press New Jersey 2006 p 29– 
32. 
 
 Adam, B. D., Duyvendak, J. W. and Krouwel, A. (1999). The global emergence of gay and 
lesbian politics: national imprints of a worldwide movement, Edited by: Adam, B. D., 
Duyvendak, J. W. and Krouwel, A. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Altman, D. (2001) Global Sex, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Binnie, J. (2004) The Globalization of Sexuality, London: Sage 
 
Kollman, K., & Waites, M. (2009). The global politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender human rights: An introduction. Contemporary Politics, 15(1), 1-17. 
Heinze, E. (1995) Sexual Orientation – A Human Right: An Essay on International Human 
Rights Law  
Wintemute, R. (1995) Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: The United States Constitution, 
the European Convention, and the Canadian Charter (1995). 
U.N. H.R.C., Views of the Human Rights Committee in Toonen v. Australia, Communication 
No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/ C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (hereinafter “Toonen v. Australia”)  
Amnesty International, Breaking the Silence: Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual 
Orientation (1994) 
Gross, A. (2013). Post/colonial queer globalisation and international human rights: images of 
LGBT rights in Jindal Global Law Review, 4(2). 
Uganda, The Anti-Pornography Act, 2014 available at http://www.ug-
cert.ug/files/downloads/The-Anti-pornography-act-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 | P a g e  
 
ADDENDUM 1 
 
 
Research Question:  
What are the factors leading to an increase in 
repressive policy making for gender minorities in 
Africa between the years 2006 and 2014?  
 
Independent Variables (IV):  
1. National Impacts 
2. Regional Impacts 
3. International Impacts 
 
Method of Inquiry: 
Inductive: theory creation that looks at 
the interaction between phenomena 
with the aim of coming up with a 
generalizable theory.  
 
Operationalization of IV: 
1. Change in political systems or 
leadership in: a) Uganda; b) Nigeria 
2. Impact of: a) Regional rhetoric 
around gender minorities; b) Presence 
of other gender repressive laws 
passed in other parts of the continent 
3. Impact of: a) Christian Right Wing 
evangelism; b) International human 
rights advocacy  
 
 
Conditions for Case Selection: 
1. Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 
2. Same-Sex (Prohibition) Act 2014 
Criteria for case selection:  
Case selection was framed by the outcome 
and dependent variable, then variance on the 
independent variable was used to achieve 
falsifiability. In this case selection the cases 
have varied profiles but the same outcome. 
  
 
Causal Mechanisms: 
Co-variance will be used as a method 
of causality. This is a condition where 
two processes vary together which can 
also be understood as an association 
or correlation between the two 
variables. The way that this correlation 
is determined will depend on the 
measures or indicators specified 
through operationalization. 
 
Dependent Variables: 
Passing of the gender 
repressive, anti-homosexuality 
laws.  
 
Knowledge Gain: 
The gaps within feminist literature that the study aims to fill are answering the question of 
political salience of the increase in criminalisation of homosexuality. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
A map showing the religious divide between the north and south regions of 
Nigeria, with the Muslim north in blue and the Christian south in green.  
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ADDENDUM 3 
 
 
  
 
